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ABSTRACT
Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era
by
Álvaro Eduardo de Prat
Advisor: Kenneth Paul Erickson
Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era, is an
interdisciplinary exploration of Venezuela’s politics and its consequences during the Chavista
years. On a concrete level, in this thesis I propose how the very manner in which Hugo Chávez
implemented his at first apparently benign redistributive politics could do nothing but precipitate
what I will argue are the times of starkest inequality in modern Venezuelan history, as well as its
current humanitarian crisis. Integral to this, although on a more philosophical level, here I also
offer a theory of how and why Chávez’s representations might have been so misinterpreted.
The list of eminent political thinkers who have vouched for Hugo Chávez’s “socialism”
is puzzling; the damage that they have caused by ignoring the counterevidence and discarding
even the most radically progressive and honest of Chávez’s critics as “neo-conservatives” has
been profound. It has served only the most undemocratic extremes of the Manichean divide that
Chávez contrived to consolidate his “neo-totalitarianism,” and today to the general discredit of
the Left in the continent, perhaps for decades to come. The above notwithstanding, although I
intend to show how Chávez and his successors have made of Venezuela one of the most unequal
countries in the planet in the material domain of its economy, essential to Marxism, I will also
present in what ways, in the theater of appearances of the political, Chávez was the first Latin
American politician in the neoliberal era who could effectively articulate for its dēmos that there
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could never be true democracy with rampant poverty. For while he empowered “the people” in
the end only symbolically, Chávez showed his spectators how they were players of their play.
This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, both inspired by and
including the full series of ten interviews—eight of which were hours-long conversations—that I
conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and intellectuals of its government
and opposition during 2013. I offer brief summaries of all ten interviews (of roughly 1,200 words
each) as an appendix due to their prescience and historical value, but the limitations of space for
this master’s thesis, as well as the time elapsed, has forced me to refocus instead on my own
interdisciplinary explorations. However, without those conversations this thesis would not exist.
Among my interviewees, there were two former ministers: the first, vice-Secretary of the
Presidency during Chávez’s first term and later Minister of Culture until 2011; the second, a
former vice-minister of Health. There were two former presidential candidates: one, a legendary
guerrilla leader during the 60s, founder of the Venezuelan party “MIR,” and prolific writer; the
other, Venezuela’s highest vote-getter to Congress in 2010. But I also interviewed some wellknown intellectuals: historians, journalists, and political analysts, as well as the heads of leading
public and private institutions, such as the then director of both the National Center of History
and the National Archive; the then President of the UNT—the largest trade-union organization in
Venezuela—; and the former Dean of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello—President of the
“Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus in Latin America,” as well as the
chief research coordinator of PROVEA, one of the country’s most prominent HR organizations.
The first and more theoretical chapter of this thesis studies what populism, neo-populism,
and rentierism are and how they operate. It also explains the ways in which Chavismo fits and
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exceeds these categories. In this chapter’s first half, we consider works from the Argentinian
post-Marxist theorist Ernesto Laclau to the Mexican philosopher Ernesto Dussel, the political
theorist Benjamin Arditi, the comparativist Kenneth Erickson, and other specialists for their
“political science” understandings. The second half incorporates the French Marxist theorist Guy
Debord, the Russian philosopher Mikhail Backhtin, and several experts in cultural and literary
studies for what I offer as my first original contribution in this text: it is both a psychological and
literary deconstruction of Chávez’s myth and his “Aló Presidente” program in a baroque key.
The second, more sociological chapter, presents Venezuela’s gruesome off-the-charts
statistics, albeit focusing on its homicide rates—Caracas has been the “world’s homicide capital”
since 2015, and Venezuela has the second highest murder rate worldwide. While the first chapter
considers the magic of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” this one deals with its realities, its darkest
side. In it, I establish the link between those statistics and the systematic dismantling of the
country’s institutions, and proceed to discard alternative explanations. Since the country’s
institutional meltdown is common knowledge in Venezuela, this chapter’s contribution is to have
linked that reality to the country’s collapse in general, and to present it to the American public.
The last chapter analyses the prior statistics from the point of view of economics and
income inequality, to propose how Chavismo’s “socialism” might have turned Venezuela into
one of the world’s most unequal countries. Because the search for social equality is what brings
together all socialisms from their most democratic to their totalitarian forms, at least rhetorically,
I consider these findings as my third original contribution to the text. In the concluding section, a
journalistic postscript, I present a sequence of the political events after the constitutional coup
d’état, on March of 2017, and of the ensuing crimes against humanity to repress street protests.
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PREFACE
This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, inspired by but also including a
series of ten interviews that I conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and
intellectuals of its government and opposition during 2013. For making that initial stage possible, I
owe a special debt of gratitude to some very dear people, both at the City College of New York’s
Division of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Venezuela. Before concluding a Master’s in the Study
of the Americas at the CCNY, I traveled to Venezuela under the auspices of that program with a
superb recommendation letter from the division’s dean, Dr. Juan Carlos Mercado, written at the
instigation of my professor and former mentor of undergraduate studies at the CUNY BA, Martin
Woessner, and of my former professor Alessandra Benedicty, then director of that M.A program.
Without their constant encouragement during that summer to pursue my “independent studies” this
thesis would not exist. However, in its present form this work would not be possible either without
a course I took under Professor Carlos Aguasaco to complete that master’s upon my return from
Venezuela. The first chapter of this text incorporates many ideas of my final paper for his course.
I lived in Venezuela most of my adult life and know personally two of my interviewees.
Guillermo Cerceau, a dear lifelong friend, facilitated another three of my interviews. The rest of
notable intellectuals and political figures granted me interviews thanks to the good offices of María
Elena Ramos and Ricardo Martínez. I dedicate this thesis to María Elena and Ricardo not because
they made those interviews possible (nor because Ricardo later helped me transcribe those rather
long conversations that ran into many hours of tape) but because they are my mother and stepdad,
and with them I have had many of the most fruitful discussions about Venezuelan politics ever.
Regarding the preparation of this thesis as part of my requirements to obtain a Master’s in
Liberal Studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, I would like to thank
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Professor David Halle for his course, “Global Cities.” His classes as much as his books inspired
me to venture into the domains of sociology and statistics to develop this thesis’ down-to-earth
second chapter, and with that a new approach. I also want to specially thank the economist Branko
Milanovic, whose writings and course, “Within-National Inequalities: From Pareto to Piketty,”
both sparked and helped me articulate this thesis’ third chapter, which I see as one of its original
contributions. I express my gratitude to Professor Tomohisa Hattori for an important addition I had
to make in the first chapter to help clarify Hugo Chávez’s rise to power, and to Professor David
Gordon for important reflections during our long conversations about the left-right controversy.
Before graduating summa cum laude at the CUNY Baccalaureate for Interdisciplinary
Studies, I was granted the opportunity to study over half a dozen courses at the graduate level. One
of the Ph.D. courses I studied, at the Graduate Center, in 2011, was with Professor Kenneth Paul
Erickson. Near the end of this second master’s I had the opportunity to take a second course under
Professor Erickson, but already in 2011 I knew that Ken was then, and would continue to be for
many years to come, one of the very few professors who I would ever want as my thesis’ tutor.
Indeed, everything in this thesis that has transcended my affinity for “debater’s phrasings”
and my bent to write “a mystery story,” as Ken puts it, as well as my lack of rigor to “define all
key concepts” and to provide documentation to “support every claim,” is due to him. But thanks
also to his dedication I have made innumerable additions to this text that have both enriched it and
made it clearer. What I could not fully incorporate after so much caring advice is only my fault.
Finally, I want to thank my dear friend Alex Wieder for translating into English the many
interview excerpts and citations in Spanish that I have used in this text. Without Alex’s generous
offer when I was just too burnt-out to translate anything, and without the intellectual support and
inspiration from my wife, Ivonne, and my daughter, Camille, I could not have finished this work.
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Introduction
At first, I thought that Chávez’s failed coup d’état was right wing.
Then I realized that there was no coup that was not right wing.
Manuel Caballero
Socialism is the equivalent of developing the productive forces, because a socialism
that impoverishes them would be a step backwards in the name of social charity.
Américo Martín
Already in my first academic paper in the United States, entitled “The Sleep of Reason Produces
Monsters”—for my first B.A. course at the City College of New York, in the summer of 2009—,
I dealt with a subject that bothered me as the most intriguing and vexing contradiction: How was
it possible that Hugo Chávez’s government in Venezuela was almost universally perceived as a
leftist administration, both by its population and in major academic circles overseas?1 Cui bono:
“to whose benefit” was this, admittedly not so obvious, misrepresentation of the facts? The
Italian philosopher of law and political sciences and historian of political thought, Norberto
Bobbio, tells us in his now classic, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction:
One of the most significant achievements of the socialist movements, which for a century
have been and are still, for the moment at least, identified with the left, is the recognition
of social rights alongside libertarian rights […] There is an element which typifies the
doctrines and movements which are called and are universally recognized as left-wing,
and that element is egalitarianism, by which we mean a tendency to praise that which
makes people more equal rather than that which makes people less equal. 2

1

“The Sleep of Reason” is Goya’s best known print from his masterful series “Los caprichos.”
All the scholars mentioned below have affirmed at some point Chavismo’s democratic spirit.
Thus, like them, by “left wing” I imply its democratic variations. But all left wing and “socialist”
ideologies share one trait, at least rhetorically: the search of egalitarianism and social equality.
2
Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 70-71
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And, in his Political Economy: A Comparative Approach, the political economist Barry
Clark also explains how “leftists claim that human development flourishes when individuals
engage in cooperative, mutually respectful relations that can thrive only when excessive
differences in status, power, and wealth are eliminated.”3 While, for him, “rightists claim that
hierarchical social relations are essential to a good society. A society lacking sufficient hierarchy
will fail to provide incentives for citizens to excel, resulting in a stifling mediocrity, dragging the
entire society into economic stagnation, boredom, and apathy.”4 In any case, Bobbio clarifies:
It was pure accident that the names given to the two political poles were ‘left’ and ‘right.’
As is well known, the use of these two words goes back to the French Revolution, at least
as far as national politics are concerned. It is an extremely banal spatial metaphor, whose
origin was pure chance, and whose sole function was to name the dichotomy which has
prevailed in politics for two centuries, [but it] has prevailed because it is essential. 5
On a concrete level, in the following pages I propose how the specific manner in which
Chávez implemented his at first apparently benign redistributive politics could do nothing but
precipitate what I will argue are the times of starkest inequality in modern Venezuelan history.
Integral to this, albeit on a more philosophical level, here I will offer as well a theory of why and
how Chávez’s representations might have been so misinterpreted. In his translator’s introduction
to Jacques Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics, the philosopher Gabriel Rockhill observes:
[For Rancière] the essence of politics consists in interrupting the distribution of the
sensible by supplementing it with those who have no part in the perceptual coordinates of
the community, thereby modifying the very aesthetico-political field of possibility […]
Those [without] name, who remain invisible and inaudible, can only penetrate the police

3

Barry Clark, Political Economy: A Comparative Approach (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
1998), 34.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid., 33

3
order via a mode of subjectivization that transforms the aesthetic coordinates of the
community by implementing the universal presupposition of politics: we are all equal.6
Whereas I argue how Chávez and his successors have made of Venezuela one of the most
unequal countries in the planet in the material domain of its economy, essential to Marxism, here
I also propose in what manner, in the theater of appearances of the political, Chávez was the first
Latin American politician in the neoliberal era who could effectively articulate for its dēmos that
there could never be true democracy with rampant poverty. While empowering “the people” in
the end only symbolically, Chávez “showed his spectators how they were players of their play.”7
From extraordinary internationally renowned thinkers, such as the Nobel Prize economist
Joseph Stiglitz, Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky, and Gianni Vattimo, to intellectuals—only in the
United States—like NYU’s History Professor Greg Grandin; Pomona College’s historian and
political analyst Miguel Tinker Salas; economist, writer, and activist Michael Albert, or Drexel
University’s political theorist George Ciccariello-Maher, the list of political thinkers who have
vouched for Hugo Chávez’s “socialism” is puzzling.8 In Europe, we could add to this group the
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Jacques, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (New York: Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2004), 3. For Rancière, “Subjectivization” is the process by
which a political subject extracts itself from the dominant categories of identification and
classification; and “the police” “is an organizational system of coordinates that establishes a
distribution of the sensible or a law that divides the community into groups, social positions, and
functions. This law implicitly separates those who take part from those who are excluded.” Ibid.
aesthetic division between the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, the sayable
and the unsayable.
7
As we will read later in thist text, a very appropiate sentence paraphrased from Issac V. Joslin,
“Baroque and Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa: The Aesthetic Embodiment of
Unreason” (Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the University of Minnesota, 2010), 211.
8
Just to name a few books relevant in U.S. academia: the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo’s
(with Santiago Zabala) Hermeneutic Communism: from Heidegger to Marx (2011); Steve
Ellner’s Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon (2008);
Miguel Tinker Salas’ Venezuela, What Everyone Needs to Know (2014), and his The Enduring
Legacy: Oil, Culture, and Society in Venezuela (2009); George Ciccariello-Maher’s We Created
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enormously influential circle around the former editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diplomatique from
1991 to 2008, Ignacio Ramonet. The list only grows exponentially in Latin America and the
“Third World.” But the damage that many of these thinkers have unwittingly caused by ignoring
the counterevidence and discarding even the most radically progressive and honest of Chávez’s
critics as “neo-conservatives” has been profound.9 It has served only the most undemocratic
extremes of the Manichean divide that Chávez contrived to consolidate his “neo-totalitarianism,”
and today to the general discredit of the Left in the continent, perhaps for decades to come. In
reality, as the Mexican historian and political writer Enrique Krauze already described in 2008:
La Revolución bolivariana es ante todo un fenómeno mediático posmoderno en el que un
solo hombre, Hugo Chávez (el teleevangelista político más extraordinario que ha nacido
en América Latina), actúa el papel de revolucionario heroico frente a una multitud de
sinceros adeptos a su mensaje mesiánico […] El teleevangelista es militar y ha salido de
compras para comprar armas, cada vez más armas. El teleevangelista es dueño del
petróleo y reparte dinero, mucho dinero. El teleevangelista es propietario privado de la
presidencia venezolana. El teleevangelista, en suma, puede salir de las pantallas y hacer,
en un acto de “realismo mágico”, su “real gana”. Es un monarca absoluto.10
Paraphrasing my epigraph by the notable left-wing Venezuelan historian, essayist, and
journalist, Manuel Caballero: There is no political televangelist who is not right wing either.11
Indeed, long before 2005, when Chávez proclaimed his “Socialismo del Siglo XXI” at the Fifth
Chávez: A People's History of the Venezuelan Revolution (2013). Also, see Greg Grandin and
Michael Albert’s related articles and interviews, and those of Slavoj Žižek and Noam Chomsky.
9
Showing that counterevidence from an interdisciplinary perspective is one of this thesis’s goals.
10
The Bolivarian revolution is, first and foremost, a post-modern media phenomenon in which
one man alone, Hugo Chávez (the most extraordinary [political*] televangelist born in Latin
America) plays the role of a heroic revolutionary before a crowd of sincere followers of his
messianic message […] The televangelist is a military and has gone shopping to buy arms, more
and more arms. The televangelist is the owner of the oil and distributes money, lots of money.
The televangelist is the private owner of the Venezuelan presidency. The televangelist, in short,
can come out of the screens and perform, in an act of “magical realism” “whatever he wants.” He
is an absolute monarch. Enrique Krauze: El poder y el delirio (Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2008), 62
11
*On “televangelism” as transcending the original connotation used in the U.S. to encompass as
well any televised form of politics with strong messianic components that addresses a group of
“elect” vs. the reject, see the interviews’ excerpts quoted on pages 15 and 16 and my comments.
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World Social Forum, in Brazil, he founded his Movimiento Revolucionario “Bolivariano” 200 in
1982, with which he planned and executed his failed military coup in 1992. And only much later,
after 1997 through its decade-long transformation into the Movimiento V República, he would
create the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela in March of 2007. For as Carl Schmitt cleverly
observed nearly a century ago, in his “The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy:” “Until now the
democracy of mankind and parliamentarism has only once been contemptuously pushed aside
through the conscious appeal to myth. And that was an example of the irrational power of the
national myth.”12 But Chávez did not need to say, like Mussolini, “We have created a myth, this
myth is a belief, a noble enthusiasm […] the great nation which we want to make into a reality
for ourselves.”13 In his new and exuberant iconography, he created a foundational tale: the “Tree
with the Three Roots,” which reminded us of how Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution
had been inspired by the lives and spirits of Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and Ezequiel
Zamora.14 Instead, he settled for renaming the country “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela:”
Audazmente hemos tratado de buscar un punto de referencia original y autóctono, de un
modelo ideológico que pudiese ser cohesionado en torno al planteamiento bolivariano,
zamorano y de Rodríguez […] Somos un movimiento revolucionario, un movimiento
popular a favor de la causa de los dominados de este país y de este planeta.”15
12

Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1985
[1923]), 75
13
Ibid., 76
14
Simón Bolívar was the Venezuelan soldier and statesman who led the independence wars
against the Spanish Empire that established Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia, and
Panamá as independent states. Simón Rodríguez was Bolívar’s tutor and mentor; Ezequiel
Zamora was a legendary caudillo in the 19th century (See more about this on pages 12 and 13).
15“We

have boldly tried to search for an original, indigenous reference point, of an ideological
model that might fit around the premise of Bolívar, Zamora and Rodríguez… We are a
revolutionary movement. A popular movement working on behalf of the subjugated of this
country and this planet.” Cristina Marcano y Alberto Barrera-Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin
uniforme. Una historia personal (Caracas: Ramdom House Mondadori, 2004), 154.

6
Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era, is an
interdisciplinary exploration of Venezuela’s politics and its consequences during the Chavista
years. This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, both inspired by but also
including the full series of ten interviews—eight of which were hours-long conversations—that I
conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and intellectuals of its government
and opposition during 2013.16 However, the vertiginous political, economic, and social changes
that started to unravel in the country in February of 2014, shortly after my interviews, and later
personal circumstances that led me to pursue this M.A. in Liberal Studies with a specialty in
International Studies, rather than my envisioned Ph.D., complicated that project.17 Still, I offer
brief summaries of all ten interviews (of roughly 1,200 words each) as an appendix due to their
16

Those conversations lasted from nearly fifty minutes in one case to over three hours on two
occasions. Among my interviewees, there were two former ministers: the first, vice-Secretary of
the Presidency during Chávez’s first term and later Minister of Culture until 2011; the second, a
former vice-minister of Health. There were two former presidential candidates: one, a legendary
guerrilla leader during the 60s, founder of the Venezuelan party “MIR,” and prolific writer; the
other, Venezuela’s highest vote-getter to Congress in 2010, later impeached, in 2014, after coleading the movement “The Way Out,” which capitalized from and further promoted massive
student protests on the streets since February of that year. I was also able to interview some wellknown intellectuals: historians, journalists, and political analysts, and some heads of leading
public and private institutions. Among them were the then director of both the National Center of
History and the National Archive; the then President of the UNT—the largest trade-union in
Venezuela—; the former Dean of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello—and President of the
“Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus in Latin America”—; and the chief
research coordinator of PROVEA, one of the country’s most prominent HR organizations.
17

In February of 2014, La salida—translated by the international press as “The Exit,” but rather
meaning “The Way Out” (as in “the only way out”)—, was a spontaneous wave of massive
student protests that had started in January of that year in the city of Mérida, after the murder of
Héctor Moreno, a student of the Universidad de los Andes – Mérida, that spread to the rest of the
country after a second student was nearly raped in February in the city of San Cristóbal, at the
Universidad de los Andes – Táchira. On February 12th,, three important leaders of the opposition:
at the time Caracas’s Mayor, Antonio Ledezma, popular former presidential candidate Leopoldo
López, and Member of Congress María Corina Machado (one of my interviewees) helped
organize that movement as a national protest to oust Nicolás Maduro’s government. The drastic
fall in oil prices later that year has ended by submerging Venezuela in a humanitarian crisis.

7
prescience and historical value, but the limitations of space for this Master’s thesis, as well as the
time elapsed, has forced me to refocus instead on my own interdisciplinary explorations. The
above notwithstanding, without those conversations this thesis would not exist; there are multiple
quotations of those interviews interspersed in the text for a more encompassing understanding.18
During the past few years alone, I have read literally thousands of articles and several dozen
books related to Venezuela and its circumstances. Only to mention a fraction of representative
books just by the Venezuelan left: Teodoro Petkoff’s El chavismo como problema (2010), El
socialismo irreal (2007), and Las dos izquierdas (2005); Manuel Caballero’s La peste militar.
Escritos polémicos (2007); and my interviewees’ Margarita López Maya’s (who proclaimed the
official discourse for Hugo Chávez’s ratification before the National Assembly, in 2004), Del
Viernes Negro al Referendo Revocatorio (2005); Américo Martín’s Huracán sobre el Caribe
(2013) and Socialismo del siglo XXI. ¿Huida hacia el laberinto? (2007); and Rafael Uzcátegui’s
La revolución como espectáculo (2010). In fact, from the majority of my interviewees who are
prolific writers, I have read many of the texts they have published (and from the few who are not,
most of their testimonies). A bibliography of some fifty books by Venezuelan authors from its
full political spectrum and by international experts on the subject is offered at the end of this
thesis. But, as with my now remote first paper, beyond all the interviews, books, articles, and
interactions, it is my passion as a knowledgeable Venezuelan that has vitally motivated and
informed this work. I write this thesis as an engaged observer as much as a dedicated scholar.
The first and more theoretical chapter of this thesis involves a general study of what
populism and neo-populism (and rentierism) are, and how they operate. It also explains the ways

18

Translations in footnotes of the original excerpts and citations in Spanish by Alex Wieder.
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in which Chavismo fits and exceeds these categories. In its first half, we consider works from the
Argentinian post-Marxist theorist Ernesto Laclau to the Mexican philosopher Ernesto Dussel, the
political theorist Benjamin Arditi, the comparativist Kenneth Erickson, and other specialists for
their “political science” understandings. The second half incorporates the French Marxist theorist
Guy Debord, the Russian philosopher Mikhail Backhtin, and other experts in cultural and literary
studies for what I consider to be this thesis’ first original contribution: it is a psychological and
literary deconstruction of Chávez’s myth and his “Aló Presidente” program in a baroque key.
The second, more sociological chapter, presents Venezuela’s gruesome off-the-charts
statistics, albeit focusing on its homicide rates—Caracas has been the “world’s homicide capital”
since 2015, and Venezuela has the second highest murder rate worldwide. While the first chapter
considers the magic of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” this one deals with its realities, indeed its
darkest side. In it, I establish the link between those statistics and the systematic dismantling of
the country’s institutions, and proceed to discard alternative explanations. Since the country’s
institutional meltdown is common knowledge in Venezuela, this chapter’s contribution is to have
linked that reality to the country’s collapse in general, and to present it to the American public.
The last chapter analyses the prior statistics from the point of view of economics, and
specifically of income inequality, to propose how Chavismo’s “socialism” has turned Venezuela
into one of the world’s most unequal countries. Because the search for social equality is what
brings together all socialisms from their most democratic to their totalitarian forms, at least
rhetorically, I see these findings as my third original contribution. In the concluding section, a
journalistic postscript, I offer a sequence of the political events after the constitutional coup
d’état, on March of 2017, and of the ensuing crimes against humanity to repress street protests.

9
La Cuarta República: Venezuelan democracy in crisis before Chávez’s rise to power
Two introductory sections seem essential before we start considering our explorations. The first
involves a brief account of the institutional crisis that led to the social explosion of 1989, known
as El Caracazo, and to the two failed coups d’état in 1992, the first of them led by Lieutenant
Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías together with other field and junior officers. This historical narrative
is crucial to understand important aspects that in my opinion explain the perfect timing, acumen,
and naturalness with which Chávez started to be perceived as a “Bolivarian socialist” during the
neoliberal period. The second segment deals with the subject of Venezuela’s exceptionalism.
Contrary to all of Latin America except for Costa Rica, Venezuela lived decades of
representative politics—and remarkable social achievements—from the late 1950s to the early
1980s, until the infamous “Black Friday” that wrecked the country on February 18 of 1983 (La
Salida, El Caracazo, and Chávez’s coup also occurred in a February).19 The region’s most stable
and widely accepted currency since the 1930s lost over half of its value that day. During the next
decade, the Bolívar’s unstoppable downward spiral and the geometrically increased corruption
due to the mix of a sudden and unprecedented scarcity and new currency exchange controls, all
but severed the democratic channels that a vertiginously impoverishing population had once
19

Not to make an overstatement, many political analysts consider that Colombia and Mexico
should also be included as imperfect democracies during this period, but this author disagrees.
Venezuela’s “Black Friday” happened on February 18 of 1983 due to massive capital flights of
U.S. dollars, mostly from corporate sectors (estimated at US$90 billion) that started to occur in
1981 as a consequence of declining oil prices after the Islamic Revolution in Iran cut production,
making oil prices peak in 1979. With the Central Bank devoid of foreign exchange reserves, that
day banks did not open their doors, and the government of President Luis Herrera Campins was
forced to devalue the Venezuelan currency by 100% and soon after to impose exchange controls.
For more about Venezuela’s “Black Friday,” see Ramón Santiago, “On the Anniversary of Black
Friday: Venezuela’s Devaluation and Inflation Debacle from 1983 to 1998,” Axis of Logic,
February 18, 2008: http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_26069.shtml
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enjoyed with its representatives. The IMF’s neoliberal “adjustment program” further deepened
the population’s protests and despair. However, alternative channels of expression started to fill
that vacuum: groups of students and intellectuals, more attuned and nimble new (and renewed)
socialist parties, HR NGOs, communal organizations, the media, the Church, and of course the
military: Hugo Chávez rode that tsunami. Once on the shore, he carefully started to adjust his
uniform. Few of those civilian groups kept leverage after El Comandante Chávez’s second year
in power. And only in 2005, after those groups had been either tossed or absorbed into Chávez’s
militias, he proclaimed his Socialismo del Siglo XXI at the Fifth World Social Forum, in Brazil. 20
But a second set of events catapulted Chávez to enter the presidential elections of 1998
and win the country’s presidency. And it was the series of incidents, or rather of extraordinary
blunders, that led to his early release from prison a mere two years after his unsuccessful coup
against then President Carlos Andres Pérez, when Chávez briefly appeared on national TV to
proclaim his celebrated “Por ahora” allocution (“Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the
objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved”); there, he personally assumed
responsibility for the coup and asked his comrades to lay down their arms.21 After spending two
years in jail, Chávez received a “pardon” from Carlos Andrés Pérez’s nemesis—and then newly
reelected President—Rafael Caldera.22 Caldera had been one of the original signatories of the
Pacto de Punto Fijo (the Punto Fijo Pact, named after Caldera’s house, where it was signed) that
had consolidated the two-party system of representative politics forty years earlier. The pact was
20

Term coined by Heinz Dietrich, first used by Chávez in 2005 at the Fifth World Social Forum.
Hugo Chávez, “Por Ahora,” with English captions, archive of February 4, 1992, YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKcoFPsoKLU For a full analysis, see Christopher Conway,
“Hugo Chávez and Bolivarian Nationalism,” in Christopher Conway\’s Research Page:
https://christopherconway.wordpress.com/hugo-chavez-and-bolivar/
22
Popularly called a “presidential pardon,” it was rather a dismissal with prejudice of the case
decided from Rafael Caldera’s Presidency. In fact, Chávez’s trial was still pending at the time.
21
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signed by Rómulo Betancourt, the founder of Pérez’s own party, Acción Democrática, Rafael
Caldera for his party, COPEI, and an important political figure who was never to achieve the
presidency, Jóvito Villalba, for his party, URD. In the aftermath of Chávez’s coup, Caldera gave
some polemic declarations justifying the “painful and deplorable incident of the military revolt”
that infused with new life his long declining political career: “We cannot ask people to immolate
themselves for freedom and democracy, when freedom and democracy are not able to feed them
[…] Democracy cannot exist if the people are hungry.”23 Those words gained him the people’s
trust to become the country’s president for a second term after having tried for two decades; he
also promised to pardon the coup plotters should he be elected.24 At a time when the Venezuelan
people had become disenchanted with the two-party “partidocracia” (indeed, the shrewd Caldera
disavowed the party he founded to run and win as an independent), Chávez’s release from jail—
and some gross miscalculations by those parties during the next election, further weakened after
Caldera’s victory—opened the gates for Chávez to become the next Venezuelan president.25
According to Michael Coppedge’s “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela:”
Partyarchy helped channel this moral outrage into a rejection of AD and COPEI at the
polls. The downside to being so much in control for so many years is that everyone
knows whom to blame when things go wrong. (Of course, voters could have blamed the
IMF or oil buyers, but they were not on the ballot.) […] When the oil economy went bust,
the middle class shrank and working-class unions lost membership and clout. The
political culture became less moderate and more radical. Venezuelans withdrew some

23

Kajsa Norman, A Hero’s Curse. The Perpetual Liberation of Venezuela (London: Hurst &
Company, 2017), iv
24
Carlos Eduardo Guerra, “¿Quién es el culpable? ¿Indulto o Sobreseimiento?” Wordpress, Jan
26, 2013: https://carloseguerraa.wordpress.com/2013/01/26/quien-es-el-culpable-indulto-osobreseimiento/
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support for the regime and the moderate parties, and turned instead to leftist parties and
an immoderate, intransigent, and intolerant politician—Hugo Chávez Frías.26

But Venezuela’s exceptionalism is not only due to its oil riches, or to Simón Bolívar’s feats in
the continent to liberate six countries from the Spanish monarchy and help cement with his
writings the bases for modern Latin American republicanism. Venezuela also had the largest
civil devastation during the Independence wars (a third of its population died).27 And, following
its Independence, it suffered 166 caudillo insurrections during half a century of wars that left
between 400,000 and one million casualties, depending on the source.28 According to Steve
Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, two scholars who vouch for Chavismo’s socialism, those events
“nearly decimated the established aristocracy,” which contributed to the country’s “having
greater social mobility than its socially stratified neighbors […] a high degree of miscegenation
and [a lack of] the legal structures of [social] separation evident elsewhere in Latin America.”29
Venezuela is the only country in Ibero-America never to have fought a war against a neighboring
nation. And, together with Costa Rica, it was the only Latin American nation not to fall under
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Michael Doppage, “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through Nested
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some form of dictatorship or civil war from the late 1950s until the early 2000s. Indeed, as the
Venezuelan political scientist Andrés Stambouli points out in his book, La política extraviada:
No logramos la democracia porque tuvimos petróleo, más bien, los logros democráticos
son producto de la artesanía política dirigida a confeccionar una comunidad política,
utilizando al petróleo para tal fin […] Venezuela pudo evitar, durante los años sesenta y
los setenta, la ola militar autoritaria de la América Latina, no porque dispusiera del
petróleo sino por el uso que le dio el liderazgo político social, en función de los fines
democráticos compartidos. Venezuela dispuso de petróleo desde principios de siglo, pero
de una democracia en proceso de permanente consolidación solo a partir de 1958.30
Today, together with Cuba, Venezuela is the only country in Latin America under a
hybrid military-civilian regime. In fact, after Chávez’s death, Venezuela has transitioned to a
unique military takeover: the most exceptional in the Americas.31 In a country where, as Ellner
and Tinker Salas explain, “its protracted democratic stability after 1958 appeared to differentiate
the nation from the military dictatorships that dominated Latin America from the 1950s through
the 1980s,” in the following pages we will examine an era of exceptions of a different kind.32

30

“We did not achieve democracy because we had oil; the democratic achievements are rather
the product of a political craftsmanship aimed at creating a political community that used oil to
such end [...] During the sixties and seventies, Venezuela was able to avoid the authoritarian
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First Chapter
I. Populism, Neo-Populism, and Paradoxes of the Chavista Era
The root of the spectacle is that oldest of all social specializations, the specialization
of power. The spectacle plays the specialized role of speaking in the name of all
the other activities. It is hierarchical society’s ambassador to itself, delivering
its messages at a court where no one else is allowed to speak. The most
modern aspect of the spectacle is thus also the most archaic.
Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle
Form is the limiting principle by which a thing is itself.
R. P. Blackmur
To understand the Hugo Chávez phenomenon, as well as the appalling deterioration of
Chavismo and his successors after his death, a panoramic view of classical populism and of
“neo-populism”—the later tellingly so-called only after the Washington Consensus—will help us
elucidate in what ways Chavismo became the emblematic embodiment of neo-populism, the
implications of the reemergence of populist politics in many parts of our world upon the seeming
shortcomings of liberal democracy, and the ways in which Chávez and his successors are at once
representative of neo-populist traits and unique to the Venezuelan experience. Besides, when
confronted with what according to most poststructuralist analysts is the false binary of liberal
democracy and neo-populist politics, such an analysis will help us decipher how, more than an
articulatory form (Ernesto Laclau), or an internal periphery of democracy (Benjamin Arditi),
Chávez’s radical takeover of the country through his baroque televised revolution marked a
departure from traditional political forms, both liberal and populist, not as a hybrid, either, but
rather as a mutation: a crude but clear manifestation of a detour in the unfolding of democracy.
In the introduction to their Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, the
political scientists and editors Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson argue that “the
reemergence of populism as part of the discussion of contemporary politics in Latin America is,
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for the most part, a product of the regime and persona of Hugo Chávez;”33 For his part, Francisco
Panizza, a senior lecturer in Latin American politics at the London School of Economics and
Political Science as well as a prolific analyst on the subject of populism, adds in his “What Do
We Mean When We Talk About Populism?” “If the political conflict in Venezuela in the 1990s
and 2000s had been defined only by struggles about the distributions of oil rents, it is unlikely
that it would have led to such a radical rupture of the political order as seen in the Bolivarian
Revolution.”34 Similarly, the Ecuadorian politician, scholar, and political analyst César Montúfar
concludes in his “Rafael Correa and his Plebiscitary Citizen Revolution” that our current populist
radical regimes do not see themselves as “another government, subject to democratic alternation,
but as a new political regime that will endure over time, opening a new epoch.”35 One of my
interviewees, the historian Luis Pellicer, at the time President of Venezuela's Archivo General de
la Nación and President in charge of the Centro Nacional de Historia, explained it this way:
Te lo digo con Tucídides y con Manuel Briceño Guerrero: Hay hombres que empalman
su corazón con el corazón colectivo y las circunstancias históricas para lograr grandes
hazañas y grandes hechos. Si esos hombres siguen vivos en la memoria del colectivo, en
el corazón del colectivo, su legado logrará perpetuarse. Lo que llamamos aquí corazón
es la afectividad y el raciocinio. Eso fue Bolívar y eso debe ser Chávez para nosotros.36
If this paean may seem like a radical statement coming from the acting director of two of
Venezuela’s most important historical institutions, Chavismo’s messianic reality has been the
cause of much consternation as well as of considerable curiosity for many of its opponents. One
33

Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arson, Ed. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First
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of my interviewees, Luis Ugalde, s.j.. President of the “Association of Universities Entrusted to
the Society of Jesus in Latin America,” author of numerous books and essays on the subject, and
member of the Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, sees this as a motive of great concern:
Chávez, con su magia comunicacional, con su audacia verbal y con su condición militar
encarnadora del poder de imposición armada, resultó para muchos ideal para castigar a
los que traicionaron al pueblo y colmar las esperanzas de éste. [Un problema con esto]
es la ilusión mesiánica de que hay acceso a la felicidad por la vía de creer en el mesías
político, fértil en imaginación y promesas, pero anti modelo en la responsabilidad de
gestión pública, eficiente, honesta. […] Uno de los daños mayores que hemos heredado
es que el mesías no creía en la democracia y sobre todo descalificaba a todos los que no
fueran seguidores y dóciles a él. Sin reconocimiento desde el Estado de la dignidad y
razón de los que opinan de otra manera, no es posible la democracia.37
But Rafael Uzcátegui, the Chief Research Coordinator of PROVEA (Venezuelan
Program of Education-Action on Human Rights), one of Venezuela's most prominent Human
Rights NGOs, author of Venezuela, Revolution as Spectacle, and other works, and coeditor of the
only anarchist publication in the country, told me something that in part inspired this chapter’s
second half. A critic both of the government and of the traditional opposition, he wondered:
Una cosa en la que he estado pensando mucho […] es en todos los elementos subjetivos,
carismáticos, de la relación de Chávez con la gente. Yo creo que eso faltó. En el libro
[above] había mucha racionalidad, un análisis profundo, una necesidad de racionalizar
mucho el análisis para dar un primer elemento, pero creo que faltó explicar toda esa
sintonía que tenía con los sectores populares por una serie de sincretismos religiosos,
carismáticos, esa construcción de una nueva religiosidad popular llamada chavismo.38
“With his communicational magic, his verbal audacity, and military condition that embodied
the power of armed imposition, Chávez was ideal, for many, to punish those who betrayed the
people, and thus to sate their hope. [A problem with this] is the messianic illusion that there is
access to happiness through the belief in this political messiah, fertile with imagination and
promises, but an anti-model with regards to efficient, honest, public policy responsibility […]
One of the greatest harms we have inherited is that the messiah did not believe in democracy
and, above all, disqualified all who weren't followers and docile to him. Without the State's
recognition of the dignity and reason of those who think differently, democracy is not possible.”
38 “Something I've been thinking about a lot […] is all the subjective, charismatic elements of
Chávez's relationship with the people. I believe that that was missing. In the book there was
much rationality, a profound analysis, a need to overly rationalize the analysis in order to provide
37
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After offering an analysis of what populism and neo-populism are—and are not—to ask
whether Chavismo has inaugurated a new political category, in the second part of this chapter I
suggest that to understand Chavismo’s seismic repercussions in the continent we must transcend
the strictly political and inquire into what gave form to the revolution that made Chávez a major
protagonist in contemporary history: the style and meaning of his relatively neglected and often
derided media government from the “Aló Presidente” program. Only through its conduit could
Chávez impress his “politics,” first by re-presenting and progressively by molding Venezuela’s
mass culture. Indeed, as his fervent admirer and remarkably successful new kid on the “populist”
block, Spain’s Podemos party’s Pablo Iglesias, explains: “En el año 2012, el 90% de un discurso
político es un dispositivo audiovisual, el 95% de un liderazgo es un dispositivo audiovisual.”39

Following the Argentinian post-Marxist political theorist Ernesto Laclau, most political analysts
explain neo-populism today variously (and aptly, but insufficiently) as a “mode of articulation.”
Rather than exploring the contents of populist discourses or offering us a functionalist analysis,
Laclau tells us: “a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual
contents identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those
contents—whatever those contents are.” 40 Thus, to intend the paradoxical goal of more fully
encompassing a subject that can only be comprehended by “the isolation of smaller units than the
group, and the consideration of the social logic of their articulation,” Laclau invites us to see in
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the distinct demands of the multiple collective wills the social building blocks that must be thus
articulated.41 In his essay, “Whats’s In a Name?” we find the three structural elements that will
link these demands to understand (neo) populism: “equivalential chains,” an “internal frontier,”
and “empty (or floating) signifiers.” For Laclau, “a social situation in which demands tend to
reaggregate themselves on the negative basis that they all remain unsatisfied is the first
precondition of that mode of political articulation that we call populism.”42 He explains:
A logic of equivalence (is) one in which all the demands tend to reaggregate themselves,
forming what we will call an equivalential chain of reivindicaciones [“demands,” where]
each demand presents its own claim as only one among a large set of social claims […]
The subject of a demand conceived as differential particularity we will call a democratic
subject. In the other case the subject will be wider, for its subjectivity will result from the
equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands. A subject constituted on
the basis of this logic we will call a popular subject […] A situation in which a plurality
of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb
them differentially co-exist, creates the condition leading to a populist rupture.43
However, if a popular subject emerges through equivalential chains, there can still be no
popular subjectivity “without the creation of an ‘internal frontier’ [because] the equivalences are
only such in terms of a lack pervading them all. Equivalential popular discourses divide the
social into two camps:” the power block and the people.44 But a fourth “articulatory surface” is
still missing from our compound articulation: the “empty” and/or “floating” signifier.45 For the
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hegemony of one symbolic signifier over the rest can only be achieved by the populist
production of tendentially empty signifiers: “As their function is to bring to equivalential
homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to the
minimum their particularistic content.”46 Hence, for Laclau, populism is a mode of discourse
made of empty or floating hegemonic signifiers that symbolically link a diversity of unsatisfied
demands in equivalential chains by creating an internal frontier (a culpable other). And I would
add: thus molding, while assuming its shape, the popular subject that it purports to embody.
Two advantages of this formula are that it can be equally applied to the neo-populism of
the extreme right and of the radical left and to the full spectrum between them. And, as I will
propose here, that by putting an emphasis on its “articulatory” logic, this formula immediately
refers us to its enhancing prosthesis: the mass media. This is what sets neo-populism apart as a
mutation. Intuitively copying Guy Debord’s third thesis, early in his mandate, Chávez discovered
that “The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as society itself, as a part of society, and as a
means of unification. […] But due to the very fact that this sector is separate […] the unification
it achieves is nothing but an official language of universal separation.”47 This is strikingly similar
to how the political analyst Joseph Lowndes describes the populism of George Wallace, the
segregationist 45th Governor of Alabama: “hegemonic movements all require some illusion of
complete commonality—a particularity that comes to stand for the general—as well as foes
against which to forge that commonality.”48 Right or left, the formula makes no difference.
But if most poststructuralist definitions of neo-populism differ considerably from more
classical explanations of populism (perhaps obviously, for they are distinct political phenomena
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regardless or their similarities), both interpretations, as well as their traits in common and those
where they stand apart, will help us identify where Chavismo stands as a political phenomenon.
Of classical populism, Kenneth Erickson, the co-editor-in-chief of the Journal of Comparative
Politics, says that: “Nationalism, stemming from political and economic dependence, marks all
populist movements.”49 And “At best, Latin American populist movements reflect what Theodor
Geiger defined (in contradistinction to ideologies) as mentalities, i.e., non-codified ways of
thinking and feeling which are more emotional than rational.”50 We could argue how both
nationalism and a “non-codified way of thinking” function as structural equivalents of Laclau’s
internal frontiers and “empty signifiers.” But, for Erickson, these traits also help explain that:
Populist movements, because they seek a social base in the lower class, and their rhetoric
emphasizes economic nationalism, state enterprise, and equitable distribution of food and
services, are sometimes confused with socialist ones. This is a fundamental
misunderstanding. Unlike socialism, populism fails to address itself to two important
aspects of production […] Because populist movements lack a comprehensive ideology,
they see workers merely as consumers and thus focus mainly on distributing food and
services to them […] Second, their exclusive focus on distribution leads them to neglect
the saving and investment necessary to create the food and services, [failing] everywhere
to emphasize the necessity to create enduring political institutions to safeguard the just
society they seek to establish […] Hope for social justice rests instead with a hero-figure
who will create with one blow the just society. Even if a savior could work such wonders,
however, no political institutions would exist to ensure their preservation.51
Although Erickson’s paper was written a full quarter century before Chávez’s first
government, it brings together what I believe is the central confounding aspect of Chavismo
(thanks to its rhetoric) and accurately describes the country’s maladies today. I address those
realities in detail in the following two chapters, but specifically as to Chavismo’s trait of treating
49
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“workers merely as consumers,” contrary to any socialism, that was, interestingly, a critique of
several of my interviewees regardless of political affiliations. I will only quote three of them.
Tulio Hernández, arguably one of the handful of most influential intellectuals for the
opposition (self-exiled in Spain in June of 2017 due to public threats of incarceration received
from the Venezuelan president), a sociologist expert in culture, communication, and politics, as
well as an international consultant for cultural and urban politics, explained it to me this way:
Lo único nuevo fueron las misiones que hacían sentir a la gente que se les estaba
prestando atención directa, pero la verdadera gran inclusión fue la redistribución del
ingreso que permitió que mucha gente se incorporara al consumo, sobre todo al consumo
de determinados bienes eléctricos, electrónicos, del hogar, y al consumo de ropas de
marcas y al consumo globalizado. Esa inclusión a través del mercado es realmente la
única transformación profunda porque, a juzgar por el aparato económico, esto es un
capitalismo de estado con un mercado tradicional de sociedades mono-productoras.52
But José León Uzcátegui, a former Health Vice Minister and at the time Carabobo State’s
Director of Misión Barrio Adentro (the government’s flagship social welfare program, with over
7,000 centers nationwide that provide healthcare in poor communities), with an M.A. in Oil
Economy, an M.D in Psychiatry, and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences, diagnosed a similar problem:
En la gente está la idea del “buen vivir” antes de saber que viene de los aimara o de los
quechuas.53 Solo que el buen vivir en el lenguaje oficial -de nuevo, allí creo que el
comandante supremo en esa parte no lo leyó bien- se convirtió en algo tan simple como
que con una tarjeta de crédito podían adquirir electrodomésticos, colmar los mercados

“Las misiones (missions) were the only new thing that made people feel they were getting
direct attention. But the true great inclusion was the re-distribution of income, which allowed
many to join consumption, especially the consumption of certain electric, electronic home goods,
and the consumption of brand-name fashion and general consumption. This inclusion through the
market is really the only profound transformation because, judging by the economic apparatus,
this is state capitalism with the traditional market of single-commodity producing societies.”
53
“Rooted in the indigenous belief system of the Quechua, “sumak kawsay,” the Quechua word
for “buen vivir,” or “good living,” connotes a harmonious collective development that conceives
of the individual within the context of the social and cultural communities and his or her natural
environment.” It is in the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia. Adapted from Wikipedia:
“Sumak Kawsay:” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sumak_Kawsay
52
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bicentenarios, más equipos de aire acondicionado, más lavadoras, con lo cual de paso el
problema eléctrico se hace mayor. Y vivir mejor así es lo contrario del buen vivir.54
While for his part, Luis Ugalde, who has been accused from each extreme of the political
spectrum in Venezuela of being, respectively, a communist and a CIA agent, had this to say:
Esta demagogia lleva a despreciar la educación de calidad, el profesionalismo y la
eficiencia productiva, a nombrar incompetentes, siempre que sean incondicionales
políticamente. Crea además la ilusión y el deseo de acceder al consumo abundante de
bienes superiores importados sin pasar por la producción de los mismos o de los
equivalentes, que se transan en el mercado. Cuesta salir de la ilusión de que en
Venezuela se puede dar la revolución del consumo sin la revolución de la producción.55
However, there are several features of Chavismo that do not match classical populism’s
traits. According to the former consultant for the Argentinian Ministry of Social Development,
Hector E. Schamis, the main defining characteristics of classical urban-industrial populism are:
“movement, proindustrialization, multiclass, urban, inclusionary, reformist and redistributive,
corporatist, nationalist, and a charismatic leader.”56 Chávez’s movement, which never was
“proindustrialization,” “multiclass,” or “corporatist” (and “urban” only inasmuch as 90% of the
country’s population already lived in its cities), displays just half of classical populism’s traits.57
Following, we explain why Chavismo has been anything but multiclass and corporatist; and
54

“People have this notion of what ‘good living’ is before realizing that it originates from the
Aymara or the Quechua. Except that in the official language—and, again, I believe that the
supreme commander didn't quite ‘get’ that part—it became something as simple as the ability to
acquire home appliances, stock the Bicentenario supermarkets, get more air conditioners, more
washing machines, with a credit card, which, in turn, exacerbates the electrical problem. And
living better this way is the opposite of ‘good living.’ ”
55 “This demagoguery leads to contempt for quality education, professionalism and productive
efficiency, to the naming of incompetent individuals as long as they're politically unconditional.
It also creates the illusion and the desire for access to abundant consumption of superior,
imported goods foregoing the production of similar or equivalent products traded in the market.
It is difficult to leave behind the illusion that the revolution of consumption can take place
without a revolution of production in Venezuela.”
56
De la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 151
57
Editorial, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/urban-populationwb-data.html
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Chavismo’s most solid constituency is not in the urban slums but in the smaller cities, towns and
hamlets in the countryside (populations that during the past eighteen years have progressively
become consumers of highly subsidized imported goods). And regarding “proindustrialization,”
after in fact decimating the country’s private industry and laying waste its farm land, its civilianmilitary ruling caste has been fabulously enriching itself under the euphemism of an Alianza
Cívico-Militar Bolivariana that sucks its oil and sacks the country by having also become its de
facto trading elite.58 Felipe Pérez, for instance, former minister of planning under Chávez’s first
government, recently denounced the regular theft of 80% of the imported food managed by the
military.59 Yet, during Chávez’s first presidential campaign, one of his most powerful arguments
was that it was a disgrace that in Venezuela nearly half of the goods consumed were imported.
But eighteen years later the country must import nearly every good and over 70% of its food!60
The Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel calls today’s “populism:” “El
‘pseudo-populismo’ de hoy. Epíteto peyorativo como crítica política conservadora sin validez
epistémica,” and tells us that classic urban-industrial populism emerged in the periphery thanks
only to the hegemonic center’s “loosening of the grip” during its “world wars” for supremacy:
Fue un pacto social, en el que una débil burguesía nacional crecía al mismo tiempo que
la clase obrera y organizaciones de campesinos. Las “Confederaciones Generales” de
Refer to the second and third chapters for a more detailed explanation of this.
Federico Parra, “Felipe Pérez: Militares se quedan con 80% de las importaciones de los
CLAP,” El Interés, January 4, 2017: http://elestimulo.com/elinteres/felipe-perez-militares-sequedan-con-80-de-las-importaciones-de-los-clap/
See also Anna Pratt, “Venezuela’s military has turned its food crisis into a ‘racket’. And it’s
profiting from people going hungry,” Public Radio International, PRI, January 6, 2017:
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-06/venezuelas-military-has-turned-its-food-crisis-racketand-its-profiting-people
60
Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Venezuela has to Converge FX Rates to Grow, Ramirez Says,”
Bloomberg News, Jun 15, 2014: https://www.bloomberg.com/authors/ARFe0MFySwc/anatolykurmanaev
Also, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, Venezuela imports 70% of its
food. http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/venezuela-prospects-us-agricultural-exports
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empresarios, obreros y/o campesinos pusieron de manifiesto la irrupción de una nueva
constelación política, económica, social y cultural que se denominó “populismo”. Esta
categorización no era negativa, sino intentaba mostrar el hecho de un proyecto político
hegemónico (en tanto cumplía con los requerimientos de la mayoría de la población,
incluyendo a la elite industrial) que afirmaba un cierto nacionalismo y protegía, gracias
a un Estado con relativa autonomía de las clases dominantes, el mercado nacional.61
Other than for the systematic dismantling of Venezuela’s liberal institutions and a more
socio-electorally conscious redistribution of its oil wealth (which after destroying the national
industry is now more vital than ever), Chávez and his successors have been dramatic examples of
anything but of a corporatist “pacto social,” and indeed of classical populism’s opposite traits.62
In fact, de la Torre and Arnson explain five ways in which these neo-populist democratic
revolutions constitute a distinct phenomenon in the region. First, the “revolutions” are “carried
out through [permanent] elections”; second, they are carried out in the name of a “substantive”
and “redemptive” democracy; third, they seek to “refound” the nation, “creating expanded

61

“It was a social pact, in which a weak national bourgeoisie grew, at the same time as the
working class and peasant organizations. The “General Confederacies” of entrepreneurs,
workers, and/or peasants brought to light the irruption of a new political, economic, social, and
cultural constellation that was denominated “populism.” This categorization wasn't negative, but
rather attempted to present the fact of a hegemonic political project (at the same time as it met
the requirements of the majority of the population, including the industrial elite) that would
affirm a certain nationalism and protect, thanks to a State with relative autonomy from the
dominant classes, the national market.” Enrique Dussel, “Cinco tesis sobre el ‘populismo’ ”
(México, UAM-Iztapalapa, 2007)
62
For a more detailed explanation, read the last section of this text’s second chapter, “Death by
Politics: On the Dismantling of the Country’s Institutions and Its Consequences,” from page 50.
For a meticulous analysis of this subject, refer to the noted Venezuelan legal scholar Allan
Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: the Chávez Authoritarian Experiment
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a brief elucidation of the destruction of the
country’s agriculture, read Grace Livingston’s eclectic, “Venezuela’s Farmers: Planting for the
Revolution,” BBC News, February 25 2016: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america35642365 ; and for a more detailed narrative of the systematic destruction of Venezuela’s
industry in general, see, among others, Enrique Krauze, “Hell of a Fiesta,” The New York Books
Review, March 8, 2018: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/03/08/venezuela-hell-fiesta/
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mechanisms of direct and semi-direct citizen participation and elaborately enshrining the role of
the state in providing for social welfare;” fourth, they rely on state intervention of the economy
in the name of distributing wealth and reducing poverty and inequality; and, lastly: “They view
their governments as part of a continental or even worldwide movement aimed at the realignment
of international politics.”63 As to all these traits, more than merely representative, Chavismo was
pioneering in the continent. Margarita López Maya, former editor of the Venezuelan Magazine
of Economics and Social Sciences of the Universidad Central de Venezuela, visiting professor,
among others, at the universities of Oxford, Columbia, and Notre Dame, and member of both the
Academies of Social and Political Sciences and of History, elaborated this during our interview:
Chávez fue el primero que puso la agenda de los pobres sobre la mesa en lugar principal
y dijo: si no hacemos igualdad, aquí no hay democracia y no hay nada. Cuando él lo dijo
en los años 98 y 99 eso era absolutamente contracorriente en América Latina y ahora es
absolutamente de consenso, de derecha y de izquierda, Santos repartiendo tierras en
Colombia, Lula y Roussef pasando los pobres a ser clase media en Brasil, Chávez con su
discurso súper radical y todos de alguna manera […] Él hizo el esfuerzo para que,
además, se diese un diálogo entre estos países que no se hablaban. Hoy la relación que
hay entre los gobiernos es muy diferente a la que había antes, incluso porque hay una
camada de dirigentes que se han mantenido mucho rato en el poder. Se abrieron vasos
comunicantes en esas naciones que pueden ir a otra cosa y el tema de la inclusión se
volvió un tema importante de México para abajo. Cómo va a incidir eso en el planeta no
lo sé porque venimos de un boom de materias primas en toda América Latina y eso está
llegando a su fin. Claro, es más grave para Venezuela porque su materia prima es el
petróleo. Cuando venga el tiempo de las vacas flacas no sé si esto va a retroceder…64
63

de la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 9-13
“Chávez was the first to put the agenda of the poor on the table, in the main place and said: ‘if
we don’t build equality, there's no democracy and there’s nothing here.’ When he said it, in 1998
and 1999, that was absolutely counter-current in Latin America and now it’s the absolute
consensus, of left and right: Santos distributing land in Colombia, Lula and Roussef bringing the
poor into the middle class in Brazil, Chávez, with his super-radical discourse and all somehow
[…] He made the effort so that, also, a dialogue would ensue between those countries that didn't
talk to one another. Today, the relationship that exists among governments is quite different from
the one that existed before, even because there is a cohort of leaders who have stayed in power
for a very long time. Communicating vessels opened up in these nations that could lead to
something else, and the topic of inclusion became an important one from Mexico and to the
64
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In his “Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” Schamis echoes the last point:
Chávez’s rule represents an oil-funded, twenty-first century version of patrimonial
domination. Along with the nebulous socialist goals come clearly undemocratic methods.
The question is whether, with a shift in the price cycle, his “Bolivarian Revolution” will
collapse just as the Punto Fijo arrangement did in the late 1980s and, if that happens, how
much farther from stable and democratic party politics in Venezuela will then be.65

We can only understand the paradox of calling “neo-populist” projects that have little in
common among them, other than media-enhanced messianic leaders that present themselves as
outsiders, if we analyze the forms in which these leaders appear as being superior to the political
class but are still subordinated to capital and corporate interests.66 This is important, for “neopopulism” stretches from various rights (Uribe, Fujimori, Menem), through the tepid and more
liberal lefts (the Kirchners, Lula, Mujica), to those who have moved on a misleading axis all
their own, such as Correa and Chávez. Thus, if Chávez was essentially “the most extraordinary
political televangelist born in Latin America,” as Krauze puts it (as I did, too, after watching my
first “Aló Presidente”), it is time for us to take a detour into the mass media and psychological
dimensions of his neo-populism. Speaking of audience democracy, the Mexican political theorist
Benjamin Arditi elaborates in his “Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics:”
Media experts replace party bureaucrats and activists (and transform) politics into a
spectacle run by media and marketing professionals […] There is a personalization of the
South. How will that impact the planet, I don't know, because we’re coming from a raw materials
boom in all of Latin America and that is reaching an end. Of course, it’s direr for Venezuela
because its commodity is oil. When lean times come I don't know if this will go backwards...”
65
Hector E. Schamis, “Populisn, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” Journal of
Democracy, 27, no. 4 (October 2006): 31
66
See the last chapter for a more detailed description of this, and in more than one sense.
To quote Schamis again on what is still a not so well-known fact, even after Chinese companies
started participating with their own large share in the Venezuelan oil industry: “most of
Venezuela’s offshore exploration remains contracted out to U.S. firms and all the country’s oil
continues to be refined in Louisiana.” Ibid. The latest negotiations for Citgo are with Russia.
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link between candidates and voters […] characterized by the “as if” of virtual immediacy.
Audience democracy intertwines with populist representation as a crossover between
acting for others, authorization, and the strong role of symbolic imagery.67
However, Chávez did not need any media or marketing professionals, López explains,
“either because there was no clear or coherent government communication strategy or because
Chávez decided it should be that way, Chávez himself became the center of [the strategy of]
nationwide government broadcasts and the ‘Aló Presidente’ program.”68 Guy Debord tells us in
his introductory thesis that “in societies where modern conditions of production prevail […]
everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation;” Arditi echoes this:
“representation means bringing into presence through a substitute, ‘the making present of
something that is nevertheless absent’ […] acting for others.”69 In the next section we explain
how Hugo Chávez—El Líder Supremo, El Comandante Eterno, and empty signifier par
excellence—by indefatigably reenacting the battle of good vs. evil in a panoply of Latin
American myths, powerfully articulated a whole worldview rather than just “a diversity of
unsatisfied democratic demands.” For after the initial push to gain the presidency, Chávez did
not need to “articulate” much in the democratic sense: his neo-populism purged its multiple and
many times conflicting origins, and the poorest segments of the population that comprised the
vast majority of the country were solidly behind him (and after eighteen years of Chavismo, they
remain poor).70 Rather, after copiously showing the obscene class divide of the richest country in
Latin America, Chávez radicalized his message by “naming” the split as one between Chavistas
and oligarchic right wingers. He did not need to “articulate” the old liberal institutions either, for
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Quoted in Panizza, Ibid., 84-6
de la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 253-53
69
Debord, Ibid., 1st. thesis, and Panizza, Ibid., 80-81
70
Poverty in Venezuela as compared with pre-Chávez years is covered in the third chapter.
68
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he either dismantled or replaced them, but could only coopt part of the workers movement and
his intents to win the student movement and sectors of the middle class ended up in failure.71
According to another of my interviewees, the former National Coordinator of the UNT
Unión Nacional de los Trabajadores, or “ÚNETE” (the largest trade-union confederation in the
country) and editor of the former pro-government journal Marea Socialista, Stalin Pérez Borges:
Yo pertenezco al partido (PSUV), a una corriente, como dirigente sindical. Ahorita soy
del Consejo Consultivo de la nueva Central de Trabajadores. Yo me desprendí de Chávez
y en privado me he burlado del socialismo tropical, socialismo bucal, pero no creo que
haya socialismo. El capitalismo está muy arraigado en Venezuela, pero hay un proceso
revolucionario en marcha. Ha habido cambios importantes dentro de la sociedad. De
hecho, el gobierno ha hecho conquistas sociales y democráticas, las primeras mediante
una redistribución distinta de la renta petrolera, que no es cualquier renta, para
desarrollar inversiones sociales […] Con Chávez vivo, y fue un error de Chávez, todo se
fue corporativizando, institucionalizando. A todos los movimientos les quitaron su
independencia […] Al sector campesino también. En el movimiento sindical no tan así,
aunque tiene un sector que sí. Con la UNT lo quisieron hacer pero nunca lo lograron.
Nunca perdió su independencia. Muchos compañeros y yo logramos que se mantuviera.72
But Chávez would have replied: “Exijo lealtad absoluta a mi liderazgo porque yo no soy
yo […] yo soy un pueblo, ¡carajo!”73 How this came to happen is the subject of our next section.

71

The dismantling of the country’s institutions is addressed in detail in the second chapter.
“I belong to the party (PSUV - United Socialist Party of Venezuela), to a current, as a union
leader. Right now I belong to the Council of the new Workers' Central. Y seceded from Chávez
and have mocked tropical socialism, speech socialism, in private, but I don't believe that there's
socialism. Capitalism is very deeply rooted in Venezuela, but there is a revolutionary process
underway. There have been important changes within society. In fact, the government has
achieved social and democratic conquests, the former through a different re-distribution of oil
rents, which aren't just any rent, in order to develop social investments […] In the beginning of
Chávez some initiatives of social movements were developed. With Chávez alive, and this was a
mistake of Chávez, everything was slowly corporatized, institutionalized. All the movements
were stripped of their independence […] The farming sector too. In the unions, not so much,
even though there is a sector where it was so. With the UNT they tried to do it, but were never
able. It never lost its independence. Many comrades and I managed to keep it that way.”
73
“I demand absolute loyalty to my leadership because I am not me […] I am a people, damn it!
Hugo Chávez, Video “No soy un individuo, yo soy un pueblo, ¡carajo!” Youtube Video, 1:15,
Globovisión – RCTV, February 10, 2010: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swBsxRWAmbk
72
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II. On Hugo Chávez’s Baroque Televised Revolution
But for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the
original, representation to reality, appearance to essence . . . truth is considered
profane, and only illusion is sacred. Sacredness is in fact held to be enhanced
in proportion as truth decreases and illusion increases, so that the highest
degree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of sacredness.
Ludwig Feuerbach
To the eyes of any liberal democrat or petit bourgeois, the “Aló Presidente” programs seemed
like an abhorrent compendium of Mikhail Backhtin’s “four categories” of the Carnivalesque. 74 It
is no wonder that in the long-forgotten first years of his mandate—as right before them—one of
Chávez’s epithets among “la gente bien” was “that ignorant clown.” And, indeed, in his “Aló
Presidente” Chávez used, abused, and supremely excelled at becoming an embodiment of “the
familiar and free interaction between people” with his “eccentric behavior,” his “carnivalesque
misalliances,” and “the sacrilegious” tirades with which he treated topics from George W. Bush
to nearly everything under the sun. Chávez artfully weaved his programs with myriad allusions,
quotations, and parodies in a multifarious pastiche that transcended the intertextual to become
true appearance of a promised land where an upside-down people had finally seized power.
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Mikhail Bakhtin’s four categories of what he calls the “carnivalistic sense of the world” are: 1.
Free and familiar interaction between people: normally separated people can interact and freely
express themselves. 2. Eccentric behavior: behavior that is otherwise unacceptable is legitimate
in carnival, and human nature's hidden sides are revealed. 3. Carnivalistic misalliances: the free
and familiar attitude of the carnival enables everything which is normally separated to connect –
the sacred with the profane, the new and old, the high and low etc. 4. The Sacrilegious: the
carnival is a site of ungodliness, of blasphemy, profanity and parodies on things that are sacred.
These categories are not abstract notions of freedom and equality, but rather a lived experience
of the world manifested in sensual forms of ritualistic acts that are played out as if they were a
part of life itself. See “Mikhail Bakhtin "Carnival and Carnivalesque,” Cultural Reader: Articles,
Summaries, and Reviews in Cultural Studies, July 22, 2011:
http://culturalstudiesnow.blogspot.com/2011/07/mikhail-bakhtin-carnival-and.html
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It is unlikely that Chávez ever read—at least back then—anything by Backhtin, Debord,
or Julia Kristeva. But what makes him both fascinating for many and abhorred by just as many is
that he intuitively tapped from the same springs that have nurtured some of our most lucid and
iconoclastic critics of modernity and the enlightenment. Yet, if for Backhtin the carnivalesque
refers to a literary mode where “social hierarchies of everyday life—their solemnities and pieties
and etiquettes, as well as all ready-made truths—are profaned and overturned by normally
suppressed voices and energies,” the carnival itself is circumscribed to a very limited time of the
year, and thus has more significance as a cathartic release of energies where the profane meets
the sacred. Backhtin never considered the carnivalesque as a revolutionary force. But associated
with the carnivalesque is the Baroque, of which in fact it is one of the main traits. Dr. Esperança
Camara, St. Francis University’s specialist in the Italian Renaissance and Baroque Art, says:
In the context of European history, the period from c. 1585 to c. 1700/1730 is often called
the Baroque era. The word baroque derives from the Portuguese and Spanish words for a
large, irregularly-shaped pearl—barroco and barrueco, respectively. Eighteenth-century
critics were the first to apply the term to the art of the 17th century. It was not a term of
praise. To the eyes of these critics, who favored the restraint and order of Neoclassicism,
the works of Bernini, Borromini, and Pietro da Cortona appeared bizarre, absurd, even
diseased—in other words, misshapen, like an imperfect pearl […] While the Protestants
harshly criticized the cult of images, the Catholic Church ardently embraced the religious
power of art. The visual arts, the Church argued, played a key role in guiding the faithful.
They were certainly as important as the written and spoken word, and perhaps even more
important since they were accessible to the learned and the unlearned alike. In order to be
effective in its pastoral role, religious art had to be clear, persuasive, and powerful. Not
only did it have to instruct, it had to inspire. It had to move the faithful […] Caravaggio
turned to a powerful and dramatic realism, accentuated by bold contrasts of light and
dark, and tightly-cropped compositions that enhanced the physical and emotional
immediacy of the depicted narrative. Other artists […] turned to daring feats of
illusionism that blurred not only the boundaries between painting, sculpture, and
architecture, but also those between the real and depicted worlds. In so doing, the divine
was made physically present and palpable. Whether through shocking realism, dynamic
movement, or exuberant ornamentation, 17th-century art was meant to impress. It
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aimed to convince the viewer of the truth of its message by impacting the senses,
awakening the emotions, and activating—even sharing—the viewer’s space.75
Indeed, the Baroque’s subverting force has been amply studied, particularly in the Latin
American arts. Following, we will explore Chávez’s baroqueness to grasp the uniqueness and
impact of his “Aló Presidente” program. It is only poetic justice to thus interpret the mass media
power of a figure whose critics kept lambasting for making of Venezuela a “magical-realism.”
What follows is a collage of journalistic texts in English taken from the web, all devoted
to Chávez’s “Aló Presidente.” In The New York Times, the journalist Rachel Nolan tells us:
Chávez sits at a desk in a field before a collection of rural supporters, while cows swish
their tails behind him. “You are an ignorant man,” he says, looking straight into the
camera, addressing President George W. Bush, whom for the purposes of the show he has
nicknamed Mr. Danger after a villain in a popular Venezuelan novel. It is the height of
the Iraq war. “You are a donkey, Mr. Danger,” Chávez says, then goes on to call him a
coward, assassin and genocidist. “It’s very easy to command an army from far away,” he
says. “If one day you ever get the crazy idea of invading Venezuela, I’ll be waiting for
you on this savanna.” His eyes blaze. The crowd cheers. “Come on here, Mr. Danger!” 76
In The Radical Philosophy Journal of the Independent Left, Martin Marinos says:
Chavez’s television show, Aló Presidente, is also mainly treated as a joke. The
programme began in 1999 and was broadcast every Sunday from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m.,
although its ending was never firmly fixed. […] It is true that some of the conversations
with audience members, as well as the frequent dancing and singing demonstrations by
Chavez, created a comical and amusing presidential image. For this reason, the
description of Chavez as a ‘clown’ and a ‘buffoon’ was very common in mainstream
media discourses. But one should not forget that the success of a populist discourse
depends on its capacity to connect with the broader masses and not with the refined
university, middle and upper classes in Venezuela and the West. 77
75

Esperança Camara, “Baroque Art in Europe, an Introduction,” quoted in Khan Academy:
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/monarchy-enlightenment/baroque-art1/beginnersguide-baroque1/a/baroque-art-in-europe-an-introduction
76
Rachel Nolan, “The Realest Reality Show in the World” The New York Times, May 4, 2012:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavezs-totally-bizarre-talkshow.html?mcubz=0
77
Martin Marinos, “Aló Presidente,” Philosophical Journal of the Independent Left, July/Aug
2013: https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/alo-presidente
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For its part, the ubiquitous and ever more reliable Wikipedia describes in English:
Chávez addressing topics of the day and touring locations where government social
welfare programs were active. The first broadcast was made on May 23, 1999 […]
Government ministers were required to attend the program. They may be questioned by
the president about anything […] even military policy is made on the show. During the
March 2, 2008 airing, Chávez ordered a top general to send ten battalions of troops to the
border with Colombia in response to a bombing by Colombian forces inside Ecuador that
killed Raúl Reyes, a top member of FARC (the battalions were not deployed).78
From another U.S. major newspaper, in The Washington Post, Juan Forero explains:
It's true that the program usually goes on and on—the record is eight hours straight—but
some say "Aló Presidente" is anything but tedious. In fact, no matter which way they lean
politically, many Venezuelans watch "Aló Presidente" to learn what new social program
officials have hatched or which companies the state plans to seize. Chávez's foes monitor
it to see which one of them is in the government's sights […] Without a teleprompter,
Chávez gabs about whatever catches his fancy, all in the argot of the working class,
which supports him. Sipping one cup after another of strong Venezuelan coffee, Chávez
often breaks into song (he favors folkloric ballads from his native plains region), scolds
his ministers and discusses the love of his life—his job. He once spoke at length about a
bout of diarrhea […] "Never has a revolutionary idea made use of a medium of
communication with such efficiency," former Cuban President Fidel Castro wrote… 79
Quoting Michel Foucault in his Postslavery Literatures in the Americas, George B. Handley tells
us: “Political power is characterized by its ability to divide truth in two parts repeatedly […] and
conceal those parts from each other. Thus a coherent whole becomes fragmented and incoherent,
unintelligible in any of its individual parts.”80 Or, as the political scientist Susan Buck-Morss
explains in her Hegel and Haiti: “Disciplinary boundaries allow counterevidence to belong to
someone else’s story.” 81 Anglo America’s emphasis on the “sciences” (related to the Latin
78

“Aló Presidente,” Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al%C3%B3_Presidente
Juan Forero, “‘Aló Presidente,’ Are You Still Talking?” The Washington Post, May 30 2009:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052903379.html
80
George B. Handley, “Postslavery Literatures in the Americas: Family Portraits in Black and
White,” in New World Studies, A. James Arnold, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 2000), 33
81
Ibid., 822.
79

33
scindere, “to cut, to divide;” and the Greek skhizein [root of “schizophrenia”] “to cut, to split”)
as opposed to the “arts” (from the Latin artus, “to join” and the Greek artios, “complete”) is at
the root of our incapacity to understand what Chávez has meant to the Latin American continent.
Through his multifarious and ubiquitous “Aló Presidente,” Chávez was able to re-connect (to
articulate, truly) “through everyday expressions, tropes, themes, and images” (Kazin) for many
Venezuelans as well as in the continent how “the presence and consequences of global capitalism
and the imperial power rhizomatically spread through various forms of cultural, economic, and
racial domination.”82 He purportedly empowered the people to “grasp their reality and act.” 83
How Chávez shattered those boundaries, thus lifting the veil for his viewers through his
“Aló Presidente” program and larger-than-life persona—in the process mocking to oblivion the
Western understanding of liberal politics as inherently self-serving, elitist, and corrupt—can be
better grasped when we explore the meaning of his style through the concept of the Baroque.
Paraphrasing Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic, Modernity and Double Consciousness, Chávez
re-created “not a succession of tropes and genres, but a philosophical discourse to hold on to the
unity of ethics and politics sundered from each other by modernity’s insistence that the true, the
good, and the beautiful had distinct origins and belong to different domains of knowledge.84

In her work Barroco y América Latina, un itinerario inconcluso, the former Venezuelan
coordinator of the Universidad Simón Bolívar’s Literature Graduate Program, Carmen Bustillo,
notes as one of the fundamental aspects of the Baroque its opposition to “master narratives:”
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La escritura “clásica” trata de equilibrar lo central y lo lateral, dando a cada uno su
peso correspondiente, y manteniendo la importancia semántica también a partir del
centro. En cambio la escritura barroca presentará una alteración de ese equilibrio,
reforzando la lateralidad en detrimento del núcleo o explotando una sola rama lateral
que destruye el centro de gravedad: construcción en fuga que se vale de un efecto de
derivación de sentido […] En el fondo del barroco está la destrucción del equilibrio
entre alma y cuerpo, espíritu y materia, como anota (Arnold) Hauser, para quien “(su)
esencia consiste en esta unión de oposiciones aparentemente inconciliables:
racionalismo e irracionalismo, intelectualismo y anti-intelectualismo, ilustración y
misticismo, anhelo de Dios y sensualismo”.85
Viewing the Baroque as a style that “dissolves” master narratives acquires new meaning
in the context of dependency theory’s “center” and “periphery.” Bustillo’s lines also remind us
of one of the Argentinian philosopher Rodolfo Kusch’s main tenets to understand the continent:
Either América is the hole where a humanity limited to homo faber is to be buried, or
homo faber covers only one aspect of the totality of man. In the later case, it is possible
that the blockage is due to the fact that in América residual aspects of man accumulate,
those aspects that were not predicted by Western thinking [...] Could the blockage be due
to a dialectical moment pointing to the rescue of the missing part of the mutilated
conception of modern man? Not to accept this would be to suppress the […] Américan
pueblo so that a small executive bourgeoisie may fulfill its programs of development.86
Indeed, Kusch adds that these programs presuppose all different aspects of the thinking
“of a bourgeoisie in crisis, in which I gladly include the most utopian revolutionaries as well as
the most enterprising of progressives. The one and the other are segregated—and history shows
85
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this—from and by something that breathes within the continent itself. 87 To be sure, the hybrid,
baroque, mythological Chávez embodied this “something” for his people. As Rancière put it, he
modified “the very aesthetico-political field of possibility by supplementing the sensible with
those who had no part in the perceptual coordinates of the community.” Born in the legendary
Llanos that has inspired some of the greatest Venezuelan literature (on the topic of civilization
and barbarism!), in one of the remotest corners of the country and as far from the modernizing
process as from the racial Venezuelan-European mixtures of the twentieth century, Los Llanos
would mark him with its myths and legends as “a heroic character from the plains, indomitable
but also undisciplined an irreverent, whose origin goes back to the independence period.”88

Born from a preceding split, thus longing for totality, it is no wonder that, of all the European
countries, the Baroque fully flourished only in Spain—and Portugal—and achieved its splendor
in Latin America (and again in Spain through a reverse movement). But, in Spain, it appeared as
a response to Renaissance humanism in the South and to the Reformation and Enlightenment of
the north in a country with a long history of hybridity and in the grip of a medieval worldview. In
Latin America, the Baroque responded also to the very split that the Catholic Church imposed on
the colonized and later to the rupture that the Independence wars (with ideals imported from
France and the United States) caused after centuries of Spanish colonization. Still today, it lives
in the schism that capitalism has forced upon a continent where the seamless presence of the
worlds of the flesh and the spirit are active in myriad autochthonous and syncretic practices.89
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It should not surprise us that Chávez’s first “articulating portent” after his failed coup
d’état, in February of 1992, was that the most popular carnival costume in March of that year
was the “chavecitos:” myriads of kids across all social classes dressed in military uniform, like
Chávez had appeared on TV during his first, now famous “Por ahora” allocution; or that, right
after he was elected president, the discreet practice of Santería became a fashionable vogue.90
Referring to how the Baroque erases these cultural separations, in his book, Sor Juana,
or, the Traps of Faith, Octavio Paz tells us: “I must add that each of these societies is separated
from the other by a negation […] Each negation contains within it the negated society—usually
as a masked, a veiled, presence.”91 And the palimpsest and the polyphonic are all fundamental
traits in Chávez’s “Aló Presidente.”92 The Cuban author Severo Sarduy explains the Baroque as:
Espacio del dialoguismo, de la polifonía, de la carnavalización, de la parodia y la
intertextualidad, lo barroco presentaría, pues, como una red de conexiones, de sucesivas
filigranas, cuya expresión gráfica no sería lineal, bidimensional, plana, sino en volumen,
espacial, y dinámica. En la carnavalización del barroco se inserta la mezcla de géneros,
la intrusión de un tipo de discurso en otro --carta en un relato, diálogo en esas cartas--.93
With his emphasis on the polyphonic and on “reflective appearance” rather than on the
veracity of representation, “the realm of politics is no longer a fixed and immutable form of
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authority and power, but subject to revisions based on its appearance to the mind of the once
powerless spectator.” And Chávez showed his spectators how they were players of this play.94
Héctor Soto, Minister of Culture until 2011, and founder of Misión Cultura and a Vice
Minister of the Secretary of the Presidency during Chávez’s second term, put it to me this way:
Chávez mató, liquidó, eliminó, exterminó, en poco tiempo, en dos años de ejercicio, a los
pendejos, a los idiotas. En un pueblo en donde la política era algo solo de unos cuantos,
de un 10%, de una gente que dirigía pase lo que pase, hemos pasado a una situación en
la cual todo el mundo en Venezuela sabe para qué trabaja, para quién trabaja, para qué
intereses. Ese es un logro de Chávez y quisiera recordarlo por ahí.95
But Chávez, too, was split between his autochthonous and his militaristic self, between
his honestly hybrid “embodiment of the people” and his totalitarian notions of authority. If he
articulated anything outside a mythical heroic worldview of common resistance for the peoples
of the “Third World,” it was his own dichotomous self in the eyes of his followers, an art that his
successors are sorely lacking. And if his totalitarian tendencies prevailed after 2006, he was still
capable through his mass media appeal to symbolically convey an empowering of the people,
and thanks to the immensely deep pockets of the most abundant times in Venezuelan history,
enough money to “the people” to think that this state of affairs, Chávez’s show, could go on.96
But as Goya put it when naming perhaps the best-known print of his masterful series, Los
caprichos: “the sleep of reason produces monsters.” Gone after Chávez’s death is his telegenic
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magic, and for the foreseeable future the huge oil revenues that he commanded. His successors
have been increasingly resorting to violence to stay in power (see my concluding postscript for
an account). Paraphrasing Arturo Sosa, the Venezuelan Superior General of the Society of Jesus,
populist or not, the “media savvy, statist, presidentialist, autocratic and rentierist military-civilian
system of dominion that during its first years was legitimized by a tyranny of the majority built
on a doubtful redistribution of oil wealth with electoral purposes” is living its darkest hours.97
For even if the charismatic “hero-figure who would create with one blow the just society”
somehow came to exist in Venezuela, paraphrasing Erickson, after his fiesta was over we are
witnessing how he did so mostly symbolically and just for a limited time, like in a carnival. As in
a carnivalesque frenzy the “savior who worked such wonders” rather went on and destroyed “the
very institutions that were to ensure his just society.” That is the underlying subject of our next
chapter, but if two decades of Chavismo have been nothing but a flash in the crawling time of
our nations, the same cannot be said of the millions of people whose lives have been wrecked.
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Second Chapter
Death by Politics: On the Dismantling of the Country’s Institutions and Its Consequences
The most potentially destructive forces today are hidden under the banner of “goodness”.
Whether this is done hypocritically or because the rulers believe in such professions of
“goodness” is immaterial; the latter is even worse. The terms under which such
“goodness” is projected to the heathens—“the American exceptionalism”,
“the Third Rome”, “Hindutva”, “the new (old) Caliphate”— are
nothing but a self-license to impose own [sic] values and
beliefs on those who dare disagree with them. Such
rulers are the most bloodthirsty because belief
in own [sic]moral superiority renders
them unconcerned with reality.
Branko Milanovic 98

If in the previous chapter we dealt with the “magic” of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” in this one
we will consider its realities. For both sections I owe different debts of gratitude to one of my
interviewees, Rafael Uzcátegui, and to his book, Venezuela: Revolution as Spectacle, published
in 2010. 99 Uzcátegui used whenever possible the government’s official figures to turn Chavismo
on its head. This section will present in numbers some of those realities. Although it will not be
an exhaustive exploration of the subjects’ histories, it will contrast the figures that reflect those
realities with what the official discourse calls its “great achievements” as they compare with their
pre-Chavismo’s trajectories and countries that Chavistas love, and love to hate. Most Venezuelan
institutions have stopped providing official statistics, some of them since 2005. In every case, I
have matched either the official or most credible statistics against those of other countries.100
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To say that Venezuela has gone “off-the-charts” in every calamitous manner possible
would be an understatement. But neither such clichés nor any readily available adjective could
do justice to the country’s deterioration, manifest in the dismal levels of its economy, of its
governance and infrastructure, its public and private health, of the salaries, the media, even of its
oil production together with record highs of crime, impunity, scarcity, poverty, lawlessness,
emigration, hyperinflation, corruption, political prisoners, repression, and an external debt
impossible to pay due to rock-bottom oil prices when the country imports almost everything! 101
Américo Martín, the former presidential candidate and noted guerrilla combatant founder
of the leftist MIR party, a lawyer, prolific writer, and editorial journalist, put it to me this way:
Aquí se habla de revolución, pero cómo va llamarse así si lo que ha hecho es aniquilar
las fuerzas productivas. Hasta etimológicamente es un contrasentido. Revolución es
avanzar con doble rapidez […] Nadie entiende cómo teniendo un financiamiento tan
monstruosamente alto de dólares y divisas para una población pequeña, de veinte y pico
millones de habitantes, la agricultura se haya reducido a la cuarta parte de lo que era, se
han aniquilado la mitad de las empresas industriales que había, todas las industrias del
Estado se cayeron, estamos importando gasolina. He llegado a la conclusión de que los
que realmente entiendan que esto es una farsa, profundamente, son los que vienen del
socialismo -marxistas, socialistas- porque nosotros fuimos formados en varias ideas
simples pero exactas. Marx decía que el socialismo implicaba un desarrollo descomunal
de las fuerzas productivas. Precisamente ¿de qué surgía el socialismo? Lo dice en el
prefacio de La crítica de la economía política. Dice que hay un momento en el que las
fuerzas productivas se han desarrollado mucho pero que las relaciones de producción
privadas asfixian ese crecimiento. Entonces, cuando las fuerzas productivas revientan
esas relaciones de propiedad privada es cuando viene la revolución. Es decir, lo que
viene es un desarrollo libre de las fuerzas productivas a tal grado que se producirá una
súper abundancia de bienes materiales y espirituales y llegaremos al comunismo, porque
el comunismo se basa en el principio de que a cada cual según su necesidad y de cada
cual según su capacidad, es decir que aunque tú tengas menos méritos que otros pero
tengas más necesidades te dan más. Ese es el comunismo basado en una solidaridad
absoluta, pero para que eso sea así se requiere que haya una súper abundancia tal de
bienes materiales y espirituales que cada quien reciba de acuerdo con sus necesidades.
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Esa es la ilusión del marxismo y del comunismo. Y Marx decía que eso iba a ocurrir al
desaparecer la propiedad privada sobre los medios de producción, porque entonces los
trabajadores van a desarrollar libremente, sin la interferencia de las relaciones de
propiedad privada y el derecho privado, la capacidad productiva. Es entonces cuando
dice: de allí daremos el salto del reino de la necesidad al reino de la libertad. Partamos
de este hecho: socialismo equivale a desarrollar las fuerzas productivas, porque un
socialismo que las empobrezca sería un retroceso en nombre de la caridad social.102
With a total urban population of 88.9%, it makes sense to follow Venezuela’s people into their
cities, and, specifically, to Caracas, to grasp the magnitude of the country’s crisis in a few brief
pages.103 Caracas is the country’s capital city, as well as the largest in a country with a hypercentralized government, with by far the most resources, slums, and better statistics. To guarantee
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Chavismo’s survival, Caracas is also the city least affected both by the electric infrastructure
crisis and by the scarcity of food and medicines that is ravaging the country.104 And to be fairminded, we will compare Caracas to other cities in nations with every type of political system.
Not that long ago, until the early 1980s, Caracas’ best-known moniker for its massive
populations of immigrants and us proud Caraqueños was “Heaven’s subsidiary.” Yet the year
Hugo Chávez ascended to power—closing the old millennium, in 1999—Venezuela already
shared with countries like Brazil and Mexico similar homicide rates (in 1999, there were 5,968
homicides in Venezuela, and the UN’s “Global Study on Homicide” estimated the murder rate
per 100,000 inhabitants at 32.9).105 However, after a decade of Chavismo that figure had tripled,
according to the Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales del Observatorio Venezolano de la Violencia,
a group founded in 2005 by the Social Science departments of Venezuela’s most important
public universities to address the vertiginous increase in crime.106 And after the last three years
of having the dubitable honor of competing with San Pedro Sulas in Honduras, San Salvador in
El Salvador, and Acapulco in Mexico, in 2015 Caracas displaced all three hell subsidiaries as the
world’s homicide capital, at 119.87 murders per 100,000.107 Four other Venezuelan cities are in
the list of the world’s most dangerous twenty cities: Maturín (fifth, at 86.45), Valencia (seventh,
with 72.31), Ciudad Guayana (eleventh, at 62.33), and Barquisimeto (twentieth, with 54.96).108
To put Caracas’ abstract murder rate for 2015 in still impossibly abstract “murder totals,”
when in a country of twenty nine million people there were 5,968 homicides the year Chávez
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was elected president, by the end of 2015, in Caracas’ “Capital District” alone—with 3.3 million
inhabitants of Greater Caracas’ total population of 5.3 million people—, 3,946 people had been
murdered.109 In the whole country, there were 27,785 homicides!110 But before considering the
multiple causes of violence in Caracas, let us compare these statistics with those of other cities.
In murders per 100,000 inhabitants, in the United States only St. Louis, a city with
317,420 inhabitants in 2104—roughly one tenth of Caracas’ Capital District population—and
Baltimore, which is twice St. Louis’s size, made the “twenty most dangerous cities” list (and
only in 2016: in 2015, Baltimore was 40th and St Louis was also much lower, at 49.93, which
speaks of a rise in violent crime also in the U.S.). St. Louis ranks 15th now with a murder rate of
59.93, and Baltimore 19th with a 54.98. The only other two cities in the U.S. to make it into the
“fifty most dangerous” are Detroit, the 28th, at 43.89, and New Orleans, 32nd, with 41.44 a decade
after Katrina’s devastation.111 However, when we speak of “systemic violence,” it is important
that despite the arguably well-deserved reputation of the United States for violent crime when
compared to Europe and many other countries in the world, these four cities combined comprise
some 2.3 million of the country’s 320 million population (New Orleans had roughly 390,000
inhabitants and Detroit 690,000, as of 2014). Composing far less than one percent of the US
population, they represent rather an anomaly, which is rather the opposite of Venezuela’s case.112

109

Simeon Tegel, GlobalPost, “Venezuela’s Capital is World’s Most Murderous City,” USA
Today, January 29, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/29/venezuelascapital-worlds-most-murderous-city/79508586/
110
Steven James Grattam, “Venezuela violence hits record levels in 2015, Colombia murders
lowest in 20 years,” Latin Correspondent, January 5, 2016,
http://latincorrespondent.com/2016/01/venezuela-violence-hits-record-levels-in-2015-colombiamurders-lowest-in-20-years/
111
World Atlas, Ibid., http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/most-dangerous-cities-in-theworld.html
112
“Statistics 2013,” (with projected trajectories for 2015), United States Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/

44
Venezuela’s murder rate fares much worse under Chavismo’s years when we compare it
to those of the European nations, to the rest of Latin American countries with governments both
“progressive” and “reactionary,” and to all totalitarian regimes. For instance, in communist
Cuba, the country with which Venezuela sealed its political and economic fate after the failed
coup d’état against Hugo Chávez in 2002, the per 100,000 rate of murder for 2015 was about the
same of the U.S.: 5.113 Yet, even a 5-homicide rate is still very high when compared with most
European countries and other cities in the world. But Caracas’ rate is twenty four times that 5!
The next graphic is The Economist’s Data Team chart of the 50 cities with most homicides:114

The fifty most dangerous cities in the world are all located in ten countries (with forty
four in six countries): twenty one in Brazil, with 200 million people nearly seven times more
populous than Venezuela; eight cities in Venezuela; five in Mexico with four times Venezuela’s
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population, at 120 million; four in the US (detailed above); three cities each in Colombia and
South Africa, with respectively 48 and 52 million people; and the infamous Central American
trio of Honduras, with two cities in a country with a quarter of Venezuela’s people, Guatemala
with one city and half of Venezuela’s population; and El Salvador: with one city and a fifth of
Venezuela’s population. Kingston, Jamaica’s capital city, in the 33rd place completes the list.
However, when we compare those cities’ countries proportionally, Venezuela’s off-thecharts homicide rates reveal a more dramatic reality, for even Brazil’s twenty one cities among
the fifty most dangerous worldwide would dwarf at the Venezuelan rate. In 2012, for instance,
there were 56,337 murders in Brazil vs. 21,692 in Venezuela.115 With Brazil’s population, total
homicides in Venezuela would have exceeded 140,000!116 Admittedly, this would require a
perfectly homogeneous homicide rate across each country, but this exercise shows how unique
Venezuela’s catastrophe is, and may help explain why lynching has become a daily event.117
Caracas has the highest homicide rate worldwide. There is no other city in the planet,
whether Asian, Middle Eastern, African, rich or poor, managed by a government benignly
socialist, savagely capitalist, or plainly totalitarian that shares the hellish honor of having 120
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Thus, the government’s argument that “violence is endemic
to the region” is a terrible excuse when most other countries in the region have kept their murder
rates under 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and at least half of those countries have kept
them under 11, like “left-leaning” Ecuador at 6.3, Uruguay at 7.9, and Nicaragua at 8; and “right115

Jonathan Watts, “Latin America leads world on murder map, but key cities buck deadly
trend,” The Guardian, May 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/murdermap-latin-america-leads-world-key-cities-buck-deadly-trend
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This graphic exercise considers the rates of homicides per total country populations, not
cities.
117
Alexandra Ulmer and Diego Oré, “Livid over crime, some Venezuelans resort to mob
justice,” Reuters, September 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-lynchingsidUSKCN0R14EU20150901
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leaning” Paraguay at 7.9; and Costa Rica at 11.118 When, in fact, there are even several countries
under 5, the murder rate around which both Cuba and the U.S. have hovered during the past few
years, such as the “leftist” Bolivia at 4.7 and the alternatively right and center-left-leaning Chile,
at just 3 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.119 Indeed, even the poorest country in the continent,
Haiti, has a 10.2 after a sharp increase since 2007, while in Argentina during the Kirchner years,
from 2003 to 2015—an era regularly associated with Chavismo both in form and substance—the
murder rate was checked under 9.120 Moreover, regarding some of their capital cities, Buenos
Aires’ murder rate in 2014 was 5.5; Santiago’s was 3.9; Quito’s was 6; and Montevideo’s 6.4.121
This numerical and eschatological tour through some regions, countries, and cities of our
planet demonstrates with mathematical certainty the utter impossibility of anything said by the
Venezuelan government to justify the country’s exorbitant homicide rate on account of “regional
118

Editorial, “2015 has officially set new record for murders in Costa Rica,” ICR News, January
29, 2016, http://insidecostarica.com/2015/12/11/2015-officially-set-new-record-murders-costarica/
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David Cagne, “InSight Crime’s 2015 Latin America Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime,
January 14, 2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up2015-latin-america-caribbean
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Editorial, “Homicide rates double in Haiti over a 5-year period, UN study,” Jamaica
Observer, April 11, 2014, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Homicide-rates-doublein-Haiti-over-a-5-year-period----UN-study
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James Bargent, “Why are robbery related killings rising in Quito, Ecuador?” InSight Crime,
November 22, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/why-are-robbery-related-killingsrising-in-quito-ecuador
As for Europe, but for Russia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Estonia (with, respectively 9, 6.8, 5, and
4.1) most are at decimal points or under 2 (but Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, and Latvia in the low
middle digits); and all Asian countries but for Myanmar (15.2) and Turkmenistan (12.8) are in
the wider but still much lower spectrum between the high digits and the very low decimals
regardless of government “system.”121 Yet Moscow’s murder rate is 4.6; while in Rangoon,
Myanmar’s most populous city (without official statistics), according to the United States
Department’s OSAC, “violent crimes and other major crimes are rare,” and most of them happen
in remote areas of the country. Regarding Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital and its largest city
with nearly one million inhabitants, in the words of the OSAC, “unofficial sources claim that the
murder rate in Ashgabat is about one per week,” coming to roughly 5.2: United States
Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “2015 Crime Safety Reports,” various,
OSAC, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17543
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trends,” political challenges, economic conspiracies or historical patterns, because every poorer
city in the world is safer, every capitalist, socialist, egalitarian, totalitarian or liberal city is safer,
and as far as the early 1980s, Caracas was rightly called by its inhabitants “Heavens’ subsidiary.”
Today, in Caracas only the economic charts of an expected hyperinflation of 18,000% for
2018, those of its health and of its infrastructure crises, of the hyper-devaluation of its bolívar
“fuerte:” meaning “strong” (called “strong” when in 2007 Chávez’s government eliminated three
zeroes from the old bolivar, after the “strong” devaluation of previous years made it worth less
than two thousandths of a U.S. dollar), and of the skyrocketing cost of living when life itself has
become worthless, match the steep rise of the murderous race that was lost in the Chavista era.122
To be sure, as The New York Times’ editorial board wrote on May 17 of 2016:
The threats Venezuelans face today are not the result of foreign or domestic conspiracies,
but of a disastrous leadership. The country’s health care system has atrophied so severely
that scores of Venezuelans are dying every week because of chronic shortages of
medicine and ill-equipped hospitals. Violence has soared as armed gangs loyal to the
government roam the streets. During the first three months of this year, 4,696 people
were murdered in Venezuela, according to the government […] The three-month death
toll is higher than the 3,545 civilians killed last year in Afghanistan, a new record. While
many Venezuelans got a taste of prosperity in better housing, subsidized food and higher
wages when oil prices were high — oil accounts for roughly 96 percent of Venezuela’s
exports — the government failed to build anything resembling a sustainable economy.123
However, when the Times argues that “Mr. Chávez and Mr. Maduro made spending on
welfare benefits their top priority to keep their base loyal, while neglecting institutional reforms
that would have ‘diversified’ the country’s revenue sources and made lasting improvements to
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the education and health systems,” they are missing a crucial element, for, as we will read next,
if anything is unambiguous in two decades of Chavismo is their distaste for diversification.124
About this point, nearly all of my interviewees coincided regardless of their political
affinities, although of course each provided a different judgment according to preference. Tulio
Hernández, the intellectual political refugee whom I mentioned, explained it to me this way:
El otro elemento negativo de estos 14 años es el retorno y la multiplicación de una tara
nacional que nos ha hecho mucho daño, que es el estatismo y el paternalismo, y una de
las incidencias más grandes es el retorno de la población a las prácticas del clientelismo
que a su vez son prácticas de la mendicidad instaladas como forma de sustitución del
trabajo […] Como nunca antes somos mono productores, somos un estado rentista, como
nunca el Estado es el distribuidor arbitrario de la renta petrolera y como nunca antes se
ha incrementado en la gente tanto el sentimiento de que el Estado le debe algo y de que,
como el petróleo es propiedad de todos, el Estado tiene obligación de mantenerlo.125
But this, as former minister Soto understands it, is really a matter of interpretation:
Con el chavismo ha habido tremendo avance. El avance en concreto es: yo no quiero
trabajar, pero de todo esto que se reparten denme mi parte. Ciertamente que hay algo
cultural que marca la historia de Venezuela, que es el rentismo. Cuando el venezolano
entendió o subjetivizó que su bienestar no tenía que ver con el trabajo, allí se produjo
una dislocación ideológica tremenda, y tiene 120 años. No es del chavismo, ni del
marxismo leninismo, ni de AD ni de COPEI. El venezolano dijo: se puede vivir sin
trabajar. ¿Qué es lo que pasa con el rentismo, es decir, con ese vivir sin trabajar? Eso
124

Regardless of paying lip service to the contrary. See the following interviews excerpts.
In general terms, a rentier state derives all or the majority of its revenues from the rent of its
resources to the world market rather than from taxing internal economic factors. López Maya
and Panzarelli say: “This enables those who gain access to the state to gain significant power to
act arbitrarily or without deference or accountability to the demands and pressures of civil
society […] Those who gain power in Venezuela tend to legitimize themselves by employing a
nationalist discourse featuring themes of equality and social justice as well as a certain level of
mistrust of foreign corporation and powers.” De la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 241-2
125
“Another negative element of these past 14 years is the return to national defects that have
caused us much harm, that is, statism and paternalism, and one of the biggest incidences of the
return of the population to the practices of patronage, which, at the same time, is the practice of
mendicancy established as a work substitute […] We are mono-producers like never before, we
are a rentier state, as never before the State is the arbitrary distributor of oil rents and, as never
before, the State has reinforced the sentiment that it owes something to the people and that, as oil
is everyone's property, the state has the obligation to maintain this practice.”
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explica, complejiza, enreda todo. La teoría marxista dice que los hombres, por la
industrialización, van a crear una clase obrera que cada día va a ser más explotada y se
va a organizar y va a luchar por tomar los aparatos de producción y después se va a
liberar. ¿Qué pasa en donde la riqueza sale del subsuelo? Marx no pudo prever eso. 126
Given the calming advantages of having a tighter control of the population (and of their
“popular vote” while elections were fashionable) by making most people dependent on one sole
employer—and mainly on one product—did not seem to faze most Chavistas regardless of the
likely cost, although opinions differed. Tepidly answering a follow-up question, Pellicer adds:
Se han hecho ensayos, pero que no han pasado de ser ensayos. Y siempre fue una línea
del propio Chávez. ¿Cómo es que nosotros éramos un país productor de ganado, de café,
de caraotas -porque hasta caraotas parece que estamos importando ahora-, y por qué no
podemos volver a eso? Entonces, los ensayos que se han hecho son ensayos que tienen
que ver con empresas mixtas o con empresas sociales. Y allí están esos ensayos. Yo creo
que este es un momento bueno para revisar lo que está pasando con esos ensayos… 127
While Soto, usually the most honestly radical, appears to have a more coherent position:
Un gobierno, si es honesto, decide en qué campo es más productivo. Aquí cuando se
invierte la pirámide y dejamos de ser país agrícola y hay solo un 3% de población
campesina, todo el que esté hablando de soberanía alimentaria es un farsante, es
mentira. Pareciera más honesto decir como dijo Kuwait: yo soy país petrolero y como
126

“There has been tremendous progress with Chavismo. Concretely, the progress is: I don't
want to work, but of all that you divide out, give me my part. Certainly, there is something very
cultural that marks Venezuela's history, which is rentierism. When Venezuelans understood or
subjectified that their well-being had nothing to do with work, a tremendous ideological
dislocation took place, and that has been going on for 120 years. It doesn't come from Chavismo,
nor from Marxism-Leninism, nor from AD or COPEI. Venezuelans said: it's possible to live
without working. What happens with rentierism, in other words, with that living without
working? That explains, makes more complex, tangles everything up. Marxist theory states that
men, due to industrialization, will create a working class that will be more exploited every day
and it will organize itself and fight to take hold of the production apparatus and then will free
itself. But what happens where riches ooze from the earth? Marx couldn't foresee that.”
127
“Attempts have been made, but they haven't gone beyond being attempts. And it was a line of
Chávez himself: How is it that we used to be a country that produced cattle, coffee, beans –
because it seems like we are even importing beans now – and why can't we return to that? Then,
the attempts that have been made are attempts that have to do with mixed enterprises or with
social enterprises. And the attempts are all there. I believe that this is a good time to review
what's going on with those attempts...”
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petrolero no me ocupo de la producción de nada, pero tengo petróleo y dólares más que
suficientes y traigo de todo: papas, fresas que llegan 24 horas después de cosechadas. 128
However, for the opposing María Corina Machado, founder and former president of the
Venezuelan civil organization Súmate as well as the highest vote-getter in the National Assembly
election of 2010—albeit ousted by the Chavista majority in 2014 for promoting that year’s street
protests—this compounded socio-economic catastrophe has a political origin. She said to me:
Una de las cosas que promovió el chavismo fue generar la mayor dependencia posible de
toda la sociedad en el Estado, de todos los sectores, empezando obviamente por los
sectores políticos, descabezando o minimizando los partidos como organizaciones
intermedias, y luego los sectores económicos […] porque todo espacio que represente
autonomía había que liquidarlo. Y en el plano social, lograr que el mayor número de
ciudadanos dependiera del Estado, y que dependieran además de una forma humillante,
porque no es ni siquiera el empleo público, sino la dádiva, la transferencia directa,
absolutamente condicionada no ya solamente a la militancia política sino a la renuncia a
tu libertad, a tu libertad de pensamiento y a tus ideales y convicciones. Eso me parece
dramático porque lo que se ha tratado de destruir es esa relación esfuerzo-logro,
esencial en una sociedad que quiere avanzar y que quiere progresar. Eso en términos
negativos, además de lo que señalé antes respecto de la división y de la confrontación en
todos los planos que, además, ha generado una sociedad profundamente violenta, porque
los incentivos a la violencia son obvios, no solamente más de diez millones de armas
ilegales en la calle, 18.000 bandas criminales, tráfico de drogas generalizado -con todos
los males que eso va trayendo para destruir y atacar a la familia- y la impunidad, por
encima del 97%. Ese es el incentivo directo a la violencia, intencional desde luego.129
128

“A government, if it is honest, decides in which field it is most productive. Here, when the
pyramid is inverted and we stopped being an agricultural country, and there is only 3% of the
population who are peasants, anyone talking about food sovereignty is a fraud, that's a lie. It
would seem more honest to say something like Kuwait: I am an oil country, and as such, I don't
take up the production of anything, but I have oil and more than enough dollars and I bring
everything over: potatoes, strawberries that arrive 24 hours after being harvested.”
129
“ One of the things that Chavismo promoted was to generate the highest possible dependence
of all society on the state, from all sectors, starting, obviously, with the political sectors,
beheading or minimizing the parties as intermediate organizations, and afterwards, the economic
sectors […] because any space that represented autonomy had to be terminated. And in the social
sphere, to ensure that as many citizens as possible would depend on the State, and to have them
depend, also, in a humiliating manner, because this isn't even about public employment, but
rather about alms, about a direct transfer, absolutely conditioned, not just to political militancy
anymore, but to one's renunciation of freedom, of one's freedom of thought, of one's ideals and
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The deliberate dismantling or replacement of every competing social institution that
could not be directly controlled or coopted by Chávez is the most salient structural trait of his
first years in government.130 This fractal pattern of demolition was repeated in every area from
the moment the old political parties crumbled after the tsunami that resulted from their disastrous
neoliberal policies took Chávez to power. It started with the branches of government responsible
for checks and balances by adding an “Electoral” and a “Citizens” power and taking over all five
powers; it continued by creating official worker unions, a parallel (second) public health system,
by seizing the Central Bank’s autonomous and the oil industry’s semi-autonomous functions, by
founding new Bolivarian public universities while defunding the old public ones, just because
like the old public health system, their meritocracies would not be coopted; it followed with the
expropriation of private industries, agricultural land, and most of the press when not forcing their
bankruptcy. And, as the icing on the cake, all conceivable public infrastructure projects—such as
convictions. That seems dramatic to me because what has been attempted to destroy is that
relationship between effort and achievement, essential in a society that wishes to advance and
wants progress. That, in negative terms, apart from what I noted before with regards to the
division and confrontation at all levels (which also has generated a profoundly violent society,
because the incentives to violence are just obvious, because not only are there more than ten
million illegal weapons out in the streets, 18,000 criminal gangs, widespread drugs trafficking –
with all the ills that that brings along in order to attack and destroy the family – and more than
97% impunity.) That is the direct incentive for violence; intentionally, of course.”
As explained before, from the three poltical leaders who capitalized from and helped promote the
wave of spontaneous students’ protests in February of 2014, Caracas’ Mayor, Antonio Ledezma
and former presidential candidate Leopoldo López (Venezuela’s most emblematic political
prisoner after during one of Caracas’ largest protests he was filmed surrendering voluntarily to
the government forces) have been incarcerated several years. Machado was charged with treason
and impeached by her fellow legislators in the former Chavista-controlled Congress. Although
she has been constantly harassed and threatened, she remains free at the date of this text. See:
Centro de Justicia y Paz’s Report to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations:
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/VEN/INT_CCPR_CSS_VEN_
20686_E.pdf
With respect to the impunity of which Machado speaks, see figures and footnote on page 54.
130 Brewer-Carías, Ibid. For a substantially briefer text regarding the private industry, read Juan
B. Salas, “Aparato productive nacional registra caida del 80%,” El Impulso, December 2, 2015:
http://www.elimpulso.com/noticias/economia/aparato-productivo-nacional-registra-caida-del-80
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the maintenance of our dams and reservoirs—started to be directly assigned to the select circle of
Chavistas that for the past eighteen years have been constantly reshuffled to manage all the
public and many former private institutions. It is naïve to think that public security could have
escaped this fate. But the dismantling of Venezuela’s liberal institutions is also at the core of the
country’s impunity, lynchings, endemic corruption, hyperinflation, hyper devaluation, health
crisis, emigration, essential goods’ shortages, and of its infrastructural crises and productivity
meltdown. The next charts show, respectively, Venezuela’s inflation, from 2009 until 2018 (the
IMF’s projection for 2018); its consumer price index and currency exchange rate, from 2003
until 2015; and basic food basket paired with minimum wage, from 2006 until 2016.131 132 133
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“Venezuela was the first nation in the world to be certified by the World Health
Organization for eradicating malaria in its most populated areas, beating the United States and all
other developed countries to that milestone in 1961.” 134 Thus read the recent article by The New
York Times quoted below. Yet the following graph reproduces the “official” numbers today.
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Nicholas Casey, “Hard times in Venezuela Breed Malaria as Desperate Flock to Mines,” The
New York Times, August 15, 2016: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/world/venezuelamalaria-mines.html
Graph: “La dramática crisis económica y política de Venezuela en doce gráficos,” La Patilla,
July 17, 2017: http://regionales.co.ve/2017/07/27/la-dramatica-crisis-economica-y-politica-devenezuela-en-12-graficos/
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A similar exercise to compare both Caracas and Venezuela with other cities and countries
worldwide could be made for any of the previous categories to demonstrate that Venezuela’s offthe-charts statistics have long surpassed any conventional explanation. As with Venezuela’s
homicide rate, their extreme—incomparable, truly—nature, reflected in the ghastly repetition of
that sideways grin in all related charts, does not speak of the usual “multiple factors” that
variously contribute to social and economic crises, but of one same, unique, and main
exacerbating cause at the root of a compounded catastrophe. Indeed, when the slant in each
graphic is so eerily similar, the realities they depict are but symptoms of a common malady that
both foments and transcends each particular reality: Venezuela is also the country with the
highest hyperinflation (4,000% in 2017), the highest “unofficial” hyper-devaluation, the highest
official impunity rate (at 98% according to the prosecutor general’s office!), and the highest
“misery rate,” quadrupling the next-worst ranked.135 This oil-rich nation has received over one
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Catarina Saraiva and Michelle Jamrisko, “These Are the World’s Most Miserable
Economies,” Bloomberg Markets, February 4, 2016,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-04/these-are-the-world-s-most-miserableeconomies
According to InflationData.com, “The original Misery Index was created by economist Arthur
Okun during the Johnson administration in the 1960’s […] It helps determine how the average
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trillion U.S. dollars in revenues during the chavista era, yet its poverty rate increased from 55%
when Hugo Chávez took power in 1999 to 82.8% in 2016.136 His long-time former Economy
Super-Minister, Jorge Giordani, and others have accused government officers of pocketing more
than $300 billion of crude oil revenues over the past decade alone.137 A Chavista assessment!
In the segment of my interviews that inspired this thesis’s title, José León Uzcátegui told me:
Yo soy psiquiatra y tengo una especialización de economía petrolera. Un periodista me
preguntaba sobre esta doble condición y le decía: nada más natural, Venezuela es locura
y petróleo. Claro, no se queda allí. Lo que mejor la define es el capitalismo rentista que
el mismo Chávez llamaba socialismo rentista y, como pasa con el socialismo en general,
ahora está más claro que antes que no hubo tal socialismo sino capitalismo de Estado
[…] Se ha producido un cambio importante en la redistribución de la renta. Eso lo sabe
cualquier venezolano, desde los que se han enriquecido a costa de los pobres hasta los
pobres que siguen viviendo en la pobreza pero que, desde un buhonero hasta un taxista,
esperan una parte del reparto más allá de lo que se haya robado toda la burguesía. […]
Ciertamente, en esta revolución bolivariana ha aparecido una nueva burguesía a imagen
y semejanza de la que se construyó en la cuarta república. Sea más o menos cierto, más
allá de los discursos, más allá de esa dirigencia que puede ser incapaz, corrupta,
mediocre, la gran posibilidad está en el pueblo que entendió y asumió el discurso de
Chávez y pudiéramos estar en un proceso de transición hacia otro momento.138
citizen is doing economically, and it is calculated by simply adding the annual inflation rate to
the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate:” https://inflationdata.com/articles/misery-index/
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See the next chapter for a more detailed explanation of Venezuela’s current poverty rates.
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Eyanir Chinea and Corina Pons, “Venezuela ex-ministers seek probe into $300 billion lost in
oil revenue,” Reuters, February 2, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politicsidUSKCN0VB26F
Editorial Board, “Prepare for the worst: Venezuela is heading towards complete disaster,” The
Washington Post, February 11, 2016: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/inflationpoverty-food-shortages-venezuela-heads-toward-disaster/2016/02/11/10aad5b4-d035-11e5-88cd753e80cd29ad_story.html
Regarding Venezuela’s current poverty rate, see: “Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de
Condiciones de Vida, ENCOVI 2016, Universidad Simón Bolívar Noticias, February 21, 2017
https://usbnoticias.info/post/49835
Due to the lack of official statistics, the study, called ENCOVI, is a household survey of 6,430
families conducted by the Central University of Venezuela, the Andrés Bello Catholic
University, and the Simón Bolívar University together with the Fundación Bengoa Food and
Nutrition Group and other non-governmental organizations.
138 “I am a psychiatrist and have a Master’s in Oil Economy. A journalist asked me about this
double condition and I answered: nothing more natural, Venezuela is oil and madness. Of course,
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But Venezuela transitioned somewhere else. According to a Washington Post editorial:
The country is running desperately short of food and medicine. Venezuelans spend much
of their time waiting in lines outside stores, but increasingly the shelves are bare. The
head of the national pharmaceutical association appealed for aid to the World Health
Organization, saying that distribution of 70 percent of basic medicines was disrupted. The
chairman of the largest domestic food producer has said that if the government does not
quickly seek aid to import food, it “will cause grave harm to ordinary Venezuelans.”139
A second factor proposed by the Chavistas to understand the increment in violent crime
is that Venezuela “has become the main transit country for Colombia’s cocaine, which has led to
the presence of Colombian criminal networks in Venezuela and the development of organized
crime.”140 However, that argument suffers from mistaking the consequences of a series of
deliberate and horrendously executed policies with the causes of violent crime, and points us
again to the same responsible party by referring us to the Chavista era. A third, very important
consequence whose implications take us closer to our root cause has to do with what has been
called “the privatization of security in Venezuela.”141 This process, by which individuals and the
infamous “collectives” take the law into their own hands, is a direct consequence of the power
it doesn't stop there. What best defines it is the rentier capitalism that Chávez himself called
rentier socialism, and, as it happens with socialism in general, it is now clearer that there was no
such socialism before, but rather State capitalism […] An important change has taken place in
the distribution of income. Any Venezuelan knows that, from those who have become rich at the
expense of the poor, all the way to the poor who continue living in poverty, but who –from a
street vendor, all the way to a cab driver– expect a part of this sharing, beyond what all the
bourgeoisie might have stolen […] Certainly, a new bourgeoisie has appeared in this Bolivarian
revolution, in the image and likeness of the one built during the fourth republic. Whether it's true
or not, beyond the speeches, beyond that leadership that might be incapable, corrupt, mediocre, I
believe that the great possibility lies in the people, who understood and assumed Chávez's
discourse, and we might very well be in a transitional process towards another moment.”
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vacuum caused by the “abandonment of state protection and the absence of punishment, rampant
corruption in almost all branches of the security forces, a lack of investment in the police force,
weak gun control which has led to a proliferation of arms, and a lack of coherent security policy”
that manifests in nearly every conceivable area: from routine lynching to extrajudicial killings.142
A more recent, equally ominous result has been the militarization of repressive security
under the so-called “People’s Liberation Operation”—“OLP” by its acronym in Spanish—, that
neither “points to a decline in violence in society, but, on the contrary, to an increase.” Adding to
the Masacre de Barlovento, the Observatorio Venezolano de la Violencia estimates that police
officers shot dead about 3,800 people in 2016, making the OLP one of the most homicidal forces
in the world.143 As mentioned, the OVV was founded by the Social Sciences’ departments of
Venezuela’s largest public universities to address the vertiginous increment in violent crime in
2005—well into the years of unimaginable riches gained from a stark rise in oil price, the same
year that the government stopped providing official figures of violent crime—. They explain:
The institutional destruction that the country continues to suffer from is the most
significant explanatory factor in the sustained increase in violence and crime. The
institutions of society, in terms of social life based on trust and governed by rules and
laws, is diluted more and more each time to the arbitrary power and the predominance of
social relations based on the use of force and weapons.144
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Other structural and cultural factors that promote mayhem in the region in general could be
mentioned, such as a machista penchant for violence (partly because of a mistrust or incapacity
for the verbal articulation of feelings), alcohol and drug addiction, the lack of opportunities for
education and employment, an excess of segregation in the cities, and urban density in the slums,
perhaps even the diminished role of religion and the church, but they would be only of academic
interest here, for they cannot truly explain Venezuela’s distinctively off the charts statistics.
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The two best-known principles of criminal investigation are: first, asking, “who benefits?” when
a crime has been committed; and, secondly, figuring out if there is a pattern to the crime. If the
answer to the first is obvious, I expect to have suggested a “pattern of institutional destruction”
that is at the core of most of Venezuela’s off-the-charts realities in this absurdly compounded
catastrophe. Together with the abysmal levels of corruption, incompetence, and disrespect for
civilian laws of a government essentially militaristic, where obedience rather than efficiency has
been the cardinal rule, that pattern should help explain the most recent failed state in our world:
The descent began almost twenty years ago. When Chavez took power in Venezuela in
1999 and launched his so-called “Bolivarian revolution,” he echoed the socialist
programs of socialist ally Cuba in investing in poorer communities, running literacy
campaigns and setting up health clinics with Cuban doctors. More equality, he hoped,
would lead to less crime. [Yet] Chavez criticized the police for being repressive, while
his hardcore supporters formed their own armed groups ostensibly to fight crime. Roberto
Briceño, a sociologist who heads the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, says the tactic
weakened law enforcement and led to increasing chaos on the streets. “There has been a
destruction of the institutions, a breaking of social rules,” Briceño says. “There are armed
groups the police know they can’t touch.” At the same time, Venezuela has seen the
growth of the criminal gangs that plague much of Latin America […] There are drug
cartels with links to the security forces, several leftist guerrilla groups, right wing
paramilitary forces opposed to the socialist government, and heavily-armed street gangs.
This tangle of competing gunmen has proven a lethal cocktail. When supporters of
Chavez formed the armed community groups, known as collectives, the socialist
government largely tolerated them, rarely seizing their guns or raiding their bunkers.
Cienfuegos [not his real name] claims there are now about 8,000 such militants in
Venezuela, mostly in the Caracas area, although there is no official registry.145
But as if a humanitarian crisis and having become one of the most violent countries in the
world were not enough, this anti-socialist destruction of the country’s institutions has had as well
tragically inconsistent consequences. Next, we explore in what ways and how they came about.
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Third Chapter
Venezuela’s Crooked Lorenz Curve: Matching Homicides, Inequality, and Corruption
The diverse natures of men, combined with the necessity to satisfy in some manner the
sentiment which desires them to be equal, has had the result that in the
democracies they have endeavored to provide the appearance
of power in the people and the reality of power in an elite.
Vilfredo Pareto
The correlation between high income inequality and a sharp increase in homicides has been well
documented by scholarly studies during the past few decades. There is also abundant academic
literature that explains this reality’s socio-psychological dynamics.146 In an ambitious study
conducted in 39 countries between 1965 and 1995, World Bank economists Pablo Fajnzylber,
Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza found that homicides and inequality are positively
correlated within countries and between countries. This is a causal interaction. That is, inequality
induces homicides. They explain: “income inequality, measured by the Gini index, has a positive
and significant effect on homicide rates. By using the corresponding coefficient estimate, we can
evaluate the crime-reducing effect of a decline in inequality in a given country.”147 There are two
competing explanations for this correlation and both are consistent in their findings of a robust
correlation between homicides and inequality. The first one, from the camp of the economists,
explains that “crime rates (in general) depend on the risks and penalties associated with
apprehension and the potential gains from crime and the associated opportunity cost.”148 They
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argue that crime may be more prevalent in poor communities because the distribution of police
services and the justice system favor the rich. The second view, from the sociological camp, sees
the problem rather as one of “relative deprivation,” and proposes that “inequality breeds social
tensions as the less well-off feel dispossessed when compared with the wealthier.”149 Thus, they
maintain that “the feeling of disadvantage and unfairness leads the poor to seek compensation
and satisfaction by all means, including committing crimes against both poor and rich.”150
Without providing official statistics, the Chavista discourse still persuades too many that
Venezuela has now at least a more equal and just society. But with a reality so distorted that it is
impossible to measure with the usual inequality ratios, I will resort to its homicide statistics to
portray how the facts contradict that discourse. I do not pretend that what I have written in this
text will show a bulletproof causal interaction between homicides and inequality in Venezuela.
Instead, paraphrasing the political scientist James C. Scott’s preface to his Against the Grain: this
chapter “aims, at its most ambitious, to ‘connect the dots’ of existing knowledge in ways that
may be illuminating or suggestive” of a robust correlation. 151 For rather than ameliorating the
country’s historical average inequality for Latin America, here I will suggest how Chavismo’s
self-styled “socialism” has made of Venezuela one of the most unequal countries in the world.
As we have seen, in Venezuela’s case, poverty cannot explain its skyrocketing crime
statistics during Chavismo’s first fifteen years. And the last three years of steadily declining oil
revenues, continuing rise in violent crime and drastic worsening of poverty, extreme poverty,
and—as we will argue in this chapter—of growing vast inequality do not change this fact:
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In the previous chart, we see how except for the sharp but brief drop in oil prices that
occurred between June of 2008 and February of 2009, the period from 1999 to 2014 was marked
by a prodigious increase in oil revenues that was strategically redistributed but benefited people
of all classes.152 Oil prices quadrupled in the fifteen months after Chávez was elected president
from its lowest price in a quarter century: from $6.33 in January of 1999 to $25.12 in April of
2000, when he was first reelected.153 They kept or exceeded ten times the price of January of
1999 from 2006 until November of 2010. Twenty times the price of the month after Chávez
gained the presidency in 2008 and fifteen times the price of January of 1999 between the years
2011 and 2014.154 Adding to that superabundance, Venezuela’s foreign debt increased from
about $35 billion in 1998 to $139 billion in December of 2016. 155 Equally counterintuitive is
Theodore Cangero, “Venezuela, Socialism, Hyperinflation, and Economic Collapse,”
American Insitute for Economic Research, AIER, March 1, 2017:
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that, in these eighteen years, homicides rose in Venezuela only at the pace of its foreign debt, for
they nearly quadrupled, from 32.9 homicides per 100,000 people in 1999 to 119.87 in 2016: That
is, during the most affluent period in the history of a country that was rich beyond measure by
nearly every other developing country’s standard, Venezuela’s homicide rates went through the
roof. Meanwhile, its government switched its official statistics for a growing socialist rhetoric. 156
In the previous chapter we proposed that the root cause of Venezuela’s aggregate
catastrophe has been the systematic dismantling of its democratic institutions—which is exactly
the opposite of any other democratic socialism. But if Chavismo gained legitimacy as some sort
of social democracy by means of fifteen elections (while oil prices reached or were at their
historical peak), in time it portrayed itself as a new kind of socialism that would upgrade the old
institutions. In this chapter we explore how the litmus test for any socialism: within-country
income inequality, compares with its reality today. Although the last Gini indexes available for
Venezuela—from 2006 until about 2011—reflect a decrease in income inequality from 0.5 to
0.4, I will introduce this subject with a chart that we already know, if certainly with a twist:157
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Besides being the most homicidal countries in the world, there is another trait shared by
this chart’s y-axis list—except for Venezuela, according to its government’s socialist discourse
and its non existent statistics. But it is neither the size of their populations nor their degree of
economic development—or of global power—but that all are among the most unequal countries
in the world. But for South Africa, all are in the Americas. In South Africa’s case, together with
Namibia (until 1990 governed by South Africa under its apartheid laws) and their landlocked
neighbor, Botswana, these are the only middle-income countries among the thirty-five that
compose Sub-Saharan Africa. And the three have alternated the title of most unequal country in
the world since reliable data became available in the 1980s. As economist Branko Milanovic
explains in his Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, “a higher total
income allows a part of the population to enjoy much higher incomes without driving everybody
else beyond the starvation point. Higher income gives more ‘space’ for inequality to increase.”158
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Before continuing with the Latin American countries in the previous homicide chart to
decipher Venezuela’s reality, the United States provides a key missing element. The U.S. makes
the chart with four cities, although those four cities combined make roughly 0.7 percent of the
U.S.’s population. But with about 4.4 percent of the world’s population, the U.S. has over twenty
two percent of the world’s incarcerated population. Either calculating per 100,000 people or per
total populations, the U.S. has by far more prisoners than any other country in the world.159
International Rates of Incarceration 2015 - International Center for Prison Studies (ICPS)

But, perhaps more interestingly, when we correlate the steep rise of the U.S. inmate
population since 1980, the year when income inequality started a vigorous return in the U.S. after
decades, we get a chart that almost mirrors its inequality. That proportion remains when include
total correctional population (adding the people in probation and parole), for a total of over 2%

And Namibia, which is also one of the world’s most sparsely populated countries, in its Hardap
region has a homicide rate higher than that of Johannesburg: 39.6 per 100.000 people. Botswana,
landlocked in Southern Africa, and Lesotho and Swaziland, two tiny countries respectively
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of the U.S. people!160 Both the incarcerated and correctional populations increased fourfold since
1980, and income after taxes for the top one percent also quadrupled (while the bottom quintile’s
growth has been just of about 20%, and that of the next three quintiles of roughly 40%):161
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The United States, which according to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development’s thirty five members is the group’s most wealth-unequal country (as well as the
third most income-unequal after Chile and Mexico), would fare far worse in homicide rates were
it not for its well honed, gargantuan policed State.162 This is also important because it explains
the otherwise odd absence from the chart of two of the six most conspicuously unequal countries
in Latin America: Chile and Panama. However, if Panama does not show by cities, it is one of
the twenty-five countries with the highest homicide rates.163 And the Chilean miracle continues
at the expense of being second only to the United States in the OECD’s incarceration rates:164
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The extreme violence among rival gangs, “the maras,” that move between El Salvador and the
U.S. afflicting both countries has been the continuation, by other means, not of diplomacy but of
the civil war that ravaged El Salvador from 1979 until 1992. Following the war’s devastation, its
Gini coefficient has continued a downward spiral: from 53.95 at the end of the conflict to 41.84
(in 2014).165 Thus, but for the relatively less unequal Jamaica, at the bottom of our homicide
chart and with a Gini of 45.5, the rest of the countries shown are the most unequal in Latin
America (and after a handful of Sub-Saharan African countries, in the planet); from a highest
Gini of 53,7 in Honduras: 53,5 Colombia; 52,9, Brazil; 52,4, Guatemala; (51,7, Panama and
50,5, Chile, neither in the chart) and 45.9 for the second least equal OECD country: Mexico.166
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It could be argued that our homicide chart represents a sample too small to claim that,
after a certain threshold, income inequality in countries above subsistence level translates into
either exorbitant homicide rates or a “policed state;” and moreover transpose that equation to
prove that Venezuela must be a highly unequal country. Couldn’t it be that, just like Jamaica,
Venezuela is an anomaly? But Jamaica is the chart’s outlier because it appears both at the bottom
and with just one city. While the other forty-nine most violent cities in the world are all spread
among just nine countries, Jamaica, as a country, would never have made it into that chart.
Venezuela, per contra, appears first in the chart by city, and with eight of the fifty most
homicidal cities in the world, second only to Brazil’s twenty-two. There is another dual link
between homicides and income inequality that is out of the scope of this thesis. Namely, that
over two thirds of homicides happen in the cities’ slums, partly as a form to gain or maintain
social status by violent means; and that in Venezuela’s slums, killings while “resisting arrest”
swelled in 2016 from 65% to 80%, together with extrajudicial killings.167 According to every
academic research, Venezuela’s homicide rates alone contradict the Chavista discourse of having
created a more equal society. Rather than ameliorating Venezuela’s average inequality for Latin
America, Chavismo’s “socialism” made of the country one of the most unequal, and it appears
that one of the poorest, in the world: the next maps illustrate the latter point.168 I will conclude
with how a Chavista oligarchy ran with the money both under the radar and off-the-charts.
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According to the UNU’s World Institute for Economics Research, still in the year 2000
Venezuela was one the wealthiest countries per capita in Latin America. Even after the crisis that
brought Hugo Chávez to power, the country was in the “$10,000 to $49,999” group of per capita
wealth with countries like Finland, Saudi Arabia, and New Zealand. In the following two charts,
by the Credit Suisse Research Institute, we see how after a decade of superabundant oil revenues,
by 2012, the country was of average wealth, comparable to Russia, Eastern Europe, and China.
By 2016, Venezuela was ranked in the “Below USD 5,000” category, at the levels of India, the
poorest Asian and Latin American countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa excluding Southern Africa.
How could over one trillion dollars from oil revenues be squandered, or merely disappear
in fifteen years in a country with a tenth of the United States’ population? For the specialists in
income distribution, the name of Vilfredo Pareto holds a special place. Branko Milanovic, former
lead economist in the World Bank’s research department, says: “[Pareto] was the first economist
to have been seriously interested in empirical analysis of inter-personal inequality,” rather than in
the fixed social classes of landowners, capitalists, and labor that had been compared up until that
time.169Although his across the board generalization of an immutable 20/80-distribution has been
widely discredited in modern economics, two of his theories do apply to the Venezuelan case.170
169
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The first is his 20/80-distribution as it relates to Chavismo in a sui generis way. For if
after World War II the efficiency of social institutions (and of social expectations in a newly
polarized world) to achieve a more democratic redistribution of income spread to most of the
West—and, in Latin America solidly to Venezuela thanks to its wealth and to the exclusive
partnership that its oil guaranteed with the U.S., Chavismo is at its core a movement against
modernity. Disguised as a progressive discourse, it displaced the old elite—Pareto’s theory of
the “circulation of elites”—first by votes and, only after taking over the old institutions with its
military-civilian alliance, by sheer power.171 This is clear these days of canceled elections, the
shutting down of congress, the proscription of opposition leaders and of intensified repression.172
Pareto died less than a year into Mussolini’s regime; whether he would have agreed with
Fascism, as his detractors assert, or not, his observations of how the dynamics of power operated
in most of the world until the first two decades of the twentieth century—regardless of political
system—apply to Chavismo today. But sadly, in Venezuela’s case not only most of the old elites
were either displaced or assimilated; in 2016, the ravages of Chavismo’s institutional destruction
achieved its “Pareto Principle:” After years of strangling and expropriating private industries and
farm lands that were later abandoned, just when the country must import nearly everything but is
bankrupted, the UPI reports that: “Venezuela's Living Conditions Survey found that nearly 75
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percent of the population lost an average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 due to a lack of proper
nutrition […] and 82.8 percent of Venezuelans are considered poor due to their income.” 173
But if all that Chavismo’s “socialism” has achieved is to recreate a crude 20/80 Pareto
distribution by squeezing 80% of the former middle classes into the bottom levels of poverty, the
Gini index could still indicate a reduced inequality as long as there has been a decrease in all
declared incomes.174 For its part, the Palma index, which I present below, only considers the
ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income divided by the share
of the poorest 40%. But if we were to apply only that ratio to the current Venezuelan reality, we
would neglect precisely 80% of the people that suffered a cataclysmic shift as to their formerly
more homogeneous share, which is why José Gabriel Palma excludes them. He elucidates:
There is a high degree of homogeneity across regions/countries regarding the share of
income that the middle and upper-middle classes are able to appropriate. This is most
striking among rich countries — i.e., no more diversity here, as in the Gini and top and
bottom deciles. Moreover, Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union are
no longer outliers; and South Africa and Brazil (as well as Latin America’s median
country, Peru) are close to India, Uganda (Sub-Saharan Africa’s median country), and
Thailand (East Asia-2 median country) […] The other major stylised fact is that the share
of this half of the population is about half of national income […] perhaps rather than
‘middle classes’ from now on this group should be called the ‘median classes’ […]
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change from the ‘heterogeneity’ at the top to the ‘homogeneity’ in the middle is abrupt,
taking place as soon as one moves from the distributional scene of D10 to that of D9. 175
In fact, as Palma sums up: “half of the world's population (the middle and upper-middle
classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes.”176
He explains this as a “a centripetal force [that] leads to growing uniformity in the income-share
appropriated by deciles 5 to 9.”177 Confirming this, even during the severe crisis that affected
Venezuela from the mid 1980s until the turn of the century, income poverty spread to its bottom
six deciles (although income in general eroded). But with 82.8% of the population income poor
today, even a part of D9, the “well-to-do,” has been impoverished. Thus, considering only the
ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income divided by that of the
poorest 40% simply cannot reflect the collapse in income that desolates 82.8 % the country.
In Venezuela, only D9, that second richest ten percent composed by some surviving
medium-size entrepreneurs, the highest-paid professionals and the landlords of at least a handful
of properties can be considered “middle class” in one of the most unequal countries in the world.
And, at over 80% of income poverty, D9 is also vanishing.178 That staggering slant that we have
found in many of its charts is perhaps a ghastly resemblance of Venezuela’s true Lorenz curve.179
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But ratios can be revealing as well because of what they cannot account for. If efficiently
implemented, Chavismo’s proclaimed social investments would have reduced inequality in ways
difficult to measure by the Gini index. However, with a hyperinflation of 4,000% in 2017 (The
IMF projects it will be of 13,000% in 2018), other than for the few and disappearing subsidized
staples that can be found—normally under extreme hardship—the most basic needs have reached
astronomical prices for all but the ultra rich.180 This has the obvious effect of increasing income
inequality in ways that the Gini was not designed to detect; and these two distortions do not
cancel each other out either, because extreme poverty affects now half of the Venezuelan people,
of which eight deciles (82.8%) are income-poor today. Regarding the Palma ratio, this poverty
happens in a country where due to its hyperinflation the highest salaries pale when compared to
the untraceable incomes that result from trading preferential dollars and a monopoly of imports
“Income Inequality,” StatisticallyInsignificant, July 25, 2011:
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180
Biller, Ibid. Noah Smith, “Venezuela is living a hyperinflation nightmare,” Bloomberg View,
December 19, 2017: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-12-19/venezuela-is-livinga-hyperinflation-nightmare
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purchased with them, their distribution, and many times their illegal resale or re-export at huge
profits; and from the allocation of money for “social investments” and infrastructure in a country
where the treasury is managed by what a couple of my interviewees termed a “mafia State.”181
María Corina Machado explained this to me in a way that we can no longer ignore:
Este es un régimen que está concentrando toda la propiedad y las decisiones en un grupo
cada vez más reducido de personas, con un comportamiento muy preocupante porque,
para mí, se asemeja cada día más no a Cuba sino a Rusia, donde tenemos una mafia
State [in English]. Esto no es la operación de un sistema capitalista, con el cual, incluso,
podamos tener todos nuestras diferencias. Quiero hacer la diferencia para describirte lo
que yo creo que va a ocurrir en Venezuela. En la esencia de un régimen liberal hay
competencia, hay reglas de juego claras, hay estado de derecho, hay independencia de
poderes a los efectos de hacer respetar los compromisos. Esto no es lo que existe en
Venezuela hoy en día. Lo que hay dramáticamente se asemeja cada día más a la
operación de la mafias que han ido ocupando instituciones y donde las reglas no son las
establecidas explícitamente, transparentemente, en un contrato como es la Constitución o
como son las leyes de la República. Por eso se ha convertido en lo que está pasando. 182
The astronomical difference between the long-held lowest official exchange rate of 10
bolivars per U.S. dollar, until January 26 of 2018 (there are still two rates), and its black market
value of 266,630.08 bolivars per U.S. dollar, that same date, brings to mind the “wheat and
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And in a continent where, as Palma argues: “according to ECLAC (2010a) income tax
evasion […] fluctuates between 40 per cent and 65 per cent, equivalent on average to 4.5 per
cent of GDP.” Ibid., 35. One can only imagine the numbers in today’s fully rentierist Venezuela.
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“This is a regime that is concentrating all property and decisions on an ever-shrinking group
of individuals with a very alarming behavior that I find every day more, not like Cuba, but like
Russia. Here we have a mafia State. This isn't the operation of a capitalist system, with which we
all could have our differences. I want to point out the difference in order to describe to you what
I believe will happen in Venezuela. In the essence of a liberal regime, there's competition, there
are clear game rules, there is rule of law, there is independence of the branches of government to
make sure agreements are respected. This is not what exists in Venezuela today. What we have
looks dramatically more and more, every day, like the operation of mafias that have occupied
institutions and where the rules aren't those explicitly, transparently, established in a contract like
the Constitution or the laws of the Republic. That is why it has turned into what is going on.”
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chessboard problem.”183 “If a chessboard were to have wheat placed upon each square such that
[starting with one grain in the first] it would double the number of grains on each subsequent
square, how many grains of wheat would be on the chessboard at the end?”184 The short answer
is: “about 1,645 times the global production of wheat in 2014.”185A shorter one would be:
“enough to ruin the richest country on earth.” In a smaller scale, that is how many privileged
government officers, civilian and military, have benefited for years from their ever-growing
centrifuges of “small” transactions. But what follows is how the government operated with the
Brazilian Odebrecht in just one of scores of “big” transactions assigned without public bidding:
Entre 2010 y 2014, Corpoelec tomaba el monto de la factura de OIV en dólares y lo
convertía en bolívares a la tasa del cambio preferencial [then of 4.30]. Luego se sumaba
a la factura en bolívares. El total se desglosaba en dos partes, 80% y 20%. El primer
monto se reconvertía en dólares (a tasa preferencial), y el segundo se mantenía en
bolívares. Así, una factura de 2,3 millardos [2.3 billion] de bolívares y 18,8 millones de
dólares se convertía en una de 491 millones de bolívares y 456,9 millones de dólares.
“fueron más de 1.000 facturas que pasaron así”, relata el ingeniero de Odebrecht […]
“Todo el mundo sabía que eso permitiría más robo”, recuerda otro ingeniero. “Pero
arriba se dijo que se firmaba. Corpoelec tenía a Chávez presionando encima, había
elecciones y mucho dinero […] “Por esa vía se pagaron 1.000 millones de dólares,
buena parte en comisiones para la gerencia del proyecto de Tocoma”, agregó. 186
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“From 2010 to 2014, Corpoelec [Corporación Electrica Nacional, a fully integrated state
power corporation] would take the sum of OIV's bill [OIV Consortium, constituted by Odebrecht
Venezuela, Impreglio, and Vincler] in dollars, and convert it to bolivars at the preferential
exchange rate [4.30 at the time]. Then, they would add this to the invoice in bolivars. The total
would be broken-down in two parts, 80% and 20%. The first sum would be re-converted into
dollars (at the preferential rate), and the second would be left in bolivars. Thusly, an invoice for
2.3 billion bolivars and 18.8 million dollars would become one for 491 million bolivars and
456.9 million dollars. ‘It was over 1,000 invoices that were processed like this,’ says Odebrecht's
engineer […] “everybody knew that that allowed for even more stealing,’ recalls another
engineer. ‘But the word from above was to sign. Corpoelec had Chávez breathing down their
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The day I write this, “Tocoma” is a still unfinished hydroelectric power plant, one of 23
incomplete giant projects directly assigned by Chávez to Odebrecht.187 About a related situation,
Andrés Oppenheimer, a journalist recipient of multiple awards, reports: “Venezuela’s PDVSA is
likely to have funneled $11 billion in illegal payments to government officials and their allies
during the same period, according to an October 2016 investigation by Venezuela’s opposition
led National Assembly.”188 Indeed, there are dozens of bank accounts, a few in the billions of
U.S. dollars and many more of lesser millionaire sums, that belong to both former and current
Venezuelan government officers or their front men that have been well-documented from
Switzerland trough Andorra to Panama, and in other fiscal paradises as well as in the U.S.189 It
should not take a lot of effort to project some “wheat and chessboard” numbers to understand
necks, there were elections coming and lots of money […] That way over 1 billion dollars were
paid, a good part of it for commissions for management of the Tacoma project,’ he added.”
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how the “Socialism of the 21st Century” was Chávez’s most ingenious myth besides his own
persona. Thanks to millions of devoted believers and the nation’s money, he made it catch fire in
the continent and among many progressive scholars, while making of a developing nation that
just decades ago was one of the richest in the world not only a poor country today, but also one
of the most income-unequal on earth. Or, as the director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin American
Center – Atlantic Council, Jason Marczak, argued: “This is a country that was an economic star
in the region, and now we have a country with sub-Saharan conditions in our hemisphere.”190
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Concluding Journalistic Postscript: About Political Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Would it not be easier for the government to dissolve the people and elect another?
Bertolt Brecht
Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely,
the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy,
but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance.
Hanna Arendt
Amid declining oil prices and shortages of basic food and supplies, for the first time in sixteen
years, on December 6 of 2015, the opposition won parliamentary elections in Venezuela. It won
overwhelmingly; with 74.3% of voter participation, the opposition’s bloc, the Mesa de Unidad
Democrática (MUD), obtained 112 seats vs. 55 of the official PSUV, a two-thirds supermajority
to legislate.191 An internal scuffle to reject the results was quashed late that night, when the
minister of defense gave a then rare press conference surrounded by his high command to
guarantee that, whatever the results, the popular will would be respected. Well after midnight,
the government recognized its parliamentary defeat and swiftly maneuvered to neutralize it.192
Less than two weeks later, days only before handing over the Asamblea Nacional, the
still Chavista-controlled body elected 13 Supreme Court justices and 21 acting judges to replace
those whose terms were to expire under the newly elected parliament, violating in the process all
the legal terms and procedures mandated by the Constitution.193 In turn, in January, that newly
appointed Tribunal Supremo de Justicia declared the National Assembly outside the law after
disqualifying the three legislators from the opposition block that represented the aboriginal
191
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peoples—exactly the number that granted the opposition a supermajority— alleging that they
had committed fraud to win the elections. However, no remedies were provided (not even a new
election in that state) and the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia declared the new Asamblea Nacional
in contempt, voiding all its legislative and political attributions as well as its role of comptroller
by instructing all government officers that had been summoned to investigate embezzlement and
other crimes to disregard the new Asamblea’s requests.194 On January 15, the Tribunal Supremo
granted President Nicolás Maduro emergency powers to rule by decree.195 On October 20th, the
Consejo Nacional Electoral, a Chavista-appointed “Electoral Power,” cancelled the presidential
referendum on the grounds of four complaints filed by Chavista officers in regional criminal
courts questioning the validity of signature recollection.196 Two days earlier, it had suspended
gubernatorial elections stating that it was a priority to resolve the economic crisis.197 In the
meantime, Maduro stated publicly that there would be no new elections until they were certain
that they could win: “Cuando haya elecciones que el CNE las convoque, no sé cuándo, en qué
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año; cuando volvamos a llegar al campo electoral debemos tener asegurada la victoria.”198 He
also promised they “would win with guns what they could not by votes.”199 Despite the growing
clamor, just as it had happened whenever opposition governors and mayors had been stripped of
any real power by defunding their local governments and/or creating parallel jurisdictions run by
Chavista loyalists, on the domestic front the country seemed to return to the watchful control of
the Chavista Executive and its still subservient Judiciary, Electoral, and “Citizen” branches.200
Internationally, however, but also with grave repercussions for the country, the Chavista
government faced a predicament. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, only the National
Assembly has the power to authorize—and thus make binding—any international agreements
entered by the government, including as well those related to its foreign debt. Adding to the dire
economic crisis caused by the sharp drop in oil prices that started in 2014, countries that were
already reluctant to continue lending money to the Chavista regime realized that there would be
no legal way in the future to enforce any agreements entered with the Venezuelan government if
the Asamblea Nacional did not first approve them.201 On March 30th of this year, after over one
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year of clashes between the branches of government led by the Executive and an emasculated
Asamblea Nacional, the Tribunal Supremo assumed the Parliament’s functions and cancelled the
immunity of its representatives. Two days later, on April 1st, the resulting outcry forced Maduro
to “ask” the Tribunal Supremo to “reconsider” their ruling, which they partially reversed the next
day, but that blunder caused the first significant schism within Chavismo, and its consequences
have brought the country to the forefront of the international news as I write this postscript.202
It is out of the scope of this thesis to analyze the extreme levels of viciousness that the
Venezuelan security forces and Chavismo’s paramilitary colectivos have exerted since April of
this year to suppress months of daily multitudinous protests. Still, a few references are necessary
before I can conclude. In its draft resolution of August 9 to suspend Venezuela from the Human
Rights Council due to “gross and systematic violations of Human Rights,” the UN expresses:
“Alarm” by the findings of the team deployed by the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, which documented the Government of Venezuela’s widespread and systematic
use of excessive force and arbitrary detentions against demonstrators, and patterns of
other human rights violations, including violent house raids, torture and ill-treatment of
those detained in connection with the protests; security forces firing tear gas and
buckshot at anti-Government protestors without warning; the systematic use of
disproportionate force by security forces, mainly the National Guard, the National Police
and local police forces, to instill fear, crush dissent, and to prevent demonstrators from
assembling, rallying and reaching public institutions to present petitions; the role of proGovernment armed groups, or armed colectivos, who routinely break into protests on
motorcycles, wielding firearms and harassing or in some cases shooting at people,
leading to at least 27 deaths (of a total of 124); the arbitrary detention of more than 5,051
people from April through July of this year, with credible reports of cruel, inhuman or
202
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degrading treatment by security forces of such detainees, amounting in several cases to
torture, using tactics such as electric shocks, beatings, including with helmets and sticks
while handcuffed, hanging detainees by the wrists for long periods, suffocation with gas,
and threats of killings, and in some cases threats of sexual violence against the detainees
or their families; and the targeting by security forces of journalists to prevent them from
covering demonstrations, including by shooting at them with tear gas canisters and
buckshot, despite being clearly identified, and by detaining and threatening journalists,
and on several occasions stealing their equipment; [the UN welcomed] the Declaration of
Lima of 8 August 2017 by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, which determined that
Venezuela is no longer a democracy, and that the so-called National Constituent
Assembly is illegitimate; condemned the systematic violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, violence, repression and political persecution, the existence of
political prisoners and the lack of free elections under independent international
observation; expressed concern about the humanitarian crisis; and condemned the refusal
of the Government of Venezuela to allow food and medicine to enter the country. 203
In its article, “Venezuela: Lethal violence, a state policy to strangle dissent,” Amnesty
International establishes a pattern: “These violent acts have targeted dissident demonstrations but
also private homes in several states across the country, which again demonstrates the generalized
nature of this strategy of violence.”204 And as to this premeditated policy, they document how:
Both the illegitimate use of force in all its dimensions, and the development of state
mechanisms of persecution against the population, are framed within a discourse of
incitement to violence that has been promoted and used by the Venezuelan government to
legitimize violence as the standard response to any form of dissent. In particular, calls by
senior officials including President Nicolás Maduro himself, addressed to both state
security forces and pro-government civilian groups, promote the use of force and identify
dissidents as terrorists, enemies and traitors to the motherland […] The illegitimate use of
force against the population on a recurrent basis, the creation of state mechanisms
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dedicated to violent repression, and the repeated discourse of incitement to violence by
the government - indicate a premeditated policy to violently neutralize any dissent.205
More concretely, in the presentation of its “Venezuela: Video footage exposes brutal
repression,” Human Rights Watch describes how security forces terrorize the population:
Security forces have used a variety of riot control munitions – pellets, marbles, teargas
canisters, and other so-called non-lethal cartridges – in response to demonstrations. In
several cases these munitions have been used inappropriately, at too close a range or
directly targeting people, causing deaths or severe injury […] Security forces have also
shot toward demonstrations from rooftops and run over demonstrators with an armored
vehicle. In many cases, the victims clearly posed no imminent threat and offered no
resistance. Some were not even participating in demonstrations. Security forces have
fired teargas canisters directly toward demonstrators, health workers, and the Red Cross
building in Caracas, and into malls, homes, universities, and health facilities.206
By July 31st, from 5,051 civilian detainees of whom 401 were minors, 609 had been tried
in military courts accused of treason and rebellion, according to the U.N.’s High Commissioner
for Human Rights, which reports cases of forced disappearances.207 And of the 1,383 people that
remain in jail, the Venezuelan Penal Forum and Human Rights Watch have reported in a joint
statement that 609 are political prisoners.208 For some opposition leaders, there are over 1,000.209
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This brief review would not be complete without mentioning the government’s response
to try to dodge the accusations of political crimes and of crimes against humanity, for, knowingly
or unwittingly, it has had the nearly universal effect of turning Venezuela into a pariah State. On
July 30th of 2017, Nicolás Maduro’s government held elections to create a “National Constituent
Assembly” decreed by him without a prior referendum. The process has been condemned in the
strongest terms by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro,
and 15 of its members, by the European Union at large and even by countries traditionally
neutral like Switzerland and Norway. 210 This is how the U.S. Department of State described it:
The process was rigged from the start, from the irregular manner in which the election
was decreed to the government’s refusal to permit voters to object to plans to rewrite the
constitution. The balloting itself was further designed to fill the National Constituent
Assembly with Maduro loyalists. In a country suffering from malnutrition, the regime
threatened that those who did not vote would lose access to food, pension, or employment
benefits. Finally, the election lacked credible international observation.211
But besides revising the Constitution of 1999, the immediate goals behind having a new
Constituyente were clear to many: first, to find an alternative to legitimately supersede the
Asamblea Nacional elected by over 14 million people on December 6 of 2015; secondly, to
remove the powerful Chavista Attorney General, Luisa Ortega Díaz, who had denounced the
Tribunal Supremo’s constitutional coup d’état to usurp the Asamblea Nacional’s functions, and
who later became a thorn in the government’s side during the protests by condemning the violent
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repression by security forces and paramilitary colectivos as well as the military trials of civilians
and cases of political prisoners; and, finally, to contrive a new form of electoral legitimation.
The first two proposals were unanimously approved during the Constituyente’s very first
session, even before voting on the new body’s procedures and objectives: Ortega was dismissed,
accused of fomenting violence, and both she and her husband, a congressman, were accused of
extortion.212 That same day, the National Assembly’s attributions were transferred to the new
Constituyente (which, according to Chavismo’s second-in-command, the former National
Assembly’s President, Diosdado Cabello, “would govern Venezuela for up to two years before
presenting the country a new constitution that would allow for elections”).213 And on August
12th, after four months of the reported horrors against the population, and after breaking 21
constitutional articles to come into being by means of the biggest electoral fraud documented in
the country, an again unanimous Constituyente brought forward the twice postponed regional
elections, but not before vetoing the Mesa de Unidad Democrática from nominating candidates
in seven states.214 Indeed, Cabello threatened, only with a “certificate of good conduct,” granted
by the spurious Constituyente, would the opposition’s candidates be allowed to participate. 215
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Adding to this electoral reality, according to the Venezuelan Penal Forum, to date at least
16 of the most popular opposition governors and mayors have been either imprisoned or barred
from public office, or else have fled the country to avoid persecution.216 For her part, after her
own cinematographic escape via Aruba in a speedboat, the former Attorney General and her
husband form part now of the over two million people who compose the Venezuelan diaspora.217
According to her statements in Brazil, she fled the country with multiple dossiers of government
officers and their front men who she had been investigating for corruption and other charges.218
During the spring protests, Pedro Trigo, the renowned Spanish-Venezuelan theologian, author of
over fifty books and articles, explained Chavismo’s transformation after Chávez died as follows:
Aunque la pretensión de Chávez era totalitaria, no llegó a serlo de hecho. Mientras se
mantuvo la bonanza petrolera y el carisma del líder, la propuesta totalitaria fue ganando
terreno a la medida de su capacidad para configurar lo que decretaban. El problema fue
que esa capacidad brilló por su ausencia […] De la revolución no existe ni la sombra.
Pero subsiste el copamiento del espacio por parte del “proceso” para lucrarse, es decir,
mafiosamente. Si no hay ya ninguna pretensión alternativa, ya no hay totalitarismo. Pero
si la anarquización está copada por el gobierno, que se lucra de ella e impide cualquier
vía alternativa, y sobre todo que funcionen los mecanismos institucionales, que son los
canales de la democracia, ante todo las elecciones, pero también la Asamblea Nacional,
es que estamos en una dictadura. Como la gente está hambrienta y enferma y amenazada
siempre por la inseguridad impune ¿cómo se va a oponer al gobierno? […] La inmensa
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Lorena Quintanilla Muñoz, “Once alcaldes de oposición han sido suspendidos por el TSJ,” El
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Alejandra Torres Reyes, Pablo de Llano, Ana Marcos, and Cecilia Ballesteros, “El chavismo
lleva al exilio a más de dos millones de habitantes,” El País, August 12, 2017:
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mayoría de la gente está en contra de él; pero él sigue controlando todos los espacios y
desplaza sin contemplaciones a quien pretende ocuparlos. Es una dictadura.219
Chávez was not, as many in the opposition argued, wearing a democratic mask to preach
the virtues of social justice. He was in fact the first politician in Latin America who effectively
articulated the scandalous inverse correlation between poverty and democracy in the continent at
a time when the neoliberal policies had all but buried that discussion. But Chávez amalgamated a
genuine and at times positively transforming “love for the people” with a totalitarian conception
of power, essentially militaristic although equivocally respectful of democratic forms: he was
indeed the mask of a totalitarian process that tried to seize a whole country by the relentless
dismantling of its institutions. Yet, for this to happen, Chávez first had to pocket the country’s
electoral majority, which he achieved by “naming” its obscene class-divide as one between a
glorious “people,” mostly poor and all Chavistas, and everyone else, who then became the
traitors, oligarchs and right-wingers of Chavismo’s socialist discourse. But Chávez also needed
abundant money, and, paradoxically, he could never achieve his totalitarian goals while oil prices
allowed him to generously redistribute it. This was not only out of ineptitude, as Trigo explains,
but also, and mainly, due to what economist José Palma has found as a constant in much of the
219

“Although Chávez's aspiration was totalitarian, it never became a reality. While the oil boom
and the leader's charisma were in full swing, the totalitarian proposal kept gaining ground to the
extent of its capacity to adjust to what was being decreed. But this capacity was conspicuous for
its absence […] Not even a shadow remains of the revolution. But the occupation of spaces by
the “process” in order to profit, that is to say, as a mafia, subsists. If there can no longer be any
alternative aspiration left, totalitarianism is no more. But if the turn into anarchy occupies the
government, which profits from it and impedes any alternative way, and, above all, impedes
institutional mechanisms, which are the channels for democracy – of elections, above all, but
also the National Assembly – [it means that] we are in a dictatorship. Since the people are
hungry and sick, and always threatened by crime and impunity, how are they going to oppose the
government? […] The vast majority of the people are against it, but it remains in control of all
spaces and displaces anyone who intends to occupy them without hesitation. It is a dictatorship.”
Pedro Trigo, s. j. “Venezuela, ¿del totalitarismo a la dictadura?”, América 2.1 (originally in
Teología Hoy), May 30, 2017: http://americanuestra.com/pedro-trigo-s-j-venezuela-deltotalitarismo-la-dictadura/
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world: In Venezuela, too, the middle classes had acquired strong “property rights” over half of
their national income. Despite the ruin of most of the country’s private industry and agriculture,
while money was still abundant there was a relatively fluid market for the professionals of the
public and private sectors and medium and small commerce owners and workers: they and their
families were variously middle-class. However, less than three years of meager oil revenues and
the corrupt diversion of much of that revenue into the “Boligarchy’s” pockets have been enough
to reveal the across-the-board devastation and plunder of the country’s economy. What a failed
totalitarian and coup d’état leader could not achieve by design, to own a country, is now being
openly sought by force. Chavismo, today, is a dictatorship. Ironically, the dangerous mix of
humanitarian catastrophe and violent repression that is spiraling out of control under Chávez’s
anointed heir, Nicolás Maduro, was best forewarned upon Chávez’s death by one of the de facto
powers behind the throne in Venezuela, Diosdado Cabello: “Yo les digo, señores, ustedes tenían
que haber rezado mucho para que Chávez siguiera vivo, señores de la oposición, porque Chávez
era el muro de contención de muchas ideas locas que a veces se nos ocurren a nosotros.” 220
And just as the Chavista regime and too many scholars worldwide keep blaming it all on
an economic and informational war promoted by El Imperio and the right wing, and the world’s
right wing keeps denouncing Venezuela’s socialism for all its plagues, the Chavista people will
always have Maduro, Cabello, and whomever they felt that betrayed Chávez’s legacy to blame.
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“ I tell you, gentlemen, you should have prayed a lot for Chávez to stay alive, gentlemen of
the opposition, because Chávez was the wall of contention for many crazy ideas that sometimes
occur to us.” Jesús Chua Espinoza, “Ese Chávez que llamaban loco era el ‘único cuerdo’ ¡No se
equivoquen!” Aporrea, March 23, 2013: https://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a162059.html
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Appendix
About my Interviews and the Interviewees with summaries in Spanish of all interviews

Following, I briefly introduce my interviewees in the order in which we met. After that, I offer in
Spanish the script of questions that guided my conversations to further explore and support many
of the arguments of this thesis. I interviewed the same number of public figures both from the
government and from those who opposed it. Still, from each “side” of this artificially contrived
polarization, two of my interviewees were decidedly critical both of the government and of the
opposition. Due to their historical value, I have also included summaries in Spanish, of roughly
1,200 words each, of all ten interviews, but I present them in counterpoint rather than in the order
of our meetings. The full interviews are available upon request both in transcripts and recordings.
Speaking with notables from the two sides while making them aware of my intentions was itself
a daunting challenge.221 With the country deeply divided after the failed coup d’état of 2002, and
thus deeply paranoid not only of “the enemy” but of being perceived as “collaborators,” for over
a decade most public figures had limited their interviews to their own partisan channels, or, with
luck, to those they considered potential sympathizers. My questions were basically the same for
all my interviewees, adjusted to their circumstances, but they did require some careful wording
and fine-tuning. After the list of my interviewees, I present my script for those in the opposition.
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On a curious note, on July 29 of 2013, during the week I conducted my last three interviews,
former ambassador, congressman, and journalist Vladimir Villegas, since May of that year news
director of Globovisión TV, conducted the first interview in his now popular program, Vladimir
a la 1, a space where, for the first time in over a decade, public figures from both the government
and opposition started granting interviews in the same show. See “Un año de Vladimir a la 1,” El
Nacional, July 29, 2014: http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/opinion/ano-vladimir_113131
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List of Interviewees
Américo Martín: Lawyer, politician, prolific author and editorial journalist, former presidential
candidate and guerrilla leader during the sixties. He was the founder of the leftist MIR party:
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Am%C3%A9rico_Mart%C3%ADn
Luis Pellicer: Historian with an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the Universidad de
Andalucía and a Ph.D. from the Universidad Internacional de Sevilla, Spain. President of
Venezuela's Archivo General de la Nación and President in charge of the Centro Nacional de
Historia: http://www.gacemail.com.ar/notas.php?idnota=17259
Rafael Uzcátegui: Chief Research Coordinator of PROVEA (Venezuelan Program of
Education-Action on Human Rights), one of Venezuela's most prominent Human Rights NGOs;
author of the book Venezuela, Revolution as Spectacle (translated into English) and coeditor of
the only anarchist publication in the country: http://libcom.org/blog/book-review-venezuelarevolution-spectacle-rafael-uzc%C3%A1tegui-09092011
Héctor Enrique Soto: Minister of Culture until 2011, former Vice Minister of the Secretary of
the Presidency and of the “Human Development” Vice-Ministry of Culture; founder of Misión
Cultura in 2005: http://www.aporrea.org/ddhh/n115737.html
María Corina Machado: Founder and former president of the Venezuelan civil organization
Súmate. In February of 2010, Machado resigned from Súmate and announced her candidacy for
the September 10 elections for the National Assembly of Venezuela; she was elected as the
highest vote-getter in the national elections (and was recently impeached):
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mar%C3%ADa_Corina_Machado
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Stalin Pérez Borges: National Coordinator of the pro-government UNT, Unión Nacional de los
Trabajadores (national trade-union confederation); editor of the journal Marea Socialista:
http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?auteur353
José León Uzcátegui: Current Director of Barrio Adentro (social welfare program with over
7,000 centers nationwide to provide healthcare in poor communities), former Health Vice
Minister with an M.A. in Economy, an M.D in Psychiatry, and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences:
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a168442.html
Margarita López Maya: Historian, Academy Member of the Universidad Central de Venezuela
and the Center for Development Studies with expertise in contemporary history and
sociopolitical analysis of Venezuela. Visiting fellow at various universities overseas, including
Oxford, Columbia, and Notre Dame University, and former editor of the Venezuelan Magazine
of Economics and Social Sciences of the Universidad Central de Venezuela:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/margarita-lopez-maya
Tulio Hernández: Arguably one of the handful most influential intellectuals for the opposition.
A sociologist expert in Culture, Communication, and Politics, Academy Member and
international consultant for cultural and urban politics, he is also a well-known cinematographer:
http://www.el-nacional.com/autores/tulio_hernandez/
Luis Ugalde S.J., President of the “Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus
in Latin America,” former Dean of Venezuela's Catholic University; author of numerous books
and essays; member of the Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales.
http://www.ausjal.org/tl_files/ausjal/images/contenido/AUSJAL%20AL%20DIA/AUSJAL%20
AL%20DIA%20PDF/ausjaldia24_en.pdf
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Interview Questions in Spanish
1.- El título aún tentativo de esta tesis es “Venezuela after Chávez: Politics and Propaganda”. Sin
embargo, más que pretender una cándida revelación de las diferencias entre cada discurso
electoral y los diversos sustratos ideológicos, dígame usted: ¿cómo cree que ha cambiado la
conciencia política venezolana durante los últimos tres lustros?
2.- ¿Cuáles son algunas de las discrepancias entre política y propaganda en cuanto al gobierno
y la realidad que vive el país? ¿Cuál es la más grave? ¿A qué las atribuye?
3.- Si algo signa al Chavismo desde sus orígenes ha sido sus contradicciones, muchas de las
cuales se pueden entender a partir del caos político en el que se hundió el país ante el
agotamiento de un sistema que dejó de satisfacer a sus electores. A pesar de ello, el discurso
absolutista y plebiscitario de Chávez, y la reacción de una oposición venezolana rígidamente
liberal, en lugar de explorar las iluminadoras ambigüedades de esta mutación política las han
ignorado. Esto a mi parecer ha empobrecido el discurso político (Y a esto cabría agregársele un
cierto totalitarismo académico de izquierdas que desde el exterior descalifica como
neoconservadora hasta a la oposición más de izquierdas que se le hace al gobierno). Ante este
diálogo de sordos, ¿cómo se hace aún política en Venezuela?
4.- La amalgama de movimientos sociales y políticos que en su momento se aglutinó en torno al
chavismo encuentra hoy equivalencias en la Mesa de Unidad. Ante esta nueva crisis de
legitimidad, la oposición busca formar causa común en torno a candidaturas de consenso,
¿cuáles serían, en lo social, económico y político, algunas discrepancias que usted prevé
deberán dirimirse de resultar exitosa la estrategia unitaria de la oposición?
5.- Esta es una investigación que se realiza desde los Estados Unidos. Como tal, el tema
bilateral me interesa especialmente. Me llama la atención que el desmedido recurso discursivo
que utiliza el gobierno sobre el “imperialismo norteamericano” encuentra un similarmente
asombroso “vacío de discurso” en la oposición frente a una realidad económica y geopolítica
que a lo largo de más de ciento cincuenta años ha implicado más de cincuenta intervenciones
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militares norteamericanas y la “administración” de muchos de nuestros países como sus
virtuales protectorados. Más recientemente, el proceso de globalización sugiere otra virtual
norteamericanización del planeta. Si bien una de las primordiales contradicciones del chavismo
ha radicado en su furibundo discurso antiimperialista versus su total complacencia con una
apertura petrolera que, en los hechos, casi ha devuelto al país al “fifty-fifty” de antes de la
nacionalización de la industria, ¿cuál debería ser, a su entender, la política del “petroestado”
venezolano? Más aún, ¿es este petroestado rentista, importador de casi-todas-las-cosas –bien
sea desde Latinoamérica, el “Imperio” o La China– el único paradigma viable para Venezuela?
6.- En el mismo sentido, ¿cuál cree usted que debería ser la política exterior venezolana en
cuanto a la consolidación de los bloques regionales que ha fomentado el chavismo?
7.- En las últimas ofertas electorales de Henrique Capriles Radonski, se percibe un
acercamiento que parece genuino con muchas de las políticas sociales rescatadas por el
gobierno Chavista. Pero, más a fondo, cabe preguntarse con la historiadora Margarita López
Maya: ¿hasta qué punto podrá negociar la oposición con un proyecto de “Estado Comunal” que
con sus múltiples perversiones de control parece bastante enraizado?
8.- Dice Fernando Mires que “El gangsterismo político es signo de que el populismo ha entrado
a su fase terminal, la que, como ocurre con algunas enfermedades agónicas, también podría ser
duradera”. Ante la progresiva falta de legitimación del actual gobierno y su total renuencia a
dejar el poder, ¿cómo se puede hacer aún política con efectividad?
9.- ¿Podría genuinamente referirse a algunos de los logros del chavismo, planificados y/o
accidentales, que usted cree sería indispensable incorporar en cualquier futuro gobierno?
10.- A su entender, ¿cuáles son las tres peores plagas originales del chavismo que se deberán
erradicar en un futuro gobierno? ¿Por dónde deberemos comenzar para lograrlo?
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1,200-word summaries of all the original interviews in Spanish: a counterpoint

Tulio Hernández
El venezolano se ha convertido en un ser más anómico. Es un fenómeno muy extraño porque,
por un lado, la ciudadanía está más politizada que nunca, entendiendo por politización no
necesariamente militancia sino interés, preocupación, seguimiento de la vida política, pero, por
otro lado, la conducta, los valores, lo que se hace evidente en una salida a la calle es que el
venezolano, incluyendo todas las clases sociales, es alguien cada vez menos apegado a las
normas, alguien que se rige cada vez más no por un sentido de destino común sino por un
sentido de pertenencias parciales y con un gran desapego por lo público. Por ejemplo, puedes
entrar a un barrio, a una casa, y está limpiecita, bonita, pero en la entrada puedes conseguir
toda la suciedad del mundo porque la gente no siente que eso es parte de sus responsabilidades.
Creo que esto, además, tiene que ver profundamente con la polarización, la polarización política
que genera mecanismos de solidaridad mecánica y mecanismos de desprecio automático de
acuerdo a las pertenencias políticas de cada quien. El daño más fuerte de todo esto es que la
gente pertenece primero a un bando que a un país, que a una nación, que a una comunidad
nacional, y ese daño se mantiene en el otro elemento, que yo creo que no es que nació pero que
se ha acrecentado en estos 14 años, que es la introducción del odio en la vida pública, del odio
político, del odio ideológico e, incluso, de uno que estaba soterrado pero que se ventiló
abiertamente que es el odio étnico, que es una sobrevivencia de la era colonial que la
democracia no tuvo ni el tino ni la inteligencia ni la valentía de abordar. Y el otro elemento
negativo de estos 14 años es el retorno y la multiplicación de una tara nacional que nos ha
hecho mucho daño, que es el estatismo y el paternalismo, y una de las incidencias más grandes
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es el retorno de la población a las prácticas del clientelismo que a su vez son prácticas de la
mendicidad instaladas como forma de sustitución del trabajo y de la productividad. Entonces, yo
diría que aquí hay un círculo perverso: como nunca antes somos mono productores, somos un
estado rentista, como nunca el Estado es el distribuidor arbitrario de la renta petrolera y como
nunca antes se ha incrementado en la gente tanto el sentimiento de que el Estado le debe algo y
de que, como el petróleo es propiedad de todos, el Estado tiene obligación de mantenerlo […]
Lo que ya veníamos arrastrando desde los finales de la década de los noventa, que no era una
crisis política cualquiera sino una ruptura civilizatoria, el choque entre dos modelos o dos
maneras de estar en la modernidad o de estar en el siglo XXI, se aceleró, se radicalizó, y yo creo
que éste es un país roto, fragmentado por una población que ya se acostumbró a vivir en medio
del horror, de la emergencia, de la improvisación, en medio de la idea de que el futuro no es
más que una tela opaca, que nadie puede imaginar el futuro. Esto que estoy describiendo es,
para mí, como una sociedad de posguerra. Es decir, en estos 15 años no hubo en Venezuela una
guerra civil en el sentido clásico como la que ocurrió entre sandinistas y contras en Nicaragua,
como la que ocurrió en España entre la falangistas y republicanos, y no hubo tampoco un
proceso autoritario como el de Chile o el de Argentina, pero sí ocurrió ya una guerra profunda
que fue una guerra simbólica, una guerra afectiva, en el orden del lenguaje, que ha dejado,
como todas las guerras, un país devastado, un país moralmente en ruinas, donde hay una gran
sufrimiento de tipo político, término que tomo de la sociología brasileña, usado para referirse a
un sufrimiento producto generalmente de guerras o de grandes confrontaciones que la persona
no puede digerir afectivamente porque no está codificado como tal. Se sigue pensando que lo
político es algo exterior a la subjetividad o a la afectividad. En casos como el de Venezuela,
donde durante 14 años hubo un secuestro de la psique colectiva, es la diferencia entre darle cien
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cachetadas a un niño o decirle repetidamente eres un imbécil, eres un imbécil. Probablemente se
tengan los mismos resultados […] Esa es la percepción que tengo, con un agravante, que en esta
guerra la sensación es que nadie ganó, no hay triunfadores, los dos lados están adoloridos, el
lado que gobierna dice que entre el imperio y la oligarquía le han impedido hacer la revolución,
y el otro lado se siente perseguido, aplastado, perseguido, discriminado, ofendido, humillado.
Entonces, lo que ha ocurrido en el país es una alianza perder-perder.
La obra más acabada de Chávez es él mismo, es decir el haber construido rápidamente
en el imaginario una figura, una leyenda, un liderazgo carismático en los términos de Max
Weber, y con ese liderazgo haber sido el activador también de una afectividad adolorida que era
la de los pobres venezolanos que se sintieron postergados, y no solo los pobres, la clase media
baja también, la clase media que se había sentido defraudada. Ahora, cómo se produce en la
práctica eso, porque no hay discurso que tenga eco sin beneficios concretos, es decir si no hay
una relación costo beneficio. Bueno, en una gran inclusión que se produjo en Venezuela, pero
esa inclusión se produjo a través del mercado. Es decir, los barrios están igualitos, tienen las
mismas carencias. Probablemente lo único nuevo fueron las misiones que hacían sentir a la
gente que se les estaba prestando atención directa, pero la verdadera gran inclusión fue la
redistribución del ingreso que permitió que mucha gente se incorporara al consumo, sobre todo
al consumo de determinados bienes eléctricos, electrónicos, del hogar, y al consumo de ropas de
marcas y al consumo globalizado. Esa inclusión a través del mercado es realmente la única
transformación profunda porque, a juzgar por el aparato económico, esto es un capitalismo de
estado con un mercado tradicional de sociedades mono productoras […] Y lo que sí hay, que es
la otra forma de inclusión, es eso que tú llamas un estado paralelo, que es más parecido a un
campamento, a una emergencia, a un operativo que a una institución sólida; por consiguiente,
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es un estado que se desmorona apenas le quitas el dinero, porque no hay organización. Esto es
lo que me hace suponer que una transformación del país va a tener más dificultades. Es decir,
volver a un mínimo de normalidad democrática, volver a un juego del pluralismo, consolidar las
instituciones, va a tener más resistencia en el orden de la cultura política de la gente y en el
orden de las nuevas economías, sobre todo la economía generada por el narcotráfico y todas las
otras formas de ilegalidad, el contrabando en la frontera colombiana, la corrupción cotidiana.
Aquí puedes traer a administrar a Santa Teresita de Jesús, pero con esa cantidad de
dinero no solo se pervierte, sino que el Estado es más poderoso que la sociedad, hay una
inequidad y hay un desequilibrio, hay un falla de origen para hablar en términos de video,
porque un dirigente político que gobierne un Estado que es más poderoso que el resto de la
sociedad estará siempre tentado al autoritarismo y a la corrupción.

Héctor Soto
Con el chavismo ha habido tremendo avance. El avance en concreto es: yo no quiero trabajar,
pero de todo esto que se reparten denme mi parte. Ciertamente que hay algo cultural que marca
la historia de Venezuela, que es el rentismo. Cuando un país comienza a vivir de algo que sale
del subsuelo y que no está vinculado al trabajo, entonces hay una desviación ideológica. Es muy
difícil así abordar las preguntas que creo que vas a hacer sin establecer una relación entre los
dos grandes programas mundiales de los últimos 200 años, que son todas las corrientes
colectivistas -entre ellas el marxismo o el socialismo, el socialismo de Estado, la
socialdemocracia.- y los programas individualistas -el fascismo, el capitalismo, el
neoliberalismo- todo eso a la luz de un país que se hizo rentista, es decir de un país que
desvinculó por razones históricas el bienestar del trabajo. Cuando el venezolano entendió o
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subjetivizó que su bienestar no tenía que ver con el trabajo, allí se produjo una dislocación
ideológica tremenda, y tiene 120 años. No es del chavismo, ni del marxismo leninismo, ni de AD
ni de Copei. Aquí hay una deformación. El venezolano dijo: se puede vivir sin trabajar. ¿Qué es
lo que pasa con el rentismo, es decir con ese vivir sin trabajar? Eso explica, complejiza, enreda
todo. Vamos a poner dos extremos: la teoría marxista que dice los hombres, por la
industrialización, van a crear una clase obrera que cada día va a ser más explotada y se va a
organizar y va a luchar por tomar los aparatos de producción y después se va a liberar. Pero
¿qué pasa en donde la riqueza sale del subsuelo? ¿Qué pasa? Marx no pudo prever eso […] Él
lo que vivió fue la sociedad industrial, la revolución industrial, las máquinas, pero no se
equivocó cuando dijo que lo económico determina lo socio histórico. Cuando te digo que en
Venezuela cuando aparece el petróleo y se puede vivir sin trabajar te estoy hablando de la
deformación del rentismo. A eso contribuye también el carácter de país tropical. Usted no puede
vivir en pantalones cortos todo el año en Europa ni en los Estados Unidos. Aquí sí.
¿Qué está pasando en Venezuela? Hay una polarización. ¿Qué es eso que se llama
polarización? ¿Es de ideología? Yo pienso que no. Yo pienso que nadie está diciendo la verdad
y nadie está trabajando por construir la fundamentación teórica que dice estar defendiendo. Ni
el chavismo ni eso que llaman la MUD. En general, todos los políticos que hablan por la
televisión, que es nuestro gran medio de comunicación, todos mienten en relación con la
ideología. El asunto de la ideología entra para mí dentro de un esquema muy básico, muy
cartesiano, pero que me permite explicar muchas cosas. En el mundo político hay tres vértices
para decir si uno es de izquierda, de derecha o de qué. El primero es el papel del Estado, el
segundo es el del individuo y el tercero el del colectivo. Son como tres categorías que yo
arbitrariamente utilizo para explicar mi posición. Parto primero del concepto de ideología -que
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es una organización de ideas-, luego lo político -cómo te organizas-, luego lo programático -qué
haces en el día a día-. Yo creo que la revolución bolivariana teóricamente se inscribe en este
vértice que es el colectivismo. En el colectivismo yo ubico un montón de doctrinas que creen que
todos mis actos deberían tener una consecuencia positiva para alguien más y, en consecuencia,
se revierte para mí. Eso es teórico. Allí entonces yo ubico el socialismo, el socialismo de Estado,
el comunismo, el anarquismo, el socialismo en todas sus formas. Cuando el Estado es lo único,
estamos hablando de fascismo. Este es mi punto de vista. Y en el individualismo hay también un
montón de doctrinas respetables: el cristianismo, el liberalismo, el capitalismo, el
neoliberalismo, que es la fase superior del capitalismo. Teóricamente el chavismo se ubicó aquí
y yo me compré esa idea. Ahora ¿qué está pasando en Venezuela? Esto desaparece. Aquí no hay
ningún debate ideológico. Aquí lo que hay es una lucha por los poderes donde hay dinero.
Algunos compañeros están luchando por esas organizaciones llamadas ministerios, etc. de
buena fe, para trabajar por los demás, por los pobres, y otros no. Y yo creo que en la derecha
también pasa lo mismo, pero me cuesta admitir que haya alguien de la derecha luchando por los
pobres.
Chávez entra en una gran confusión ideológica porque la vida no le da tiempo. Cuando
Chávez asume el poder creo que tiene 42 años, un muchacho, y entonces empieza a leer tesis
colectivistas, tesis individualistas. Cuando Chávez tomó el poder comenzó a hablar del tercer
camino, de Toni Blair, y de repente cuando se está muriendo está marxista leninista radical.
Creo que Chávez fue víctima de la social democracia internacional que dirige Ignacio Ramonet,
que es algo parecido al tercer camino que piensa que a los pobres hay que darles un poquito
pero no tanto. Chávez claudicó, siendo un gran hombre. Chávez es un fenómeno, un
extraordinario ser humano. Estuve trabajando cinco años con él, tres muy cercano. Lo tuve

103
cercano y hablamos mucho. Pero los que estaban en Miraflores, y no voy a decir quiénes son,
empezaron a meterle en la cabeza una serie de ideas y Chávez fue el brazo ejecutor para
liquidar las Mesas Técnicas de Agua, los Comités de Tierra urbanos y la Misión Cultura que se
convirtió en una cosa política de 20.000 personas. ¿Pero por malo? No, por chisme, porque son
organismos autónomos. Estaba confundido. Cada semana le entregaban un libro, la primera de
Hollowey, la siguiente de Neri, uno era anti estado y el otro pro estado. Chávez hizo un gran
esfuerzo. De militar empezó a leer y leer y entre estas tres doctrinas hubo una confusión que le
metieron personas con nombre y apellido. Que la historia sepa que Chávez hizo un enorme
esfuerzo. Si no fuera sino porque logró que el petróleo se distribuyera mejor, ya qué más le vas a
pedir. ¿Le vas a pedir doctrina ideológica? La vida biológica no da tiempo para hacer tantas
cosas. Que quede claro que yo reconozco en Chávez una gran intención, pero una gran
confusión ideológica: mucho o todo el poder para el pueblo organizado o poder centralizado;
marxismo leninismo clásico, el partido, o las comunas. El decidió. Y decidió con todo. Eliminó
la Misión Cultura: son demasiado inteligentes y soberbios, prepotentes y autónomos.
Chávez mató, liquidó, eliminó, exterminó, en poco tiempo, en dos años de ejercicio, a los
pendejos, a los idiotas. Hoy en Venezuela, 2013, no hay pendejos. En Venezuela todo el que se
despierta en la mañana y sale a estudiar, a trabajar, sabe para quién trabaja, para quién estudia
y para quién hace cosas. Eso es bien importante porque en un pueblo en donde la política era
algo solo de unos cuantos, de un 10%, de una gente que dirigía pase lo que pase, hemos pasado
a una situación en la cual todo el mundo en Venezuela sabe para qué trabaja, para quién
trabaja, para qué intereses. Creo que ese es un logro de Chávez, y quisiera recordarlo por ahí.
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Américo Martín
Aquí se habla de revolución, pero cómo va llamarse así si lo que ha hecho es aniquilar
las fuerzas productivas. Hasta etimológicamente es un contrasentido. Revolución es avanzar con
doble rapidez […] Hay un detalle en lo que dices que me gustaría destacar. Este gobierno se
declara estatista y, en función de eso, estatiza todas las empresas básicas, además de la
cementera, una serie de empresas alimentarias y otras. Nacionaliza toda una serie de empresas
para encargárselas al Estado. Aquí está el primer problema, que es un debate que se está dando
incluso con el Partido Comunista cubano hoy, que es confundir estatismo con socialismo. Si
confundes estatismo con socialismo pasas por alto una cosa elemental: el Estado genera una
clase nueva que es la que administra las empresas que antes eran administradas por el
empresario privado, pero estos te administraban basados en el interés del lucro y la
competencia -y en la competencia por mayor tecnología y mejores formas de administraciónpero estos no tienen competencia. Estos son malos administradores. Son empresarios privados
pero sin las competencias de los viejos empresarios privados. Eso se ha traducido en una
decadencia de la producción de las empresas estatales. Venezuela está importando todo:
cabillas, cemento, todo. Eso fue el primer error, confundir estatismo con socialismo.
Partamos de esta base: Chávez representó la idea del cambio pero no supo materializarla ni
ideológicamente ni en obra, sino en una apariencia de realizaciones. Las estatizaciones, por
ejemplo. Efectivamente, despojó empresas que funcionaban bien pero que eran de empresarios
privados, burgueses, y las puso en manos de funcionarios del partido que hablaban de
revoluciones. Luego optó por las cooperativas. Ideó un socialismo de cooperativas. Con todo lo
impulsivo que era, y es por eso que los académicos del Norte lo admiran, se dedicó a crear
cooperativas. Hizo más cooperativas que nadie en el mundo. Tenía un dineral para intentarlo.
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Pensaba que crear cooperativas era sencillamente reunir un grupo de personas y darles el
financiamiento. Creó un banco para financiarles. Ese banco naturalmente hacía préstamos que
no recuperaba, nadie controlaba aquello. En fin, se volvió un derroche enorme y el 80 y más por
ciento de las cooperativas desparecieron. Del dinero nunca se supo. Quedaron algunas
convertidas en falsas cooperativas. Para aprovecharse de las excelentes condiciones financieras
y crediticias que se les ofrecían muchas empresas se inscribieron como cooperativas y les
sacaron provecho. Ese fue un momento en el que se dieron cuenta de eso. Pararon. Fue cuando
Chávez dijo que las cooperativas eran otra forma de capitalismo. Nunca recuperaron el dinero.
Quedaron solo las que ya funcionaban de antes, y funcionaban bien, porque la idea de las
cooperativas era una buena idea, pero no para convertirlas en lo que Chávez creía, en la base
para la creación de una sociedad socialista de cooperativas destruyendo la iniciativa privada, la
empresa privada. Todo eso fue un fracaso tremendo pero dejó la idea de que Chávez era
partidario de las cooperativas. Luego creó las empresas de producción social, no basadas en el
espíritu de lucro, para competir con las empresas privadas basadas en el espíritu del lucro. El
resultado fue otro fracaso. No queda ni una de esas empresas. Luego la administración de las
empresas estatales y de las estatizadas, con cogestión para darles participación a los
trabajadores. La experiencia resultó trágica. Finalmente todas las empresas estatales están
destruidas, incluso una que era una joya, Minerven. No vamos a decir que todas las empresas
del Estado están condenadas al fracaso. Pdvsa funcionaba muy bien como empresa del Estado.
La idea no es si es del Estado sino en manos de quién va a funcionar. Esa es la primera idea. Y
la segunda es que si el Estado se vuelve empresario tiene que hacerlo en los términos de correr
riesgo, no de financiar saldos rojos […] De allí que estamos en esa economía que nadie
entiende cómo teniendo un financiamiento tan monstruosamente alto de dólares y divisas para
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una población pequeña, de veinte y pico millones de habitantes, la agricultura se haya reducido
a la cuarta parte de lo que era, se han aniquilado la mitad de las empresas industriales que
habían, todas las industrias del Estado se cayeron, estamos importando gasolina.
He llegado a la conclusión de que los que realmente entiendan que esto es una farsa,
profundamente, son los que vienen del socialismo -marxistas, socialistas- porque nosotros
fuimos formados en varias ideas simples pero exactas. Marx decía que el socialismo implicaba
un desarrollo descomunal de las fuerzas productivas. Precisamente ¿de qué surgía el
socialismo? Lo dice en el prefacio de La crítica de la economía política. Dice que hay un
momento en el que las fuerzas productivas se han desarrollado mucho pero que las relaciones
de producción privadas asfixian ese crecimiento. Entonces, cuando las fuerzas productivas
revientan esas relaciones de propiedad privada es cuando viene la revolución. Es decir, lo que
viene es un desarrollo libre de las fuerzas productivas a tal grado que se producirá una súper
abundancia de bienes materiales y espirituales y llegaremos al comunismo, porque el
comunismo se basa en el principio de que a cada cual según su necesidad y de cada cual según
su capacidad, es decir que aunque tú tengas menos méritos que otros pero tengas más
necesidades te dan más. Ese es el comunismo basado en una solidaridad absoluta, pero para
que eso sea así se requiere que haya una súper abundancia tal de bienes materiales y
espirituales que cada quien reciba de acuerdo con sus necesidades. Esa es la ilusión del
marxismo y del comunismo. Y Marx decía que eso iba a ocurrir al desaparecer la propiedad
privada sobre los medios de producción, porque entonces los trabajadores van a desarrollar
libremente, sin la interferencia de las relaciones de propiedad privada y el derecho privado, la
capacidad productiva. Es entonces cuando dice: de allí daremos el salto del reino de la
necesidad al reino de la libertad. Partamos de este hecho: socialismo equivale a desarrollar las
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fuerzas productivas, porque un socialismo que empobrece las fuerzas productivas es un
retroceso en nombre de la caridad social. Si dejas de producir, la torta es cada vez más
pequeña. Sin embargo, hasta muy entrados los años sesenta, todavía el Partido Comunista
Soviético tenía la idea de producir más que los Estados Unidos y aspiraba a desarrollar una
capacidad productiva bruta superior a la de los Estados Unidos y, después, una capacidad
productiva neta, per cápita, también superior a la norteamericana. Con el tiempo se dieron
cuenta de que eso no caminaba y el socialismo se reconstruyó sobre otras bases, sobre la idea
de que lo material no importa, de que lo que importa es la solidaridad, el amor entre la gente,
etc. Se construyó sobre otros ideales, pero no sobre la base principista de Marx.
Pero la intención de que hay que empoderar a la gente, hay que hacerle participar
activamente en la construcción de una sociedad, que la construcción de una sociedad no es un
grupo de personas que se van a reunir para decidir por los demás. No, así no. Así no va a
funcionar jamás. Dentro de tus propias reflexiones tú tienes que establecer la fuerza de
participación de la gente. Esa es una reflexión que se la debemos a Chávez. Yo lo reconozco
púbicamente.

José León Uzcátegui
Yo soy psiquiatra y tengo una especialización de economía petrolera. Un periodista me
preguntaba sobre esta doble condición y le decía: nada más natural, Venezuela es locura y
petróleo. Claro, no se queda allí. Lo que mejor la define es capitalismo rentista que el mismo
Chávez llamaba socialismo rentista y, como pasa con el socialismo en general, cuando se creía
en el siglo pasado que el capitalismo había llegado a su fin, que casi las dos terceras partes del
mundo eran socialismo, se reveló, y ahora está más claro que antes, que no hubo tal socialismo
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sino capitalismo de Estado, es decir otra manera, ya no es la propiedad individual de los medios
de producción sino la propiedad del Estado, puesta a su vez en manos de los particulares, de la
nomenclatura, de la burocracia.
Con la muerte del presidente Chávez, que mucha gente afirmaba que no existe chavismo
sin Chávez, creo que hay elementos que considerar. El primero es que el chavismo como una
propuesta político ideológica que presentara el rumbo de un socialismo, de lo que Hugo Chávez
llamó el socialismo del siglo XXI, forma parte de la crisis teórica del pensamiento
revolucionario. Es evidente el fracaso del socialismo real por lo menos en lo que conocemos del
siglo XX. Y colocar el socialismo en el siglo XXI no ha resuelto para nada qué entender, por
ponerle un número más. Allí sigue habiendo un problema que no es venezolano. Es un problema
de la crisis del pensamiento de la izquierda a nivel mundial. No es el marxismo en crisis. Es qué
se entiende hoy en el mundo por una propuesta postcapitalista, porque en términos globales no
hay duda de que el capitalismo nos condujo a este estado de insania mental colectiva idealizada.
La locura. Es que estamos al borde de un precipicio. Frente a eso, el pensamiento teórico de
otra alternativa todavía no está claro. De manera que Chávez hizo un extraordinario esfuerzo…
En algunos momentos de su discurso hacía referencia a Mariátegui, en otros a Gramsci, en
otros a Trotsky. Es sorprendente de dónde sacaba el tiempo para leer, para asimilar, para
elaborar, pero no es verdad que hay una propuesta teórica que nos permita una carta de
navegación para una propuesta postcapitalista, para no llamarla socialista. Y eso ya es un
problema severo. Que no es culpa de Chávez, no es culpa de nadie, sencillamente es un
problema mundial. No hay hoy en el mundo una alternativa postcapitalista clara. Todos los
esfuerzos que se han hecho en el Foro Social Mundial han sido parte de esos intentos de
reconstruir, de recomponer, de plantear, de definir hoy qué entender por una propuesta
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postcapitalista. He ahí un primer problema muy claro: no tener un norte claro. Así que el Plan
de la Patria, que es nuestra carta de navegación, combina propuestas absolutamente
contradictorias porque incorpora propuestas de política participativa y ecosocialista al mismo
tiempo que un modelo industrialista, extractivista, desarrollista, de la misma cosa a la que se
enfrenta el buen vivir cuando señala que el modelo que se nos vendió duró 500 años, cuando el
mundo entero hizo del progreso y del desarrollo una razón de ser de la existencia. De ese
modelo lo único claro es que no es. Lo que no está claro es cuál es el que es. El segundo
problema tiene que ver con el Estado Latinoamericano. Nosotros seguimos hablando de estados
nacionales de modo que Bolivia es un estado nacional, y Argentina, etc. Eso no tiene nada que
ver con el estado nacional europeo. Hasta los términos, las categorías que utilizamos no son…y
eso tiene una gran importancia porque Venezuela, -adicional a lo que eso significa en términos
de Latinoamérica- tiene una especificidad que se la da el petróleo. Se trata de un estado rentista
donde el trabajo no es el valor fundamental para construir la sociedad. Es al contrario. Eso lo
sabe cualquier venezolano, desde los que se han enriquecido a costa de los pobres o de los
pobres que siguen viviendo en la pobreza pero que, desde un buhonero hasta un taxista esperan
una parte del reparto. La economía venezolana es imposible entenderla si no es por el
capitalismo rentista. Y ese es un segundo componente bien importante. No solamente no tenemos
un modelo claro de hacia dónde vamos, sino que tenemos un tipo de economía con una
especificidad que limita terriblemente cualquier intento de transformarla y mucho más de una
propuesta como la del buen vivir que es, en mi opinión particular, la que más se asemeja a una
sociedad humana, porque en esta sociedad no hemos alcanzado la condición humana. Seguimos
viviendo en la pre humanidad. Y en Venezuela tenemos esos dos componentes: la falta de un
proyecto y la existencia de un capitalismo rentista, adicionalmente con los males del estado

110
latinoamericano: el patrimonialismo, el prevendarismo, el clientelismo, la corrupción. Y eso
desde México hasta la Patagonia. Nuestros estados funcionan de esa manera y Venezuela
también y a eso se añade el capitalismo rentista. Eso genera un tejido social que tiene dificultad
para conformarse, para constituirse. Es por eso que me asombro de cómo se ha cambiado en
estos 14 años […] y Chávez en eso fue el actor fundamental, el gran educador, fue una relación
que llega a la devoción, pero que ciertamente -más allá de los dirigentes del partido, del
gobierno, de si son corruptos o no, si lo practican o no, si creen en ello o no, más allá de esa
dirigencia- la gente común se apropió de ese discurso, lo entendió, lo asumió. Yo, que me
recorro el país por razones profesionales, políticas y morales, puedo decir que lo que conocí no
tiene nada que ver con lo hay hoy. Y eso evidentemente muestra la gran potencialidad. Yo
participé en el segundo gobierno de Rafael Caldera. En ese gobierno del llamado chiripero yo
fui director de salud de Caracas, del área metropolita, Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo, Chacao,
Distrito Capital y la Guaira, que todavía no era estado Vargas. En ese momento el discurso que
hacíamos es: Caldera es la posibilidad de un paso al futuro porque permitió la derrota de AD y
Copei. Y luego, cuando aparece Chávez y todo lo que ha representado, volvimos a pensar:
Chávez es, de nuevo, la transición. Alguien podría decir que la transición para volver al pasado.
Lo que sí es cierto es aquí en Venezuela pensar que volvamos a lo que vivimos en el derrumbe de
la cuarta república -para compartir contigo que la primera parte de la cuarta república fue de
avances y logros en términos de lo que vino después del perezjimenismo- es imposible. Se ha
producido, para comenzar, un cambio importante en la redistribución de la renta, más allá de lo
que se haya robado toda la burguesía, sea cierto o medio cierto. Ciertamente en esta revolución
bolivariana ha aparecido una nueva burguesía a imagen y semejanza de la que se construyó en
la cuarta república. Sea más o menos cierto, más allá de los discursos, más allá de esa
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dirigencia que puede ser incapaz, corrupta, mediocre, creo que la gran posibilidad está en el
pueblo que entendió y asumió el discurso de Chávez y pudiéramos estar en un proceso de
transición hacia otro momento.

Luis Ugalde
Hace 14 años se empezó con utopías y esperanzas máximas, con la creencia de que bastaba
tener buena voluntad y querer al pueblo para hacer buena gestión y curar los males del país.
Chávez, con su magia comunicacional, con su audacia verbal y con su condición militar
encarnadora del poder de imposición armada, resultaba para muchos ideal para castigar a los
que traicionaron al pueblo y colmar las esperanzas de éste.
Nadie pone a su familiar enfermo grave en manos de un médico que sea locuaz, prometedor y
compasivo con el enfermo, si no es competente. Pero en política somos muy propensos a creer
en la ilusión de las promesas. Chávez no sólo es promesa, es también ingresos diez veces
superiores en manos del gobierno dispuesto a darlos a sus seguidores incondicionales en un
trueque de dinero y ayudas a cambio de fidelidad política clientelar. En estos años ha
concentrado todos los mecanismos del poder y sometido al Ejecutivo los poderes Legislativo,
Judicial, militar, comunicacional, policial y de propaganda, que en una democracia están
separados y se necesitan desconcentrados.
A medida que se desgastan las promesas, queda en evidencia el desastre de la gestión y se
reducen los dólares disponibles que se creían ilimitados, queda la distorsión de la realidad y el
descaro propagandístico manipulado por el control y la hegemonía comunicacional y la
represión con leyes hechas a la medida de las solicitudes del Ejecutivo o elaboradas por éste.
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Esta segunda etapa, que va avanzada, es la que llamo de “cinismo” por cuanto que ya ni
los dirigentes, ni los seguidores creen en el paraíso prometido, ven que el modelo cubano es
fracaso y esfuerzo inútil y se han topado con su propia improvisación e incompetencia en
diversas áreas; lo que lleva a los de arriba a mayor corrupción millonaria en previsión del
futuro, y a los de abajo a fingir lealtad si a cambio se reciben dádivas. No están exentos de este
cinismo-pragmatismo empresarios y gente de corazón antichavista, pero que “por ahora” ven
buenas oportunidades de enriquecimiento […] Cada vez es más distante el discurso socialista de
la realidad en la que los pobres sobreviven; nacen y crecen nuevos ricos en la medida en que
estén más cerca del poder. Cada vez más se conjugan los verbos en futuro (“haremos”) en todas
las áreas en las que, en el tiempo equivalente a tres gobiernos democráticos, ya se debía haber
hecho […] Lo primero que debe distribuir el Estado es la capacidad productiva para que con
ella todos los venezolanos tengan poder, organización y acceso a los bienes y servicios que
necesitan. Exactamente el camino contrario al que ahora se quiere: instauran una sociedad
estatista donde en educación, economía, comunicación, salud… sólo haya un empresario, el
Estado, pues la empresa privada tiene el pecado original de la ganancia y de la mal explicada
plusvalía. Para que haya sociedad civil autónoma hace falta una economía autónoma y millones
de personas cuya producción y productividad no dependa directamente de un gobierno-Estado
con interés y enfoque de control y dependencia, al estilo cubano-soviético […] Es lamentable el
Estado Comunal en el que hacen una pinza de poder la cúpula del Ejecutivo y las comunas que
dependen de él y se le someten. Ese Estado Comunal implica, por ejemplo la implantación de
Consejos Educativos en la Escuela y Consejos Obreros en las fábricas con la idea de “todo el
poder para los soviets”, es decir, todo el poder para los consejos, con lo que se anula el poder
pedagógico de la dirección académica escolar o la gerencia empresarial. Esto elimina los
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sindicatos autónomos del poder gubernamental central, los municipios y todas las otras formas
de descentralización y autonomía de la sociedad. No olvidemos que la Unión Soviética
nominalmente era República de Consejos, como fachada de la República del Partido Comunista
único, mandado por el vitalicio Secretario único del Partido.
Hay una evidente crisis de legitimidad en la calle. Con la inflación, escasez, inseguridad y mega
corrupción gubernamental cada vez más a la vista, el malestar está en la calle y la dificultad
está en lograr combinar audacia con prudencia, radicalidad con gradualidad. Se puede ser
rápido y radical en el rechazo de lo que hay, pero la construcción es lenta y exige cambios
profundos. La oposición necesita combinar la emotividad e indignación desbordante en el
malestar actual con las vías democráticas para el cambio de régimen y la construcción eficiente
y democrática del futuro. Además hay millones de venezolanos que creyeron en este régimen y
sus promesas que deben ser acogidos para hacer políticas que no terminen en promesas y humo
[…] pero al mismo tiempo mucha gente se siente impotente ante el poder omnímodo y busca
salvadores. El trabajo está en crear equipos y que entre los diversos líderes haya acuerdos para
que no terminen prevaleciendo los personalismos y las ambiciones.
La peor plaga, que además es muy contagiosa, es que la población se crea que somos un
país “inmensamente rico”, por tener mucho petróleo, y que por tanto no es necesario el trabajo
creativo para producir riqueza nacional y riqueza familiar, sino que la tarea del gobierno es
distribuir la riqueza que ya existe. Así Chávez se convirtió en predicador y distribuidor de esta
enfermedad nacional heredada. A cambio sólo pedía incondicionalidad y fe en su visión y amor.
Esta demagogia lleva a despreciar la educación de calidad, el profesionalismo y la eficiencia
productiva, a nombrar incompetentes, siempre que sean incondicionales políticamente. Crea
además la ilusión y el deseo de acceder al consumo abundante de bienes superiores importados
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sin pasar por la producción de los mismos o de los equivalentes, que se transan en el mercado.
Cuesta salir de la ilusión de que en Venezuela se puede dar la revolución del consumo sin la
revolución de la producción, pues ésta está fuera y nuestros dólares son ilimitados para
importarlos […] El petróleo debe convertirse en medio de producción de ciudadanía
responsable, de poder social y de poder económico-productivo, distribuido en toda la población.
Lo que se distribuye en directo no son los bienes de consumo, sino el equipamiento de cada uno
para la capacidad productiva. Con ello se distribuye el poder (no se concentra, ni se desarrolla
la dependencia de indigentes) productivo cada vez más autónomo frente al Estado y al partido o
grupo que tiende a apropiarse del Estado y someter la población. También el hecho productivo,
apalancado inicialmente por los ingresos petroleros, se vuelve cada vez más autónomo y
autosostenido […] Otra plaga es la ilusión mesiánica de que hay acceso a la felicidad por la vía
de creer en el mesías político, fértil en imaginación y promesas, pero anti modelo en la
responsabilidad de gestión pública, eficiente, honesta. Hay que generar más poder-capacidad en
toda la población para que haya menos poder-dominación de un caudillo mesiánico y de una
camarilla única que se apropia del Estado, es decir de las leyes, de las armas, del pensamiento y
de la información- indoctrinación […] Uno de los daños mayores que hemos heredado es que el
mesías no creía en la democracia y sobre todo descalificaba a todos los que no fueran
seguidores y dóciles a él. Sin reconocimiento desde el Estado de la dignidad y razón de los que
opinan de otra manera, no es posible la democracia.

Stalin Pérez Borges
Yo pertenezco al partido (PSUV), a una corriente, como dirigente sindical. Ahorita soy del
Consejo Consultivo de la nueva Central de Trabajadores. Yo me desprendí de Chávez y en
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privado me he burlado del socialismo tropical, socialismo bucal, pero no creo que haya
socialismo. El capitalismo está muy arraigado en Venezuela, pero hay un proceso
revolucionario en marcha. Ha habido cambios importantes dentro de la sociedad. De hecho, el
gobierno ha hecho conquistas sociales y democráticas […] Antes de Gómez, la guerra en este
país se daba por la tierra. Primero por parte de los militares que venían desde la época de
Bolívar, después la Guerra Federal. Después de Gómez, las peleas, la lucha de clases, han sido
por la renta petrolera. Por muchos años Venezuela ha sido el primer país exportador de
petróleo y de allí viene la renta, que no es cualquier renta. Exactamente qué es lo que hizo
Chávez. Una redistribución distinta de la renta petrolera. Y lo hizo es inversiones sociales. Aquí
los pensionados del Seguro Social, después que habían pasado una cantidad de años trabajando
en una empresa pública, les costaba mucho cobrar la pensión a la que tenían derecho. No hablo
de la renta o parte de la renta, porque de hecho les habían descontado mientras trabajaban,
hablo de la pensión, para disfrutar de la cual algunas veces les costaba. Eso cambió con
Chávez. Hoy hay casi dos millones de pensionados, personas que llevan el salario mínimo a sus
casas. Antes tampoco era salario mínimo, era la mitad o menos del salario mínimo. Hoy en día
en una familia, en un país pobre, en una casa debe haber uno o dos viejos que se mantienen, que
por lo menos llevan ese ingreso mensual fijo. Esa es una cuestión muy importante. Yo no digo
que PDVAL resuelva el problema del abastecimiento, de la comida de todos. Estoy convencido
de que no pero, en ese sentido, muchas familias se benefician de lo mucho o poco que pueda
vender PDVAL. En muchos barrios existe el comedor popular que existía cuando los gobiernos
de AD, pero eran escasos. En este sentido yo creo que sí ha habido un cambio. Eso no significa
que sea socialismo. Y en el caso de la matrícula de estudio también. Un cambio muy importante.

116
Hay que ser serio. Eso, por ejemplo, la gente que está con la oposición no lo ve. No miran los
alcances de esos beneficios, que no son cualquier cosa.
En lo de la democracia participativa, yo creo que sí ha habido avances importantes,
democráticos. Chávez, de alguna manera, aunque le acusan de intolerante, aceptó críticas.
Chávez tuvo un proceso de aprendizaje. La constitución es obra de Chávez casi de puño y letra,
menos el preámbulo que dicen que es de Gustavo Pereira. Lo demás, artículo por artículo, si no
lo escribió, lo revisó. Allí, viendo la Constitución, que es lo que rige el país de verdad, aunque tú
podrías observar la relación entre el discurso y la práctica. Ese discurso es muy democrático.
Sin embargo hay que mencionar casos como el del Centro Internacional Miranda, integrado por
intelectuales de Venezuela y del exterior. El instituto se dedicaba a hacer charlas, sobre todo
con ponentes internacionales. Hubo un seminario en el los que intervinieron consideraron que
Chávez tenía el problema de que se metía en todo. Hablaron entonces del hiperliderazgo. A
Chávez eso le pareció una ofensa y una desconsideración y se molestó mucho. Y a Nicolás
Maduro también. Los dos declararon en términos tremendos contra este grupo de intelectuales,
muy ligados por cierto al proceso venezolano. Ahí tuvimos que hacer una campaña declarando
que era cierto lo que decían y que aun si no existiese ese hiperliderazgo no se justificaba la
reacción. Eso provocó que la dirección del Centro Internacional Miranda fuera cambiada. Y
fueron varios incidentes de este tipo, de críticas a Chávez, de observaciones al gobierno y nunca
pasó. Hablando de democracia participativa, Chávez dijo en algún momento –siendo la
Constitución democrática hablando de democracia participativa- que los sindicatos no podían
ser autónomos, no podían ser independientes. Eso fue por el 2007. Y su argumento lo planteó
sobre los escritos de Rosa de Luxemburgo contra Lenin y contra Trotsky. Que los sindicatos
tenían que disciplinarse, que la lucha de los sindicatos no era, en fin… Nosotros dimos una
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repuesta, pero no se pudo. Citamos a Rosa de Luxemburgo, que se equivocó en ese punto y
después ella reconoció. Chávez lo fue olvidando y después modificando su discurso. En el caso
del Centro Internacional Miranda llegó a reconocer, ya cuando comenzó su enfermedad, que él
había cometido el error de haber respondido a los intelectuales. Les dio la razón después, en
público. En el caso de nosotros nunca nos dio la razón públicamente, nunca reconoció, pero
después los discursos fueron distintos.
El chavismo tiene un gran componente militar, desde los oficiales que se alzaron el 4 de
febrero y el 11 de noviembre con Chávez. Muchos de ellos son corporativistas, antisindicales.
Ahora mismo, muchos con conciencia antisindical. Esa es una de las discusiones que hay ahora
en el movimiento obrero. Otra parte del retroceso de lo que se había avanzado con Chávez es
que en algunas empresas del Estado se mantiene eso que tú llamas corpoestado, estado
corporativo o, como uno decía antes, capitalismo de estado. Pero en medio de ese capitalismo
de estado había cosas positivas. No era como antes que la presencia del trabajador en las
empresas, con AD y Copei, se daba a través de lo que le llamaba un director laboral, alguien
que nunca rendía cuentas. Ahora no. Se dieron empresas que ponían a los trabajadores a
dirigir. Pudo haber resultados negativos en algunos casos, como en el de Sidor, donde se formó
una mafia alrededor de los trabajadores que fueron nombrados, incluso en casos en los que los
trabajadores estuvieron de acuerdo y aprobaron su nombramiento, pero en otros casos fue
positivo.
Al principio de Chávez también se desarrollaron algunas iniciativas (de movimientos
sociales). Ahora lo que tiene que surgir son movimientos autónomos. Con Chávez vivo, y fue un
error de Chávez, del gobierno de Chávez, todo se fue corporativizando, institucionalizando.
Todos los movimientos. Incluso el estudiantil que surgió a raíz de cuando le quitaron la

118
concesión a Radio Caracas. Los terminaron institucionalizando, les quitaron su independencia.
Y en el sector campesino también. En el movimiento sindical no tan así, aunque tiene un sector
que sí. Con la Unete lo quisieron hacer pero nunca lo lograron. Nunca perdió su independencia.
Muchos compañeros y yo logramos que se mantuviera. Entonces, lo primero que tiene que surgir
ahora son los movimientos independientes, autónomos, que se incorporen a las cosas
progresivas que hay que hacer en el proceso. La pregunta sería: ¿creemos nosotros que el
gobierno va alentar y les va a dar cabida? No sé. Lo que observo es que hay mucha
preocupación, pero está muy nuevo para hacer una caracterización ya cerrada. Decirte que los
va a permitir o no los va permitir, no sé. Yo creo que hay que esperar. Estamos preocupados
porque hasta el momento no los ha permitido. Las primeras señales son que nos lo va permitir,
pero no es una caracterización cerrada, pudiese cambiar.

María Corina Machado
Efectivamente, yo creo que nuestro país ha cambiado en estos años en muchas cosas, algunas
alarmantes. Voy a comenzar con lo negativo para cerrar con lo bueno. Yo pienso que las causas
de ese agotamiento del sistema previo fue la forma progresiva como se incrementó el populismo
-como mecanismo no solo de campaña política sino de gestión pública-, el clientelismo, la
corrupción, y el rentismo desde luego. Fue el momento en el que Venezuela vivió una crisis de
ingreso petrolero y por eso, entre otras cosas, se da ese quiebre, porque el modelo ya no daba,
desde la perspectiva rentista quiero decir, y el centralismo. Yo creo que el año 89 y el ejercicio
de descentralización son unas de las cosas más importantes que nos han ocurrido en las últimas
décadas desde la perspectiva política en Venezuela. Ahora ¿qué ocurrió? Lejos de corregir estos
males, el modelo los acentuó y es evidente que había una vocación de control del poder desde el
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primer día, más o menos explícita o más o menos consciente en sus miembros, no quiero
generalizar, pero sí, evidentemente, en una parte muy importante de sus promotores. Desde el
primer día, cómo empiezan a ponerse en práctica algunas acciones no solamente de orden
jurídico institucional, pero en el propio discurso político, fomentando la división y la
confrontación sobre la base de todos los criterios imaginables, no solamente lo típico económico
de la lucha de clases sino también en las diferencias religiosas, regionales, generacionales, algo
verdaderamente peligroso pero obviamente intencional y bien pensado de parte de quien lo
diseñó en un primer momento y de quien lo impulsó en sus diferentes etapas. Entonces yo te
diría que una de las cosas que promovió fue generar la mayor dependencia posible de toda la
sociedad en el Estado, de todos los sectores, empezando obviamente por los sectores políticos,
descabezando o minimizando los partidos como organizaciones intermedias, y luego con los
sectores económicos. A mí me pasó mucho que recorriendo el país, como siempre hago, la gente
habla. Se me acerca un productor un campesino: María Corina, mi finquita era la más
productiva, era la que estaba mejor preparada, con más inversión, entonces ¿por qué me la
expropiaron? Le contesto: precisamente por eso, porque todo espacio que represente autonomía
había que liquidarlo. Y en el plano social, lograr que el mayor número de ciudadanos
dependiera del Estado, y que dependieran además de una forma humillante, porque no es ni
siquiera el empleo público, sino la dádiva, la transferencia directa, absolutamente condicionada
no ya solamente a la militancia política sino a la renuncia a tu libertad, a tu libertad de
pensamiento y a tus ideales y convicciones. Eso me parece dramático porque lo que se ha
tratado de destruir es esa relación esfuerzo-logro, esencial en una sociedad que quiere avanzar
y que quiere progresar. Eso en términos negativos, además de lo que señalé antes respecto de la
división y de la confrontación en todos los planos que, además, ha generado una sociedad
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profundamente violenta, porque los incentivos a la violencia son obvios, no solamente más de
diez millones de armas ilegales en la calle, 18.000 bandas criminales, tráfico de drogas
generalizado -con todos los males que eso va trayendo para destruir y atacar a la familia- y la
impunidad, por encima del 97%. Ese es el incentivo directo a la violencia, intencional desde
luego. En lo positivo, yo siento que ha surgido, como en todo momento crítico para una sociedad
en una encrucijada histórica, ha surgido una genuina conciencia y reflexión sobre lo que somos
y lo que queremos ser como sociedad, como república, como bien dices. Entonces has visto unas
demostraciones sin precedentes en América Latina de movilización política consciente, más o
menos espontánea en algunos momentos, más dirigida en otros, pero en todo caso muy clara de
lo que está en juego. Yo presiento que si de algo debemos sentirnos orgullosos es de que ha
quedado claro que, a pesar de todas las fallas, males e insatisfacciones que pudo generar la
democracia en su sistema, quienes crecimos en democracia e incluso quienes crecieron en esta
neo dictadura, como yo la llamo, tenemos un ADN democrático muy marcado, muy claro, que es
lo que nos ha hecho resistir y que va a hacer que todo esto termine de salir, porque
evidentemente hemos demostrado su ilegitimidad, no solo de origen sino también de su forma de
actuar.
Este es un régimen que está concentrando toda la propiedad y las decisiones en un grupo
cada vez más reducido de personas, con un comportamiento muy preocupante porque, para mí,
se asemeja cada día más no a Cuba sino a Rusia, donde tenemos una mafia state. Esto no es la
operación de un sistema capitalista, con el cual, incluso, podamos tener todos nuestras
diferencias. Quiero hacer la diferencia para describirte lo que yo creo que va a ocurrir en
Venezuela. En la esencia de un régimen liberal hay competencia, hay reglas de juego claras, hay
estado de derecho, hay independencia de poderes a los efectos de hacer respetar los
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compromisos. Esto no es lo que existe en Venezuela hoy en día. Lo que hay dramáticamente se
asemeja cada día más a la operación de la mafias que han ido ocupando instituciones y donde
las reglas no son las establecidas explícitamente, transparentemente, en un contrato como es la
Constitución o como son las leyes de la República. Por eso se ha convertido en lo que está
pasando. La anarquía y la corrupción han ido permeando todo los planos, no solo de la
institucionalidad sino de la vida misma en Venezuela, y eso es algo enormemente peligroso […]
Si tú me dices una palabra que resuma lo que este gobierno y este modelo nos ha hecho a los
venezolanos, yo te digo: nos ha humillado. Cuando tú ves una mujer tiene que hacer cinco horas
de cola para comprar harina y leche, pero además solo puede comprar un paquete, y que en el
Táchira te ponen un chip para la compra de gasolina, o te marcan un número en el brazo como
si fueras un animal, o a un oficial venezolano al que le da órdenes un oficial cubano. Aquí nos
han venido humillando uno tras otro tras otro a cada uno de nosotros. ¿Que hay algunos que
están haciendo muy buenos negocios? Allá ellos con su conciencia, pero más temprano que
tarde, como ocurrió en el 2002, que más allá del desastre, de los puntos de vista de las
decisiones políticas del liderazgo político de abril de ese momento, eso fue una insurrección
civil, pero además hermosísima. Yo estuve en esa marcha a Miraflores y estuve orgullosísima de
haber estado allí y yo reivindico todo lo que fueron las movilizaciones en ese día. ¿Que si estoy
de acuerdo con lo que hizo el liderazgo? Evidentemente no, pero por eso te digo que esto no es
un problema de la gente, aquí estamos enfrentando un problema de liderazgo político, de no
entender claramente cuál es el modelo y qué requiere para enfrentarlo, porque un sistema neo
dictatorial no lo puedes enfrentar solamente en los términos institucionales y con las reglas de
juego que ellos ponen. Tú tienes que meterle la presión de la gente, que es lo único que
realmente tenemos nosotros: el poder de la gente.
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Rafael Uzcátegui
Pareciera que hay como un enfrentamiento entre dos relatos. Yo me mato cada vez que escucho
de parte de los opositores eso de que éramos felices y no lo sabíamos, lo cual es un poco
mitificar un pasado que no fue mítico, y el inverso del otro relato de que tenemos patria, de que
hoy somos un país soberano. Yo pienso que hay que discutir mucho cómo se han dado las luchas
del pueblo venezolano y cuál es el devenir histórico y cuáles han sido las diferentes conquistas y
las bondades y contradicciones de los diversos gobiernos, que las han tenido, incluyendo éste.
Quizás eso nos permitiría tener un área discursiva común para poder sentarse. Yo creo que es
muy importante ahora, es complicado. Ahora es imposible volver al punto de los noventa que
era un punto interesante porque era toda la época de la crisis económica, luego la crisis social
del caracazo, el desplome del modelo de la alternancia del puntofijismo y que parecía que había
la irrupción de nuevos factores sociales que iban a plantear nuevas ideas políticas y quizás
también la superación de la cultura política vinculada a la renta petrolera, pero eso
lamentablemente no ha sido así. Chávez, por supuesto que tenía sus virtudes propias,
específicas, como político, como hombre político, pero él fue también, en mi valorización, la
revitalización de toda una cultura política venezolana. El supo darle de nuevo un impulso al
movimiento fundacional Simón Bolívar y al tema de la cultura petrolera, de la riqueza mágica,
de la riqueza petrolera, todas esas cosas que nos han ido modelando como país. Ahora tenemos
diez años de una discusión que no se ha dado en ningún lado. No hay espacios de interlocución.
Muchas de las agendas de discusiones que quedaron a medias en la década de los noventa se
perdieron entre gente que trabajó mucho tiempo en reivindicaciones puntuales, como el
movimiento de mujeres o el movimiento ecologista, que hoy no se pueden sentar juntos porque

123
están en lados opuestos de la polarización, y eso ha hecho que como sociedad hayamos
retrocedido muchísimo en el tipo de demandas compartidas que tenemos.
Creo que, en general, ha habido mucha mezquindad política e intelectual dentro de los
sectores opositores. Valoro el arrojo político que han tenido líderes como Capriles o como
Henry Falcón que han hecho alguna diferencia, pero en general la masa crítica opositora en
una masa crítica conservadora y si pudieran y tuvieran la oportunidad volverían a la
Constitución del 61 de un solo plumazo. Creo que eso es parte de la tragedia: no entender en
qué país hemos estado, cuál es el problema que aquí seguimos teniendo. Chávez representó
tendencias y tensiones que ya existían en la sociedad venezolana. Chávez no las inventó. Y esas
contradicciones y tendencias van a seguir estando si no se resuelven de alguna manera. Lo que
me parece preocupante es que el proyecto opositor sigue estando basado en un país gran
exportador de recursos energéticos (y) creo que el chavismo ha elevado exponencialmente el
sectarismo político y los fantasmas propios de la ideología de izquierda, como la de acusar de
contrarrevolucionario a cualquiera que tenga un nivel de disentimiento. El madurismo penaliza
no solo la disidencia de los opositores sino también la opinión disidente dentro de sus filas. Y
eso le ha permitido que las buenas ideas que algunos sectores han intentado implementar no
caminen, porque ha habido buenas intenciones en los grupos bolivarianos y muchas de esas
cosas no han tenido el nivel de desarrollo esperado por el nivel de sectarismo y de exclusión
mutua que hay ahí. Es eso, hay esa necesidad de entender la diversidad como un valor y no
como una amenaza.
Yo creo contigo que esta es una polarización construida a cuatro manos. Y que además
la polarización se debe a odios mellizares por su forma similar de hacer política en los dos
sectores. Creo que sí, la polarización permite que sean dos cúpulas, para llamarlas de alguna
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manera, las que pueden capitalizar la vida política del país y que no permitan el surgimiento de
diferentes opciones que desborden los canales institucionales de los partidos políticos y que,
independientemente de que sea el gobierno el que esté hablando permanentemente de
repolarizar, ha sido una estrategia que le ha dado cierto beneficio a los viejos políticos para
mantenerse dentro del discurso opositor. Cuando uno comienza a hacer comparaciones de lo
que sucede en Venezuela con cosas similares como las que están pasando en Bolivia, en
Ecuador, en otros países, uno percibe en estos países que hay un tercer sector, pero una
oposición de izquierda, una oposición diferente al gobierno de Evo Morales o de Rafael Correa.
Eso no se ha dado acá no solamente por la polarización sino porque el venezolano hace política
en función de la renta petrolera, una política mágica también. En verdad, la gente creía la frase
de Chávez de que yo quiero que Chávez se vaya y Chávez se va a ir mañana. Y eso depende de
que siempre hemos creído que tenemos una riqueza que esa ahí, en el subsuelo, algo mágico que
lo sacamos y somos millonarios sin esfuerzo.
Maduro está absolutamente consciente del problemas de convocatoria que tiene, y es por
eso que ellos no están muy seguros -como Chávez sí lo hacía y tenía la capacidad de hacerlo- de
hacer permanentemente esa medición de calle. La oposición tiene ahora mismo ese problema,
pero por otras razones. Entonces, lo que quiero decir es que dentro del chavismo popular había
como una relación especial con el presidente, que es una relación que todavía muchos sectores
opositores no han entendido, porque era una relación de sintonía, de carisma, sí, pero no era de
sumisión completa como alguna gente lo plantea […] Sí creo que hubo la intención de montar
un proyecto autoritario, de características totalitario, pero creo que hubo mucha resistencia de
la gente, que es una resistencia que habría que saber medir y que es muy subjetiva incluso,
porque sí, la gente se inscribía en la Misión Vivienda, la gente marchaba cuando tenía que
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marchar, pero cuando ya recibía la gratificación dejaba de asistir, dejaba de ir a las reuniones
de los consejos comunales. Es decir que el proyecto como se quería promocionar desde las
bases nunca se logró porque la gente no llegaba a fanatizarse al grado que se deseaba.
Yo sería partidario de pensar, te hablo a nivel muy personal, de que sería posible un
proceso de transición negociada en base al respeto de la oposición a lo que está expresado en la
Constitución, un texto que significa un acuerdo social muy importante en función de demandas
positivas en la sociedad venezolana. La oposición la atacó durante mucho tiempo y ahora
tímidamente la defiende y ya el chavismo casi no habla de ella. Yo sí estaría de acuerdo, hasta
que tengamos un nuevo pacto social, de trabajar en función de los acuerdos que están allí en la
Constitución del 99. Creo que fue un logro haber puesto la necesidad de la inclusión en el centro
del debate político, igual que la necesidad de la participación, y todo esto independientemente
de cómo se materialice en lo político. Creo que por lo menos Capriles está consciente de que no
puede dejar afuera la atención a la pobreza, a la participación, y creo que esas son herencias
del proceso bolivariano.

Luis Pellicer
Te lo digo con Tusídedes y con Manuel Briceño Guerrero: Hay hombres que empalman su
corazón con el corazón colectivo y las circunstancias históricas para lograr grandes hazañas y
grandes hechos. Si esos hombres siguen vivos en la memoria del colectivo, en el corazón del
colectivo, serán capaces de seguir… Lo que llamamos aquí corazón es la afectividad y el
raciocinio. Eso fue Bolívar, y eso debe ser Chávez para nosotros […] No estoy tan de acuerdo
con que son los movimientos sociales los que traen a Chávez al poder. Esos movimientos
colaboran con el empoderamiento de Chávez y con el surgimiento de ese nuevo movimiento, el
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MVR, y otros, pero ni aquí había suficiente organización social ni suficientes grupos
organizados como para hacer eso. Los había pero no en la proporción para que digamos que
esos fueron los movimientos que llevaron a Chávez al poder. Creo que el fenómeno de Chávez es
muy diferente a una cosa de movimientos sociales que logran tomar el poder a través de un líder
y un sistema. Creo que se trata más bien de un movimiento popular, en términos de un pueblo
conectado con ese líder. Es decir, aquí lo que había y lo que sigue existiendo es la conexión
entre el líder y un pueblo y una masa […] Una aspiración social posiblemente, y seguramente
diría yo, ciega, que además no es nueva, una aspiración que tiene más de 200 años que llega al
poder sobre todo a través del liderazgo de un líder.
Aquí yo creo que lo que ha pasado es que el partido no se ha ocupado de las labores que
debe cumplir un partido. Y la primera de las labores que debe ejercer un partido es la
conciencia de esas masas, que si tú las sigues dejando en una condición amorfa, sin ideología,
con toda y la conciencia social e histórica que tiene el pueblo venezolano hoy, después de 14
años, creo que todavía hace falta mucha formación, no solamente del pueblo sino también de los
dirigentes […] El PSUV o el MVR en su momento fueron partidos que fueron creados para el
cambio social, para la revolución. Yo creo que si hay una falla en el partido nuevo no es
ideologizar, en términos marxistas de crear falsa conciencia, sino en crear conciencia social de
la realidad. Y eso no es únicamente que la gente se lea el Manifiesto Comunista ni nada de eso,
sino que esté consciente de los problemas. Por ejemplo, el espíritu de las comunas, de los
consejos comunales. Es decir, es el partido el que tiene que estar en las comunidades haciendo
ese trabajo ideológico, que no es la misma cosa sino que la ideologización para crear la
conciencia social de que hay una lucha, un reclamo, de que hay una corresponsabilidad y que
esa corresponsabilidad no quiere decir que la gente de la misma comunidad tiene que ponerse a
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hacer el trabajo, de acomodar las cloacas, etc. sino que tienen que tener conciencia de que para
que la quebrada esté limpia tienen que mantenerla limpia […] Hay una cosa que es muy grave,
que es o la vergüenza o el miedo a ideologizar a la población. Y eso empieza con la educación.
Decirles: nosotros estamos en este proyecto y este es el proyecto y yo cambio la historia escrita
al proyecto. ¿Cómo? Sin decir mentiras. No tengo por qué decir mentiras para eso. Tú no me
vas a decir que la encomienda era una manera de que los señores encomenderos protegieran a
los indígenas y les dieran comida, vestido, la religión y el lenguaje a cambio de su trabajo. No.
Tú tienes que decirme que hay explotación. Eso es descolonizar la memoria y descolonizar la
cultura. […] Es más importante la revolución cultural que el que le entregues una canaimita
(una computadora) a la gente. Tú entregas una canaimita a los niños pero si en esa canaimita
no hay contenidos que le den cuenta de la realidad que ha vivido el país, de nada vale.
Estamos en un sistema capitalista. Entonces, yo me manejo con la fórmula capitalista en
el mundo global haciendo unas excepciones que tienen que ver con los países hermanos como lo
hizo Chávez y que han redundado en el éxito de la política exterior venezolana durante los14
años y que ha sido uno de los mayores éxitos. Hay cosas que hay que ponderar en el asunto.
¿Para quién gobierna y como redistribuye la riqueza? Porque el problema es que sabiendo o no
de economía uno dice: durante 40 años se repartió la renta petrolera; entonces ¿seguimos en
una Venezuela rentista? El punto es cómo se distribuye esa renta. ¿Se distribuye para los
grandes capitalistas que quiebran las empresas y el Estado tiene que asumir la deuda privada
como deuda pública? Eso creo que es una de las mayores estafas que ha hecho el sistema
durante los 40 años de la democracia representativa.
Yo creo que se han hecho ensayos, pero que no han pasado de ser ensayos. Y siempre fue
una línea del propio Chávez. ¿Cómo es que nosotros éramos un país productor de ganado, de
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café, de caraotas-porque hasta caraotas parece que estamos importando ahora-, y por qué no
podemos volver a eso? Entonces, los ensayos que se han hecho son ensayos que tienen que ver
con empresas mixtas o con empresas sociales. Y allí están esos ensayos. Yo creo que este es un
momento bueno para revisar lo que está pasando con esos ensayos, si es por ahí que debemos ir
o si debemos pensar en otras alternativas […] ¿Cómo hacemos para que esto no siga pasando y
qué es lo que tenemos que hacer? No es que te lo diga yo. Puedes escuchar a Chávez en las
últimas alocuciones y sobre todo en esa que se conoce como El Golpe de timón. Es clarísimo.
Chávez, sin ningún tapujo, sin ninguna mentira, está diciendo: miren compañeros, esto no puede
mantener así; o buscamos nuevas fuentes de producción y de ingreso o este modelo es inviable.
No lo digo yo. Lo dijo Chávez […] El pueblo está seguro de que tiene el poder. Y cambió desde
el 89. En el 89 el pueblo salió y le dijo no al paquetazo. Sabía que si salía tenía poder suficiente
para tumbar gobiernos, para cambiar la política. Ahora el pueblo después de 14 años no solo
está consciente, y no va a salir así no más sino que va a salir con mayor organización, porque
salió en el 2002. No fue cualquier cosa lo que ocurrió en el 2002 y salió más organizado, con
mejores conexiones con sectores de poder, con los militares, etc.- .Y en esta circunstancia el
pueblo va a salir con mayor conciencia política y social, con mejor percepción de lo que está
pasando, independientemente de que sepa o no que están bajando los precios del petróleo, que
las variables económicas, etc. Entonces se van a sentar a discutir y preguntar por qué no está
llegando. Uno de los cambios radicales en todo esto es que tú no le puedes decir al pueblo que
se está yendo para los bolsillos de los ricos de este país. No, no es que está yendo para los ricos,
sino que ahora ya no alcanza.
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Margarita López Maya
Yo creo que la contribución del chavismo en lo que está pasando en América Latina ha sido muy
importante. Yo creo que Chávez fue el primero que puso la agenda de los pobres sobre la mesa
en lugar principal y dijo: si no hacemos igualdad, aquí no hay democracia y no hay nada.
Cuando él lo dijo en los años 98 y 99 eso era absolutamente contracorriente en América Latina
y ahora es absolutamente de consenso, de derecha y de izquierda, Santos repartiendo tierras en
Colombia, Lula y Roussef pasando los pobres a ser clase media en Brasil, Chávez con su
discurso súper radical y todos de alguna manera. Aquí no está pasando lo que está pasando en
Europa. Aquí la idea es: hay que distribuir, porque la sociedad latinoamericana es
profundamente desigual, profundamente racista, profundamente segregacionista en lo social,
marcada por la injusticia. Por eso es que no ha habido democracia. Es un poco la lógica que ha
marcado el destino de América en el siglo XXI y el legado de Chávez allí es importante. Ese fue
un legado importante y él hizo el esfuerzo para que, además, se diese un diálogo entre estos
países que no se hablaban. Hoy la relación que hay entre los gobiernos es muy diferente a la que
había antes, incluso porque hay una camada de dirigentes que se han mantenido mucho rato en
el poder. Se abrieron vasos comunicantes en esas naciones que pueden ir a otra cosa y el tema
de la inclusión se volvió un tema importante de México para abajo. Cómo va a incidir eso en el
planeta no lo sé porque venimos de un boom de materias primas en toda América Latina y eso
está llegando a su fin. Claro, es más grave para Venezuela porque su materia prima es el
petróleo. Cuando venga el tiempo de las vacas flacas no sé si esto va a retroceder.
Yo tuve la impresión cuando Chávez ganó que había la posibilidad de ir hacia una nueva etapa.
Estábamos arrastrando desde hacía 20 años una crisis estructural por el agotamiento de un
modelo, de un proyecto socio político que había dado lo que había podido dar -país
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industrialista, democracia representativa, etc. Ante la incapacidad de inventarse una cosa para
seguir después de la nacionalización petrolera, pensábamos que había que ir a otro proyecto,
buscar un proyecto económico y político para una sociedad ya más compleja, más moderna.
Cuando Chávez apareció fue el proyecto de la democracia participativa que era una demanda
de la sociedad, porque a través de la reforma política se va a entrar a la reforma económica. Ya
se habían rechazado políticas neoliberales, pero no se había encontrado cuál era el modelo
alternativo. Pero en la medida en que se avanzó en estos 14 años eso se desdibujó
completamente. Y nosotros estamos viviendo la continuación de la misma crisis, pero, por
supuesto, ya no con 20 años sino ahora con 35 años, y esta crisis está llegando a unos niveles
gigantescos: en la exacerbación del rentismo, en la falta de productividad, en la anomia de la
sociedad, en el retroceso de la modernidad del venezolano. Nosotros nos despertamos, nos
volteamos y resulta que no logramos resolver esa crisis y ahora está peor. En términos
económicos está peor, en términos sociales hay una descomposición brutal porque al no resolver
la crisis económica la estructura que teníamos se ha ido desmoronando. Puede ser que hoy haya
más empleo formal pero ¿cuál es la calidad de ese empleo en relación a los 80 y los 90? Son
empleados del Estado, son funcionarios públicos, aparte de que sigue habiendo como 45% de
empleo informal. Yo diría que en eso no es original el chavismo. Lo original fue que intentó salir
de esa crisis y no pudo. Lo buscó por otros medios y fue por eso que yo lo apoyé. La idea era: si
tú rompes el monopolio de estos dos partidos y acceden nuevos actores al poder, acceden nuevas
ideas, nuevas iniciativas, hay una energía social con la democracia participativa donde la gente
comienza a moverse, a movilizarse, e incluso todas esas modalidades participativas que se
hicieron en los barrios, bueno, es posible solucionar los problemas. Se habría adelantado en la
solución de muchos problemas, y de hecho algunas cosas sí se han resuelto, en los barrios por
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ejemplo. Pero cuando Chávez se voltea y dice: no, ahora vamos para el socialismo y esto ahora
es unas comunas y un territorio y un Estado paralelo, y anda gastando los reales en dos estados
-uno que está tratando de destruir y otro que está tratando de surgir-, pero además con una
nómina gigantesca, todo montado sobre el ingreso fiscal petrolero. El modelo productivo nunca
se supo cuál era […] La originalidad es que maduró la idea de la participación, ahora
irreversible. La gente siente que hay ese derecho y siente que con los partidos no basta para que
haya democracia, y que además de esos partidos tiene que haber otra cosa, otros canales para
comunicarse con el poder y que esos canales pasan por sujetos colectivos, además del
ciudadano y del derecho al voto. Y que la gente puede resolver sus problemas organizándose y
cogestionando con el Estado. Puso la idea de la democracia participativa sobre la mesa. El
primer gabinete de Chávez era como un laboratorio. Tú entrabas y vibraba. Ahora se ha vuelta
puramente gobiernero.
En Venezuela, de verdad, yo sí pienso que somos muchísimo más gringos que buena
parte de América Latina. Acuérdate que nosotros tenemos un siglo de petróleo y eso marcó en
nosotros el american way of live. La democracia representativa nuestra está muy marcada por
lo que fue la democracia norteamericana, la Alianza para el Progreso de los sesenta, pero antes
de eso también. Durante la Guerra Mundial nosotros fuimos grandes aliados petroleros de los
Estados Unidos y eso significó una relación con las élites. Allí hay demasiadas cosas. El
consumismo venezolano es muy gringo. Y tú ves que las élites chavistas de hoy hacen lo mismo.
No hay sino que ver esas cosas que han estado saliendo de los bolichicos de Miami, etc. Ellos lo
que quieren es estar allá. Les gustan los aviones gringos y los yates.
Lo peor de esto ha sido la impunidad, la destrucción de las instituciones liberales
básicas para la legitimidad de la democracia, la autonomía, la independencia de los poderes
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públicos, esta cosa del desprecio hacia lo institucional, de que la ley no importa. Antes se hacían
las cosas con pena. Tú utilizabas los recursos públicos, pero sabías que eso era un delito.
Comprabas a los jueces, llamaba la Tribu de Morales Bello a los jueces, pero sabían que eso
era un delito. Pero ahora con la idea de democracia burguesa, eso no importa. Y esta cosa de la
violencia en la Asamblea Nacional, que le rompan la nariz a una diputada y la tiren al piso
como hicieron con María Corina Machado y que no solo no se disculpen sino que digan, como
Iris Valera, que se lo tenía merecido. El desprecio a la institucionalidad, a las instituciones
liberales básicas para convivir en democracia, eso es para mí lo peor, porque ¿cómo vuelves a
construir a partir de eso?
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